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Preface
I  was travelling many miles, knowing I ’d  get here..
Writing a dissertation is not a daily activity for many. For some it is a fulfilment of a long 
cherished dream. And for me, well, it just seems as something that just happened. 
Coincidence, a very interesting subject and a bad labour market for environmental scientists, 
made this ‘choice’ a lot easier. Sadly, after five years in which everything seemed to go as 
planned, a difficult final period dawned. A period of nearly two years in which all that could 
go wrong (scientifically), went wrong. Murphy’s Law in optima forma... However, as you 
should not judge a period on the final phase alone you shouldn't say too many words of the 
last two years. Therefore, if  you asked me whether I would do it all over again, I would 
definitely answer yes!
Surely, the cliché obliges me to say that a dissertation is not something you write 
alone. Some clichés, however, have a large amount of truth in them. Indeed, I too have many 
people to thank. First and foremost, I need to thank my supervisor Rob for his guidance, 
ideas, critical view and also his perseverance over the last two years. Rob, let’s just say we 
did it!
Furthermore, I want to thank my GaP colleagues. A couple of names I cannot leave 
unmentioned, because you provided me with many relaxing (coffee) breaks from the 
otherwise not always diverse activities of a PhD student. They are, in a more or less 
chronological order Raffael, Wouter, Frank, Robert, Peter and Ary (I really enjoyed Naples 
with you guys), Annette, Yvonne and Ilona. Jasper, Huub and Bart, thank you for making the 
minutes during my two simulations. I sincerely hope you will all have the same satisfaction 
with your PhD research as I had during mine.
In this respect, I want to express my enormous gratitude to three of my former 
colleagues in particular. The first one is for Margo. Thank you for your help. Seriously, I 
cannot express enough how your comments helped me in the final phase of this thesis. The 
second special thank you goes to my friend Cor. Unfortunately, we did not finish the ride 
together, but that did not prevent us from going on a wonderful conference visit to Antwerp 
that will long be remembered from my part. My final special thanks go to Ron Wunderink
V
without whom I could not have had the successful GDR sessions.
This leads to a great thank you to all the experts who were willing to participate in 
these sessions and whose names are found in the appendices. There is one person who was of 
a great support to me, not only because he participated in one of the two GDR sessions, but 
also because he was kind enough to give me the opportunity to conduct the final part of my 
research at TNO, Nils Rosmuller. Of course, I would like to thank all the people at the 
Industrial Safety department at TNO for their time, but I would like to mention Mark Spruijt, 
Hans Boot, Peter Hochs and Raul Jimenez Zambrano separately for supporting my 
simulations and the cost-effectiveness model.
Speaking of these simulations, a great thank you goes to all the people in Roosendaal 
and Dordrecht for their cooperation. Especially, Steven Adriaanse and Wiel Verhaegh at 
Roosendaal and Ronald Kooman and Gerdien Muilman at Dordrecht, without whom I could 
not have gained all the insights I needed for successful simulations. Also, I would like to 
thank Shahid Suddle for our regular cooperation, publications and discussion.
Furthermore, there are two groups of colleagues who I want to thank. First, I would 
like to thank all of my former and present colleagues at the PvdA Utrecht for their 
understanding whenever I was absent during campaign activities or meetings with the same 
excuse: my dissertation. I promise, from now on, I will do my best in finding a more original 
excuse. Also, I want to thank my colleagues at ARCADIS for showing interest in the progress 
of this book and their understanding. Most of all, I want to thank Jorrit Nieuwenhuis for 
showing me that a consultant has the same freedom as a PhD student as long as he grasps the 
opportunity.
And then there is a special group of people who I perhaps do not need, but want to 
thank with all my heart, as they are my friends (among whom there is an unusual high number 
of five other PhD students). I cannot help but feel blessed with all the times we have already 
shared together. Whether it is going to ‘illustrious’ British cities, playing Friday evening 
indoor football with our very successful team with a rather dubious name, topshit evenings, 
participating in pop quizzes (did you find the four references to song lyrics?), visiting some of 
you abroad, or just hanging out at home having midnight sessions playing risk (what’s in a 
name). Even if I only see some of you not more than twice a year, when you are there the fun 
is never ending and each moment is a warm one. This is more than I could wish for.
I believe that in my master thesis, I already thanked my parents in the same way, but 
my thoughts are still the same now as they were then. You always taught me to put the bar 
high when it comes to setting your goals as you can always put the bar down a bit. I have 
always wondered what you would do or where you would be if you had been given the same 
opportunities that you gave me. Not only did you encourage me to go the gymnasium and pull 
through a first year of studying Dutch law, but even more, you provided me with the solid 
base that is needed to jump over those high bars or to remain a stable personality even in 
challenging times and situations. That, to me, is priceless and I cannot thank you enough for 
it. Oh, and your love as well of course.
And then there is one stunning person left to thank. Manon. What is the superlative for 
wonderful, thankful and beautiful if  the word ‘most’ does not seem to be sufficient? It does 
not matter to me where we are, as long as you are there. Let’s grow old together: you, me and 
at least a couple of goats, cats, a boxer and a French bulldog. I! Love! You! Forever!
Vincent van der Vlies 
August 2011
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Chapter 1: 
Rail transport, risks and institutions
1.1 Introduction
Every day, citizens face risks related to traffic, health, food, the environment and/or industry. 
These risks are either voluntary or, to a greater or lesser degree, involuntary by nature. 
Voluntary risks are, for example, those related to traffic or smoking: we accept risks to our 
health when we take part in traffic (we risk accidents with other traffic) or when we smoke 
(we risk lung cancer). Examples of involuntary risks are those posed by air pollution or 
nuclear radiation.
In the Netherlands, the debate on these involuntary risks has intensified since the 
1980s. Following the Bijlmer disaster in Amsterdam in 1992 and the SE Fireworks disaster in 
the city of Enschede in 2000, for example, society has become more aware of the risks 
involved in the production, storage and transport of hazardous materials.
This awareness has led to renewed attention by the Dutch government for the 
institutionalisation of risk management approaches in order to prevent disasters and improve 
the safety of people in areas adjacent to risky activities. This is done with what is known in 
the Netherlands as external safety policy (externe veiligheidsbeleid). External safety policy 
aims to control the risks related to the production, storage and use of hazardous materials (e.g. 
fireworks, liquefied petroleum gas, ammunition), the transport of hazardous materials by 
road, rail or water and through pipelines, and the use of airports (Ministerie van VROM, 
2006a).
The risks related to rail transport of hazardous materials received particular public 
attention after several near misses with freight trains in the cities of Delfzijl (2000), 
Amersfoort (2002), Tilburg (2007) and Barendrecht (2011). This growing Dutch awareness is 
obviously not unique; other disasters involving hazardous materials have occurred 
internationally in recent years. The examples in figures 1 to 3 are just two examples from an
1
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international number of accidents concerning the transport of hazardous materials by rail.
Figure 1: The city of Viareggio, Italy, after thè 2009 disaster
Figures 2 and 3: The city of Ryongchon, North Korea, before and after a disaster
The city of Viareggio experienced a so-called vapour cloud explosion after a derailment 
discharged liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from a tank wagon in June 2009. This resulted in 
27 casualties. What happened in the city of Ryongchon, North Korea, remains unclear as the 
country did not communicate openly about the accident. What is known is that there was an 
explosion involving hazardous materials in April 2004 resulting in (probably) over 50 
casualties. Figure 2 shows the situation before the accident and figure 3 after the accident.
More than in other major European countries, rail transport of hazardous materials in 
the Netherlands is organised right through city centres, creating a strong link between rail 
transport, urban planning and the (re)development of real estate near railways (de Wilde, 
2006)1. This is reflected in how external safety risks are managed. For example, the
1 De Wilde does not give a limitative set of cities, but gives examples from other major European cities and their 
respective railway stations.
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Netherlands has adopted generic norms for external safety, which are based on transport 
parameters as well as on parameters of people residing in urban areas. However, specifying 
generic norms aimed at assessing (changes in) spatial situations does not automatically imply 
that existing violations of these norms in the real world have been solved or will be avoided in 
the future. Much depends on the implementation process of such a norm-based policy. The 
above-mentioned incidents suggest that real-world decision making in transport and urban 
development is struggling with this implementation. And this struggle appears to be becoming 
more intense as a result of the increasing use of the Dutch railway network and urban 
accessibility policies in favour of intensified use of scarce areas for living and working 
adjacent to railway stations. Evidence for this intensified struggle can initially be seen in the 
publishing of a Dutch report in 2003 by the Dutch National Advisory Boards on Transport 
and Spatial Planning on the (problems with the) integration of external safety policy, transport 
policy and urban and regional planning (Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat & VROMraad, 
2003). This report is a rather unique document in the domain of spatial planning: in the 
previous decades, external safety received very little attention in spatial policy documents at 
different levels of government. Secondly, rail risk maps were produced in 2001 (DGG, 2001) 
and 2005 (AVIV & Royal Haskoning, 2005) showing that several urban areas alongside 
railway lines have overly high risk levels. This could block urban development in various 
sites along the railway network. Thirdly, very recently (2010) a new Dutch journal was 
launched focusing on the relationship between (external) risk management and spatial and 
regional planning (title in Dutch ‘Ruimtelijke Veiligheid en Risciobeleid’). Contributions to 
this journal indicate that the professional debate is still very vivid and that the field of 
rsearchers and professional planners is still searching for effective approaches (see also 
Witteveen & Bos, 2011). Finally, in the past decade safety issues played a significant role in 
the political decision to construct a special railway line for freight transport from the port of 
Rotterdam to the German border (the so called Betuwe line). The continuing debates, problem 
analyses and policy arguments regarding external safety in relation to urban planning 
constitute the trigger of this research.
This research will study external safety policy and practice in relation to rail transport, 
in particular its effectiveness (i.e. the extent to which the policy goals are met), and explores 
whether improvements to this policy are needed and how these can be reached. This chapter 
introduces this study in terms of research goal, questions and approach. To formulate these, 
some further introduction is needed. Therefore, in the next section, I will first briefly present 
the current heart of external safety policy: the Individual Risk (Plaatsgebonden Risico) and 
the Group Risk (groepsrisico) standard. Then I will present the results of recent risk studies, 
which have been performed to analyse risks adjacent to railway lines. In section four, I will 
indicate trends in rail transport to show that there are reasons to believe that these risks will 
increase in the near future. In section five, I will elaborate on the problem statement and the 
central research questions for this study. In this section, it will be argued that the general 
framework for the classification, evaluation and management of risks presented by Klinke & 
Renn (2002) in a frequently cited article will serve as point of reference for positioning the 
debates and notions addressed in the explorative part of this research. Based on the 
framework, the focus of this research can be sharpened. The limitations to this research will 
be discussed in section six. Finally, in section seven, I will present the outline of this book.
1.2 The heart of external safety policy: generic norms
As mentioned, the Dutch government has specified generic external safety norms to give 
direction to decision making in real world situations to avoid conflicts related to external 
safety policy. These norms are established in order to provide a minimum level of protection
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for civilians from risks related to the production, transport, use and storage of hazardous 
materials. Furthermore, this approach prevents health risks from being passed on to groups of 
people living in areas near chemical plants, airports or electricity pylons, or to people who, for 
various reasons, are more sensitive to environmental pollution. The norms are expressed in 
certain acceptable levels of risk, which can be compared to the risk calculations made with 
computer models. As every model, risk models are also based on assumptions on determining 
factors and their causal relationships. For example, these models assume transferability to the 
future of the multiplicative relationship between the probability of accidents and their effects, 
assuming that extrapolation of data on the past offer a reliable representation of future 
situations. The probability function in the risk models, for example, is calculated by 
multiplying data on the frequency of accidents by the probability of failure of the tank wagon 
filled with hazardous materials. The frequency of accidents takes into account such facts as 
the speed on a railway track, the number of level crossings and switches. The effect of a 
possible derailment is calculated by using such variables as the amount of hazardous materials 
released and their effects on people (‘Is the substance toxic or explosive?’), the number of 
people living in the adjacent area, and the distance between the centre of the track and the 
built-up area (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat et al., 2004).
The calculated data can be expressed in two ways. The first way to describe risk is in 
terms of individual risk (IR)2. This is the annual probability that an unprotected person will 
die as a result of an accident involving hazardous materials at a certain spot if  that person 
resides there for a full year. The risk is visualised on a map by dots which act as spatial 
contours (see figure 4). The maximum allowed risk for ‘new’ situations as laid down in Dutch 
law is 1*10-6. Dutch authorities have made a distinction between vulnerable and less 
vulnerable objects within the IR contours. This distinction is based on societal ideas on 
protection of people. Vulnerable objects are objects that need more protection and involve, for 
example, hospitals, houses, schools and large office buildings and shops. The so called less 
vulnerable objects are objects which need less protection, such as small office buildings 
(smaller than 1500m2), restaurants, gymnasia or swimming pools. A risk that is lower than 
once every million years is acceptable according to Dutch policy for vulnerable objects. In 
contrast, less vulnerable objects may be present within the 10-6 contour.
The second way to describe risk is in terms of group risk (GR). This is the cumulative 
probability for each year that at least 10, 100 or 1000 people die as a direct result of their 
presence in the influence area of an establishment or transport route if an incident happens 
with hazardous materials. This is visualised on a logarithmic scale by using the fN curve, 
where f  represents the frequency of an accident and N  the number of people expected to die as 
a result of that accident (see figure 5).
2 In contrast, the Dutch term ‘Individueel risico ’ has been replaced by the term ‘Plaatsgebonden risico ’.
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Figure 5 shows that the orientation value for transporting hazardous materials by rail for 10 
victims or more is 10"4 (once every 10,000 years); for 100 victims or more, 10"6 (once every 1 
million years); and for 1000 victims or more, 10"8 (once every 100 million years). The GR 
value is calculated for each individual kilometre of the total track. When the orientation value 
for the GR is met, a line can be drawn in figure 5 that does not cross the diagonal curve that 
represents the orientation value. The curve that is drawn is then still in the area below the 
orientation value. When it crosses the line and is thus drawn in the area above the orientation 
value, the GR is too high according to Dutch policy standards.
The calculations made for the IR and the GR concerning rail transport, are mainly 
based on two leading scenarios. For the IR, incidents related to the transport of category C3 
materials (flammable liquids) are leading. Sometimes this is also influenced by toxic liquids 
or flammable gases (AVIV & Saxion, 2005). Because of the dominant influence of the C3 
category, the 10"6 contour is hardly ever more than 30 metres from the railway track, because, 
in theory, a leaking tank wagon cannot create a pool with a diameter larger than 30 metres. 
Moreover, according to the presently used calculation models a minimum number of 3000 
tanks per year is needed to create an IR 10"6 contour around a railway track. For the GR, the 
leading scenario is a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) of a tank wagon 
filled with an LPG. This scenario can influence the GR value by more than 90%.
Now that the heart of the external safety policy has been presented, it is important to 
explore the answer to the question to what degree societal developments comply with this 
policy. The next section summarises some recent studies with respect to that question.
1.3 Real-world practice: exceeding the norms
The generic norms for external safety presented in 1.2 are supposed to influence spatial 
planning in such a way that it is ‘safe’ to reside in certain places adjacent to hazardous 
activities. In practice, the calculation and the use of norms create difficult situations. With 
regard to the transport of hazardous materials by rail, a number of locations along the rail 
network have complex problems that are difficult to solve. This is because the norms for the 
IR and the GR are being exceeded. The Rail Risk Atlas (Risico Atlas Spoor) from 2001 states 
that in 1998, the IR norms were exceeded at 21 locations along the Dutch railway network 
(DGG, 2001, p. 13). This was mainly due to the transport of flammable liquids or category C3
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materials. In the case of the GR, the orientation value was exceeded for 11 residential areas; 
for a further 34 residential areas, the GR situation was labelled as a ‘point of interest’, because 
the GR value was at least a factor of 0.1 times the orientation value which, in the opinion of 
policy makers, means a value nearing the orientation value. Finally, for 27 urban areas there 
was a ‘possible point of interest’, although this could not be concluded from the research done 
at the time (ibid., pp. 15-16).
Follow-up research conducted four years later (AVIV & Royal Haskoning, 2005) 
showed that there were still a number of spots in the Netherlands where the risks were ‘too’ 
high, as is shown in figures 6 and 7. Both figures show the situation for 2005. Figure 9 shows 
that many buildings in urban areas are presently located within the IR 10-6 contour of the so- 
called Brabant line in the southern part of the Netherlands. Figure 10 shows that there are 
several spots on the same railway (see also the next section) where the orientation value for 
the GR is not met, implying that the risk curve crosses the curve of the orientation value for 
GR. AVIV & Royal Haskoning show that there are 16 locations where the orientation value is 
exceeded. However, risks are generally modelled in kilometre sections. Within each railway 
connection there are several kilometre sections, naturally depending on the length of the 
section. The AVIV & Royal Haskoning study does not show how many kilometre sections 
exceed the GR criterion. The maximum risk found in the research performed by AVIV & 
Royal Haskoning is up to a factor of 97 times the orientation value in the city of Eindhoven 
(see also chapter 3).
Figure 6 shows the amount of vulnerable objects within the 10-6 contour concerning 
the transport of hazardous materials by rail. Figure 7 shows the bottlenecks, situations where 
the orientation value is exceeded, for the Dutch rail network. Due to the lay-out of the two 
figures 6 and 7 and the lack of a table in this document giving the exact number of locations 
where the GR is exceeded, it is unfortunately hard to give an exact number of spots where the 
orientation value is exceeded or nearly exceeded.
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Figure 6: Number of vulnerable objects within 10-6 contour in the Netherlands 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005c)
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Figure 7: Bottlenecks with respect to the orientation value for GR in the Netherlands 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005c)
The conclusion is that although generic norms exist and despite the availability of tools for 
calculating risks, risk problems tend to become manifest at local level. Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that existing or future violations of the norms are solved. In these cases, local 
interests and decision makers focusing on urban area development, and national stakeholders, 
such as the railway authority or national government organisations, conflict with each other.
As explained earlier, the calculation of the level of risk is based on the application of 
the formula in which the probability of an accident is multiplied by its potential effect. The
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volume of transport of hazardous materials is a very important variable in this formula as it 
directly and linearly influences the probability of an accident. I will therefore take a closer 
look at the trends in rail transport, to explore whether there is a foreseen growth of transport 
and therefore also a potential growth of risks.
1.4 Future transport volume estimates
The Netherlands is one of Europe’s smaller countries. If one looks at the relative length of the 
rail network (compared to the number of inhabitants), the Netherlands not only has one of the 
shortest rail network in the European Union (CBS, 2007), it also has (together with Belgium 
and the UK) the largest percentage of multiple tracks. The Dutch rail network is shown in 
figure 8.
Figure 8: The Dutch rail network (Railcargo, 2006)
Of all transport on the rail network, 93% consists of passenger transport and 7% of freight 
transport. The averages for the European Union are 79% and 21%, respectively (CBS, 2007).
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Moreover, the figure for the Netherlands is five million passenger kilometres per kilometre of 
the total network, while the European average is 1.8 million (Railcargo, 2007). These figures 
show that the Dutch rail network is used very intensively for passenger transport.
With respect to the volume of all transported goods for all transport modalities (road, 
inland shipping, pipelines, rail), the development is summarised in table 1. Table 1 shows the 
volume of freight transport in tons per kilometre in the period 1997 to 2004. As shown in 
table 1, the absolute quantity of materials transported by rail is relatively low (5.4% of the 
total in 2004)3, but that the relative development of rail (+56%) is high compared to the other 
modalities.
Table 1: Development of the total transport per modality in the Netherlands in million 
ton-kilometres (Railcargo, 2007)
Road In land
shipping
Rail Pipeline Total
1997 40,154 35,254 3,349 6,040 83,887
1998 41,014 33,818 3,793 6,043 84,668
1999 45,087 34,282 3,988 6,008 89,365
2000 44,354 33,423 4,610 5,869 88,256
2001 44,315 35,089 4,294 5,827 89,525
2002 43,103 34,741 4,323 6,017 88,185
2003 45,457 31,407 4,705 6,131 84,888
2004 48,880 37,387 5,225 6,090 97,582
Railcargo (2008) shows that the annual total volume of hazardous materials transported in the 
Netherlands in absolute volume (82 million tons) is unequally distributed across the transport 
modalities. Inland shipping is by far the largest transporter (67 million tons); road transport 
comes second (12.3 million tons), while rail transports only 2.5 million tons (i.e. 
approximately 10% of the total of transported goods). The total transport by pipeline is not 
mentioned in this document.
The expectation is that the total amount of transport movements will increase in the 
near future. Rail transport of goods increased from 8.9 million kilometres in 1997 to 10.3 
million kilometres in 2004, with a slight decrease in 2001 and 2002 due to economic 
shrinkage (Railcargo, 2007).
In 2007 the Betuwe line was taken into operation. This line is a dedicated freight 
railway that is intended to become the primary artery for the rail transport of goods. The start 
of the Betuwe line service, combined with the fact of economic growth at the time, resulted in 
the market expectation expressed in figure 9.
3 The quantities in Table 1 are expressed in so-called ‘ton-kilometres’. This is a size expressing the total amount 
of tons multiplied by the amount of kilometres that these tons are transported in the Netherlands. 2.5 Tons 
transported over 100 kilometres is therefore 250 ton-kilometres.
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These estimates are for the total kilometres of transported goods by rail. This does not 
necessarily mean that the transport of hazardous materials by rail follows the same 
proportions. The Dutch rail network administrator (Prorail) is also the actor that registers the 
transport of hazardous materials. In 2003, Prorail released a ‘policy-free market forecast’ 
(beleidsvrije marktprognose) for the transport of hazardous materials by rail. This document 
forecasts an annual growth in the transport of flammable gases by between 0.9% and 2.4% for 
the period until 2020. This implies that for the period 1996-2020, the total growth will be 
between 25% and 80%. Other categories received different estimates, showing either slight 
growth or decline figures (Prorail, 2003). However, an updated forecast in 2007 revealed 
other figures. In 2003, the total of actual transported tank wagons was counted to be 54,000. 
The estimates made in 2007 for 2020 are given in a minimum and a maximum scenario. The 
minimum scenario shows a total of 127,000 tank wagons in 2020, while the maximum 
scenario shows a total of 137,100 tank wagons for that year (Prorail, 2007). These figures 
imply increases of 135% and 154%, respectively.
Using the Dutch safety norms has consequences for the way an area can be planned. 
This is because safety distances between risky activities and, for example, housing are 
difficult to create due to the scarce space. The density of the Netherlands implies that it is not 
feasible to base safety policy on the possible effect of a disaster, because spatial zones then 
could, depending on the materials transported, extend for up to two kilometres on either side 
of railway tracks (IPO, 2006). According to de Wilde (2004; 2006), almost all railways in the 
Netherlands are through-railways, that is, they run through city centres. This implies that 
hazardous materials are transported by rail through city centres, while other major European 
cities often have terminus stations that do not facilitate transport of hazardous materials. The 
important implication of the increase of transport is that this also increases the external safety 
risks with the same percentages, while at the same time, the Dutch authorities have the 
ambition to intensify urban land-use in the vicinity of railway lines, because of the potential 
higher use of public transport, higher revenues for local authorities due to relatively attractive 
building areas and the protection of natural landscapes surrounding cities (Ministerie van 
VROM, 2006d). In a dense populated country like the Netherlands, it is therefore necessary to
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have effective town and country planning, otherwise conflicts are likely to occur between 
spatial plans and external safety.
1.5 Problem statement and research focus
The conclusion from the preceding exploration on mainlines is that in several spots adjacent 
to the railway network generic external safety standards are not met in the present situation. 
At the same time forecasts indicate an increase in transport, whereas cities have more interest 
in building alongside railway infrastructures and in the neighbourhood of railway stations. 
Consequently the Netherlands faces a potential growth of risk problems. According to the 
Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan (Ministerie van VROM, 2001), the exceedance of 
risk standards leads to two main problems in practice. The first is a hollowing out of external 
safety policy due to an insufficient risk management. The second problem is a hollowing out 
of spatial planning, because spatial functions are developed at less desired locations. 
According to the earlier mentioned unique document from the Raad voor Verkeer en 
Waterstaat & Vromraad (2003, p.50), the following problems occur from this development:
1) Stagnation of the desired spatial developments, or realisation at less optimal locations, 
which implies the undermining of spatial planning policy.
2) The undermining of external safety policy, because safeguarding the level of safety 
does not have priority.
The conclusion in this document is that these developments are directly linked to decision 
making processes that are strongly influenced by specific features of the institutional setting 
of external safety policy. Reference is made to issues such as the nature of the generic 
standards and the present distribution of responsibilities for planning and decision making 
regarding spatial development on the one hand (municipal level) and transport flows on the 
other hand (national transport networks). The document triggered quite some response. 
Several policy reports and studies were published with the goal of improving institutional 
arrangements concerning external safety and the living environment (see e.g. Ministerie van 
VROM, 2004a; Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 2004, 2006b). In chapter 2 a more 
thorough evaluation of these responses will be presented.
These considerations regarding the institutional framing of planning and decision 
making bring us to the question how actors use information from risk analyses in decision 
making processes related to urban development? Which actors participate in the decision 
making process? Are these actors selective in the use of information and if so, why? Is the 
information to be used (e.g. accident probabilities, norms) clear and do all actors involved 
understand the consequences? Do actors share their thoughts on how to weigh various impacts 
versus the costs of investments in probability mitigation? Et cetera. These questions lead to 
the following problem definition:
Even though policy actors in the fie ld  o f  external safety policy fo r  the transport o f  
hazardous materials by rail have provided fo r  a theoretically improved framework on 
decision-making on risks and urban planning, there are still significant societal 
problems concerning risks related to the transport o f  hazardous materials by rail.
For further structuring this study, the so far presented description of the societal problems 
provides a sufficient basis for formulating the scientific challenges. The aim of this research is 
to evaluate the way in which the Dutch authorities develop and implement external safety 
policy in a context of urban development projects adjacent to railways that accommodate
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transport of hazardous materials and to suggest improvements. To translate this general aim 
into a more researchable focus in the first part of this research, the framework proposed by 
Klinke and Renn (2002) is considered to be helpful. The choice of this article is based on 
evaluation of various literature on risk (management) classification (e.g. Krimsky & Golding, 
1992; Lewens, 2007, WRR, 2008). The choice for Klinke and Renn’s frequently in the 
academic world of risk research cited article is made, because it gives a thorough and 
comprehensive overview of risks combined with an analytical approach to classify different 
types of risks. The article is considered to be very useful for the explorative part of this study 
as it enables a good conceptualisation and understanding of the present practice.
Klinke and Renn (also see IRGC, 2005) argue that there exists a large class of simple 
risks. These risks require nothing more than routine actions by regulators to assess and control 
risks and thus management of these risks is largely based on traditional decision making. Data 
is provided by statistical analysis, law or statutory requirements determine goals and the role 
of risk management is to ensure that all risk reduction measures are implemented and 
enforced. For this type of risks yields that the potential negative consequences are obvious, 
the values that are applied are non-controversial and the remaining uncertainties are low. 
Based on the analysis in the previous sections, it is already legitimate to state that the risks 
involved in the interaction between transport of hazardous materials and the building of real 
estate projects alongside railways, do not belong to this category of simple risks. The risks 
addressed in this study hence belong to a remaining class of risks that can be further 
classified, according to Klinke and Renn, in terms of three notions. In fact, these notions 
represent three major challenges that characterise the handling of risks in society: complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity.
Complexity refers to the difficulty of identifying and quantifying causal links between 
a multitude of potential accidents and specific adverse effects. Low complexity implies that 
risks have little statistical uncertainty, low catastrophic potential, small numbers when 
multiplying probability and damage, and a low score on ubiquity of consequences. High 
complexity logically is characterised by the opposite.
The second challenge is that of uncertainty. Uncertainty differs from complexity, as it 
comprises different and distinct components such as statistical variation, measurement errors, 
ignorance and indeterminacy which all have one feature in common: uncertainty reduces the 
strength of confidence in the estimated cause and effect chain. Uncertainty increases when 
complexity cannot be resolved by scientific methods.
The final challenge is to solve ambiguity (or ambivalence). Most of the scientific 
disputes refer to the question what the outcome of different methodologies, measurements and 
dose-response functions mean for human health and environmental protection, instead of that 
they contest the value of the scientific methods in itself. This term therefore denotes the 
variability of (legitimate) interpretations based on identical observations or data assessments.
According to Klinke & Renn (2002; IRGC, 2005) it is possible to combine these 
notions into a limited set of risk classes on which one can base a useful risk management 
strategy. The authors suggest six different classes, based on ancient Greek mythological 
figures. The various mythological figures are used as a metaphor for the issues associated 
with the different needs for different risk management styles:
Sword o f  Damocles
Damocles became the symbol for a threatening danger in luck as he sat under a sharp sword at 
a king’s banquet and the sword was only held by a horse’s hair, while hanging from the 
ceiling. According to Klinke and Renn (2002), the threat here is the fatal event that could 
occur at any time even if the probability is low. They use the symbolism for risks with large 
damage potentials and low probability of occurrence, such as the failure of large-scale
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chemical facilities and dams.
Cyclops
The Cyclopes in ancient Greece were might giants with only one eye. With only one eye, only 
one side of reality can be perceived and the dimensional perspective is lost. In this metaphoric 
perspective, only one side of risks can be ascertained while the other remains uncertain. As 
such the probability of occurrence is largely uncertain, whereas the disaster potential is high 
and relatively well known. The probability of occurrence of this risk class is also often 
influenced by human behaviour. Risks that fit this description are for example related to 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the appearance of AIDS and other infectious 
diseases.
Pythia
The oracle of Delphi was often consulted by Greeks in cases of doubt and uncertainty. The 
blind seeress Pythia made predictions and gave advice for the future. Her advice was 
however, ambiguous, which made it hard to interpret. Transferred to risk evaluation, this 
means that the probability of occurrence as well as the extent of damage remain uncertain and 
includes technological risks for which certain effects are suspected, but neither their 
magnitude nor their probability can be ascertained with any accuracy, such as genetic 
engineering in agriculture and food production.
Pandora’s box
Pandora’s box was brought down to earth and contained, besides hope, all the evils in the 
world. As long as the box remained closed, all the evils remained in the box and no damage at 
all had to be feared. Nevertheless, overcome by curiosity Pandora opened the box, which 
caused irreversible, persistent and wide-ranging damage. The risks associated with this class 
are mainly found in relation to human intervention in the environment. These damages are 
discovered only after the ubiquitous diffusion has occurred. Examples of these risks are for 
example persistent organic pollutants (POPs), such as DDT.
Cassandra
The Trojan princess Cassandra was given the gift of prophecy by the god Apollo. 
Nevertheless, she was cursed and no one believed her predictions. This risk class dwells on 
this paradox as genuine risks are ignored or downplayed due to a considerable delay in the 
triggering event and the occurrence of damage, even if the extent of damage is high and 
relatively well known. Anthropogenic climate change and the loss of biological diversity are 
such examples.
Medusa
The mythological world of the ancient Greek was full of dangers that threatened people. 
Medusa was feared because her appearance, her hair consisted of serpents, turned the 
beholder to stone. New risk phenomena have a similar effect on modern people as some 
innovations are rejected despite the fact that they are hardly assessed scientifically as a threat, 
but because they have special characteristics that make them individually or socially 
frightening or unwelcome. These phenomena give them a high potential of psychological 
distress and social mobilization in the public. A typical example is electromagnetic fields for 
mobile electronic devices, of which most experts assessed the extent of damage as low, but 
many people still feel involuntary affected by this risk.
Chapter 1 : Rail transport, risks and institutions 15
Klinke and Renn (ibid.) link the Damocles and Cyclops analogy to the challenge of 
complexity. They categorise the Pythia and Pandora analogy to matters of uncertainty and the 
ambiguity challenge is linked to Cassandra and Medusa risk analogy.
These challenges show that risk issues range in qualification from simple to complex 
problems, from complex to uncertain and from uncertain to ambiguous problems. To cope 
with the different problems associated with these challenges, it makes sense according to 
Klinke and Renn to design different risk management strategies that focus on a different 
handling of these risk issues. If the problem is complexity risk reducing strategies and 
regulation should be applied. Risk managers should focus on lowering the disaster potential 
by implementing measures such as minimizing the effect of a disaster, investigate and 
monitor the probability of occurrence, or decrease vulnerability by the integration of buffers 
or organisational security units. A risk manager should bring together the best available 
expertise and regulate on the basis of the state-of-the-art knowledge in risk assessment. The 
risk manager should not take into account public concerns or perceptions unless specific 
knowledge of these groups helps to unravel the complexity. According to Klinke and Renn, 
quantitative safety goals and consistent use of cost-effectiveness methods are appropriate 
tools to deal with complexity when these issues show little uncertainty and no ambiguity.
In cases where the problem is that of uncertainty, there is little knowledge available or 
unattainable due to the nature of the hazard. In such cases, risk managers should rely on 
precautionary management tools and gain additional knowledge to lower risks and 
uncertainty. Strategies focus on various risk reducing approaches (see also Chapter 2) 
including implementing substitutes for the risky activity and/or apply the best available 
technology to lower risks and uncertainty. Regulations might be implemented to force 
stakeholders to apply such strategies. In these cases, a serious issue is to find a fair and 
balanced trade-off between costs of being overcautious versus the costs of not being cautious 
enough. It is obvious that parties who bear costs have to participate in the negotiations.
Setting trade-offs is even more difficult in cases that involve ambiguity. Scientific 
expertise is essential for gaining a better understanding of ambiguity, but ambiguities cannot 
be resolved by increased efficiency since the outcome in itself is controversial as well. Coping 
with ambiguity involves the use of discursive management tools such as communicative 
processes that promote rational value disputes. In these cases deliberative processes are 
required from both social-analytical as well as a normative view, to create consensus between 
the ones who believe the risk is worth taking and those who believe that the potential but 
unknown consequences outweigh the potential benefits. Moreover, ambiguity issues need to 
be addressed with strategies based on building confidence and trustworthiness in regulatory 
bodies4.
Klinke and Renn (2002) explicitly mention that even when they are qualified as non­
identical, these terms are correlated nonetheless. Therefore, risks are often characterised by a 
mixture of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. The authors note that this implies that a 
specific risk class should not exclude strategies or instruments from other classes. Also, there 
may be a misperception that only deliberation and involvement of different parties is 
necessary when the issue of ambiguity dominates. Klinke and Renn argue that in all three 
challenges a type of dicourse is needed. For resolving complexity, e.g. experts (not 
necessarily scientists) migh have a discourse on the factual assessment, revealing that there is 
more uncertainty hidden in the case than initially anticipated. Such a (cognitive) discourse can 
be organised in different forms, using e.g. consensus building conferences, Delphi techniques 
or expert workshops.
4 For more on uncertainty and ambiguity issues, see for example: Knight, 1921; Beck, 1996; Giddens, 1999; Van 
Asselt, 2000; Harremoes et al., 2001; Sunstein, 2005; Van Asselt & Vos, 2006; Sandin, 2007; Pieterman, 2008; 
WRR, 2008.
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To analyse uncertainty issues Klinke and Renn suggest organising a so-called reflexive 
discourse. Such a discourse deals with the clarification of knowledge (similar to the cognitive) 
and the assessment of trade-offs between the competing extremes of over and under 
protection. These discourses are mainly appropriate as a means to decide on risk averse or 
risk-prone approaches to innovations and provide in an answer to the question of how much 
uncertainty one is willing to accept for some future opportunity. Policymakers, 
representatives of major stakeholders and scientists should participate in these discourses, 
which can also make use of expert knowledge oriented methods.
Finally, to organise a participative discourse is suggested to address resolving 
ambiguities and differences about values. In these cases, citizen advisory panels and citizen 
juries are requested to participate. Such a discourse is mainly appropriate as a means to search 
for solutions that are compatible with the interests and values of the people affected and to 
resolve conflicts among them. Figure 10 provides an overview of the above described 
framework of Klinke and Renn, indicating the changes in discourse when moving from 
simple risks to complex, from complex to uncertain and from uncertain to ambiguous risk 
issues.
R isk  T rade-O ff A na lysis and  
D eliberation  N ecessary
R isk  B a lancing  N ecessary Risk Balancing Necessary
Risk Assessment Necessary Risk Assessment Necessary
Scientific  R isk  
A ssessm ent N ecessary
Type of conflict:
Cognitive
Actors:
Agency staff 
External experts
Type of conflict:
Cognitive
Evaluative
Type of conflict:
Cognitive
Evaluative
Normative
Routine operation
Actors:
Agency staff
Actors:
Agency Staff 
External Experts 
Stakeholders such as 
Industry, Directly Affected 
Groups
Actors:
Agency Staff 
External Experts 
Stakeholders such as 
Industry, Directly Affected 
Groups 
Representatives of the 
Public(s)
Discourse:
Internal
Discourse:
Cognitive
Discourse:
Reflective
Discourse:
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Simple Complex Uncertain Ambiguous
Figure 10: The risk management escalator (Klinke and Renn, 2002)
This framework indicates that in many risk specification and management contexts, except 
perhaps for the category of routine operations, institutional aspects are at stake. We 
hypothesise that the institutional setting in this field contributes to what can be called the 
fuzziness or wickedness (see Howlett & Ramesh, 2003) of external safety problems in urban 
development. Institutions constitute the arena in which decision-making and policy-making 
takes place. According to John (1999), institutions include political organisations, laws and 
rules that are central to every political system, constraining decision-makers’ behaviour. 
North (1991, p.97) however, states that institutions are the humanly devised constraints that
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structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, 
laws, property rights) (also see March & Olsen, 1989; Goodin, 1996). Institutions are socially 
constructed and not material in a sense that they are tangible in a ‘put your hand or rest your 
eyes on it’ sense (Schmidt, 2008). Nevertheless, they may be real in a sense that they 
‘constitute interests and cause things to happen’. Therefore, institutions are sometimes 
labelled as the ‘rules of the game’ in a society (North, 1990).
John (1999) includes political organisations to institutions, whereas North (1990) 
makes a distinction between the ‘rules’, or institutions, and the ‘players’, or organisations. 
Organisations are groups of individuals that share a common purpose to achieve objectives. 
Organisations include political bodies (ministries or city councils), social bodies (clubs), 
educational bodies (universities or schools) and economic bodies (firms or trade unions) 
(North, 1990). According to these authors, a major effect of institutions is to reduce 
complexity and uncertainty for actors by establishing a framework for risk analyses and for 
developing a stable pattern of interaction between actors. These patterns can also change 
over-time, but institutional change is hard to accomplish. Institutional change is often an 
incremental process.
Given this link between the non-routine nature of risks and risk management and the 
influence of institutions, this study more specifically aims to explore the problems related to 
the present institutional framework for external safety in order to suggest improvements with 
the intention to contribute to a more effective external safety policy. For now, it suffices to 
demarque the notion of institutions as they are treated in this study. Here, an institutional 
framework will be defined as the whole of formal rules that shape the actions of planners and 
politicians in a system: either rules of law, formal policy principles, guidelines and the like. 
This regulatory view on institutions results from the fact that the specification and use of 
formal rules constitute a dominating feature of external safety policy in the Netherlands and 
thus can be subjected to in-depth study. Informal rules such as structures of negotiation 
between different actors far less differ from other policy fields. Informal rules are 
consequently assumed to have a less unique impact on the dynamics in the field of external 
safety management and are therefore assumed to have less power for identifying and 
understanding the identified problems.
It is now possible to specify the following central research question:
What is the nature o f  problems concerning the transport o f  hazardous materials by 
rail in relation to urban planning in the Netherlands, what causes these problems and 
can adapting the present institutional framework solve these problems?
To answer this research question, the following questions deduced from the central question 
will be addressed:
1) Which institutions influence transport related risks, risk management and urban 
planning in the Netherlands?
2) What problems can be identified in the present situation?
3) What are the challenges we face in order to achieve better risk management?
4) Is it a potential solution to modify the institutional framework and, if  so, according to 
which principles?
5) What is the potential influence of this adapted framework in practice?
These questions open up a broad scope of potentially interesting research. It is not the
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intention of this study to follow every potential line of inquiry: the available research capacity 
is limited and a too broad focus would harm the coherency of the research. Therefore, in the 
next section this study will be more focused and limited.
1.6 Limitation of this research
1.6.1 Transport markets
A first limitation in this research results from the great variety of aspects that is related to the 
described global field of study. For example, the problem description so far might open up for 
simultaneously debates on the prevention of transport of hazardous materials, the issue of 
multimodal shift, the routing of transport, the technical requirements to transport equipment, 
the safety systems in the rail network, and so on. This does not help to focus the study. 
Therefore, a more limited view is needed.
In the past decade, the so-called layered three market model is often adopted to 
structure the approach of transport issues (see e.g. Van der Heijden & Marchau, 2002). These 
markets are labelled as the transport demand (or mobility) market, the transport service 
market and the traffic market. The ‘transport demand (or mobility) m arket’ constitutes the 
layer of the transport system where the total (hidden) transport demand is generated due to the 
spatial and economic organisation of society. Generally, the hidden demand is larger than the 
overt demand. The transfer from hidden to overt transport demand heavily depends upon the 
price of physical transport and the willingness to pay for it. This is influenced by aspects such 
as the size of available time budget and financial budget for travelling, general transport price 
policies and the possibilities to substitute physical trips for virtual trips. In the context of the 
subject of this studied, research might focus on the (international) spatial (re)organisation of 
industrial activities that are dependent upon the use of hazardous materials, possibly linked to 
the influence from global economic shifts and policy on pricing of transport of hazardous 
materials. Spatial-economic policies can function as a way of intervention in this market.
In the ‘transport service m arket’ the overt demand for physical transport resulting 
from the processes in the mobility market is linked to the available transport services. Choices 
regarding the use of transport services for the transport of passengers or freight are made. 
Different transport modes offer a variety of services at the supply side. Transport services 
imply the organisation of trips for clients from an origin to a destination by using a specific 
mode (or perhaps a combination of modes), at a specific moment, according to a specific 
route through networks, for a certain price. In this market, logistics providers, transport 
companies and the passengers themselves seek a match between the demand for trips and the 
transport options (in fact, available transport services). This matching process is sensitive to 
aspects such as costs, spatial structure of origin and destination, and time. In the context of 
our study object, the issue of modal shift from rail to e.g. inland shipping is an issue that 
might be studied at the level of this market. Subsidising certain transport services is an 
example of an intervention possibility.
Finally, the third layer of the transport system constitutes the ' traffic m arket’. Typical 
for this market is the tension between limited supply of infrastructure capacity in different 
networks and the level of demand resulting from the number of vehicles to be accommodated. 
Operational traffic management aims at handling this tension in an acceptable way (including 
attention for e.g. incident management, safety, operational information, et cetera). Extending 
infrastructure capacity, pricing scarce capacity slots or implementing more dynamic traffic 
management approaches, are examples of intervention in this market.
This layered approach to the transport system is helpful in further focusing this study. 
The focus will not be on the level of the transport demand or the transport service markets.
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Discussions at these levels bear a strategic nature and are either at the level of the spatial- 
economic structure or the design and use of transport networks. This study focuses on the role 
of municipalities and therefore on spots in a given rail network and accepting a certain 
amount of transport of hazardous goods. The range of intervention possibilities to apply in 
this context is consequently limited and should fit to the characteristics of the traffic market. 
Municipalities do not intervene at the level of transport demand or of mode choice. They do 
not solve their local problems by focusing on strategic reorganisation of certain economic 
sectors or regional or national spatial structures. The focus on the traffic market layer 
determines the view in the rest of this study on the institutions involved and the type of 
measures that can be taken into consideration.
1.6.2 Focus on the Netherlands
The second focus in this research is on rail transport of hazardous materials in interaction with 
urban planning in the Netherlands. According to an Environmental Resources Management 
(ERM) study (2005), the approach to risk management in the Netherlands is unique to some 
extent due to its strong focus on generic standards. Moreover, as mentioned before, Dutch 
authors stress the differences between the Netherlands and other countries due to its spatial 
specifications. Perhaps because of this somewhat distinctive position of the Netherlands in 
this respect, only Dutch authors appear to explicitly address external safety in relation to 
urban planning. Suddle (2004; 2006; 2008), for example, focuses on measures to reduce the 
possible impact of disasters on the built environment, whereas research performed by Ale 
(2002; 2003; 2005) focuses more on the performance of risk institutions in the Netherlands. In 
contrast, authors from a variety of nations focus on quantitative aspects of release of toxins or 
quantitative aspects of routing. Examples of the latter are Glickman & Rosenfield (1984), 
Verter (1998), Leonelli et al. (2000), H0j & Kröger (2002) and Verma & Verter (2005). 
Nivolianitou (2002) explicitly links the difference in focus on risks relating to hazardous 
materials between the Netherlands and other countries to the Dutch experience of living with 
the threat of dyke flooding.
1.6.3 Terrorism
This study will not discuss risks related to specific threats of terrorism and terrorist attacks, 
despite the fact that these are hot topics in both politics and the media. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, because such disasters have no causal history, quantification for 
terrorism is not possible. Terrorism is therefore an unpredictable way of failure, although 
Haimes (2006) tries to develop a framework for analysing the vulnerability of infrastructures 
to terrorist attacks. Secondly, if the research had included terrorism, it would also have needed 
to include another more obvious but perhaps even less predictable phenomenon: vandalism. 
Finally, terrorism is associated with security, whereas transport is associated with safety. As 
both vandalism and terrorism are unpredictable and therefore hard to estimate and difficult to 
prevent, I excluded them from my research
1.6.4 Group risk
Finally, two risk indicators are mentioned several times, as these are the two dominant 
indicators in the debate. These indicators -  IR and GR -  were explained earlier in this chapter. 
GR is often called societal risk as well. This term is not used here since it might suggest that 
the indicator takes all societal aspects of risk into account when calculating these risks, while 
in reality the only calculated number it takes into account is the number of possible fatalities.
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This number does not relate to other societal costs, such as economic loss, destroyed buildings 
or injured people. Therefore, only the term group risk is used, as this expresses how many 
people may be fatally affected.
1.7 Methodological outline
This research consists of two different parts. The first part of this research, comprising 
chapters 2 to 4, is the explorative part. Based on the limited and global description in this 
chapter, it was felt that a more in-depth exploration of risk management problems and 
developments is needed. Therefore the aim of the first part is to perform such an in-depth 
exploration. The aforementioned conceptual framework presented by Klinke and Renn (2002) 
will be used to frame the observations on developments in real world and to understand the 
institutions and tools used in risk management. In this explorative part, we will first aim to 
present the key principles of risk management and institutions. The basis for this is desk 
research of policy and government documents in combination with theoretical literature on 
risk management. This results in a first impression on whether the present institutional 
framework is suitable for controlling risks. This is however not considered enough 
information for drawing conclusions on the present practice. We also need to take a closer 
look into real world policy making.
Therefore, in chapter 3, the previous desk research is followed by five case studies of 
cities in the Netherlands where local authorities wish to redevelop urban areas adjacent to 
railroads that accommodate the transport of hazardous materials. In these case studies, the 
focus is on the question what the relevant urban planning processes look like in practice and 
what the role is of the identified institutions. What type of analyses is performed and how are 
their results used? These case analyses add relevant insights to the results of the desk 
research.
Nevertheless, we consider it important to extend the exploration with the opinions of 
experts in the field of our research. To do so, in chapter 4, the case studies are followed by 
reports of two consultations of experts in the field of transport, safety and urban planning, 
who were asked to give their view on the various policy and institutional issues of external 
safety in relation to transport of hazardous materials by rail within a context of urban 
developments.
The application of three different methods of research in the context of the explorative 
part of this research intends to create a view on what the key issues are concerning external 
safety and urban planning and what their impacts are on policy development. The 
combination of the findings of the desk research, the findings in the case studies and the 
systematic feedback from experts, results in a well documented and broad exploration of the 
relevant developments in practice. The findings are systematically interpreted in terms of the 
notions provided by the framework of Klinke and Renn (routines, complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiquity), This exploration will be concluded with a specification of the most important 
problems that have to be dealt with in the present practice. Following this path, research 
questions 1, 2 and 3 mentioned in section 1.5 will be answered.
The second part of this research will build upon the conclusions from the first, 
explorative part. The major aim of this second part is to search for ameliorations that can be 
used to adapt the present institutional context in the field of urban planning and transport of 
hazardous materials in such a manner that the problems found in practice can be limited or 
even eliminated. To do so, first a dedicated theoretical view for his challenge is developed, 
based on literature review in chapter 5. Based on that, a more operational view on the 
principles of risk management for our research field is elaborated. Since a theoretical 
elaboration is not sufficient, some tests should be performed on whether the adapted set of
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principles in reality can yield the desired outcomes. For this purpose, it is chosen to apply the 
approach of simulation gaming. Therefore, after formulating the ameliorations of the present 
institutional framework, we will elaborate a test environment in chapter 6, including the 
specification of a set of effect criteria and a method by which the ameliorations can be 
scientifically tested to see whether they are indeed improvements in relation to the present 
situation. In total, two simulation games performed in his context of testing will be described 
in chapter 7. Based on that, the questions 4 and 5 from section 1.5 can be answered. Finally, 
the conclusions are formulated in chapter 8, which also includes a reflection and debate on the 
findings.
This outline is just a first indication, of how this research is built up. Details are not 
mentioned in this paragraph but in the respective chapters. When needed, the methodological 
considerations will be discussed more in-depth. This in particular concerns the choices made 
in the context of the multiple case studies, the set up of the expert consultation and the set-up 
and execution of the two gaming simulations.
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PART I
Exploration of institutions and 
decision problems in practice

Chapter 2: 
The Dutch external safety framework
2.1 Introduction
Over the last 30 years, institutional choices regarding Dutch external safety policy have 
evolved into the current institutional framework. Following the focus presented in Chapter 1, 
the aim of this chapter is to critically reflect on the main characteristics of this framework. 
First, I will give an overview of generic concepts and approaches that presently dominate risk 
management. Within this general framework of risk management, the second aim is to discuss 
which policy principles and institutions influence risk management in the more specific 
context of the transport of hazardous materials and urban planning at local level in the 
Netherlands. As such, this chapter forms the basis for further analysis and aims to provide 
insight into the policy and institutional aspects relevant to the external safety problem as 
specified in chapter 1.
The analysis starts in section two by presenting the general aspects of risk 
management. I will then provide a brief historical summary of external safety policy in the 
Netherlands. Section four presents an overview of relevant institutions that influence transport 
and external safety in the Netherlands, focusing on the issues relevant to local planning of 
urban development. Section five critically discusses two possible strategic policy solutions for 
high rail transport risks in urban areas: the Betuwe line and the concept of a basic network for 
rail transport of hazardous materials. In the final section, the main conclusions derived from 
this chapter will be formulated.
2.2 Managing risks: general approaches
The aim o f this section is to introduce the reader to the basic principles o f risk management by
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highlighting the key concepts of risk management, risk analysis and risk evaluation. These 
concepts are presented successively.
2.2.1 Risk management
In chapter 1, a generic framework was presented, based on the work of Klinke and Renn, 
which offers a set of consistent classifications of risks and risk management approaches. 
Although it was stressed that a great variety of problem settings and approaches in this 
classification can be observed, it was also noted that risk management generally involves the 
use of risk information in decision making to control the risks of hazardous activities and 
processes and ensure that they do not exceed what are considered to be acceptable levels. 
Generally, risk management strategies circle around the following three major approaches 
(Stirling, 1999):
1) Risk-based approaches, such as applying numerical thresholds (quantitative safety 
goals, exposure limits, standards etc.)
2) The application of standards derived from discursive processes such as roundtables, 
deliberative rule making and mediation or citizen panels.
3) Risk-reduction activities derived from the application of the precautionary principle 
(examples are the ALARP principle (As Low As Reasonably Practical, see later in this 
section), or BACT (the Best Available Control Technology).
The process for one or a combination of different analytical and risk control approaches is 
more in-depth described by for example Vrouwenvelder (2001) and Hjaj & Kröger (2002). As 
figure 11 shows, the risk management process is generally specified in terms of four elements, 
namely risk estimation, risk analysis, risk assessment, and safety management and risk 
control. Risk estimation for specific types of accidents is basically performed through an 
analysis of the frequency and consequences of these accidents. Risk assessment consists of 
the use of all available information to estimate the risk to individuals, populations, the 
environment or property caused by identified hazards. These risks are then compared with 
targets and finally solutions are sought (Vrouwenvelder, 2001). The relationship between 
these aspects is illustrated in figure 11.
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Figure 11: The risk management process (H0j & Kröger, 2002)
From figure 11 we learn that in present practice, the risk analysis constitutes the core of risk 
management. Risk analysis in the context of safety generally involves the analysis of certain 
hypothetical scenarios of accidents (causes, chains of effects, reactions, etc.). This approach is 
the heart of the first above mentioned approach suggested by Stirling’s (1999). After 
developing these scenarios for the specific situation, they are subjected to quantitative and/or 
qualitative appraisals (see e.g. Rosmuller, 2001; Suddle, 2004). Quantitative risk assessment 
is (Roberts & Hayns, 1989, p.484):
(...) ‘the estimation o f  the risks that could result from  a particular hazardous 
installation (in the conventional sense o f  the estimated frequency o f  occurrence o f  
events with calculated consequences) from  considerations o f  the likely failure rates o f  
components and o f  the interaction between components in the total system .’
The term ‘hazardous installation’ may naturally be replaced by other hazardous activities, 
such as the production of chemicals or -  more important for this study -  the transport of 
hazardous materials. Whereas quantitative risk assessments are based on mathematical and 
statistical models, qualitative risk assessments are based on expert knowledge of values, 
relationships between actors and factors, potential impacts and necessary conditions. 
According to Rosmuller (2001, p.27-31), the elaborated accident scenarios are generally 
analysed using three techniques or a combination thereof supporting the qualitative as well as 
the quantitative appraisal. The first technique is fault tree analysis. This analytical method is
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used to systematically describe the logical development of the causes of undesired events. 
Fault tree analysis starts with the top event, which is the specified undesired event. The 
possible causes for this event -  such as human error or system or component failure -  are 
investigated in depth to find their underpinning causes. This process is repeated until the 
required level of detail is reached. The fault tree describes a combination of system states that 
can lead to the top event. For example, figure 12 presents a fault tree for the release of 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
etc. <r
Figure 12: LPG fault tree (Rhyne, 1994, adopted from Rosmuller, 2001)
The rectangles represent possible events A to E. The connectors between the events in figure 
12 are ‘or gates’. The triangles indicate that the event can be further detailed by identifying 
underlying events (Rosmuller, 2001).
Initiating events that do not have significant consequences could pose a hazard if  a 
sequence of events leads to the type of more serious consequences under consideration. In 
such cases, an event tree is established as a chain of events and subsystem reactions (H0j & 
Kröger, 2002). Rosmuller (2001) refers to the event tree analysis as the second method for 
scenario development. An event tree analysis is conducted to structurally identify and 
evaluate potential consequences of initial events. This is done through various steps. First, the 
initial events are identified, and then the potential consequences (i.e. events) are generated. 
The scenarios are then put in a chronological order of following sequences of events as 
occurring in reality. In some cases, the worst-case scenario is sought. Even though this 
scenario is not likely to happen, it could be helpful to identify and establish the limiting case. 
Figure 13 shows for example an event tree for a boiling liquid expanded vapour explosion 
(BLEVE). A BLEVE is caused when a tank filled with category A flammable gases has an 
instant rupture combined with extreme heat, as a result of which the gas immediately catches 
fire and causes an explosion.
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Figure 13: Event tree for flammable gas (AVIV, 1993, adopted from Rosmuller, 2001)
Both event tree and fault tree analysis can support a qualitative approach to risk assessment 
where it structures the expert knowledge on the dynamics of events. It can also provide the 
basis for quantitative analysis by valuing each branch of the tree with a factor of failure. 
Subsequently, each factor can be multiplied by another factor.
The fina l method mentioned by Rosmuller is consulting experts, who can develop 
scenarios for incidents in potentially hazardous systems, based on a creative interaction and 
debate or on learning from their tacit knowledge. In the case of transport of hazardous 
materials by rail, experts that are generally involved in such scenario development approaches 
vary from consultants to transport planners and from fire fighters to local policy makers. 
Experts can provide rough quantitative risk assessments, based on their knowledge but can 
also assess the plausibility of the chains of incidents and the deterministic impacts of chain 
scenarios. This method is to some degree related to the second above mentioned approach 
suggested by Stirling’s (1999).
2.2.2 Critique on quantitative risk assessment
The approach described in the previous subsection is dominated by quantitative risk analyses 
and the appraisal of these outcomes using quantitative standards. The acceptance of 
quantitative approaches in the field of risk management is large. The dominant argument is 
that it gives a controllable and objective insight in risk levels. Short (1989) and Renn (1992), 
for example, argue that technical risk analyses help decision-makers estimate the expected 
physical harm and provide the best available knowledge about actual damage that is logically 
or empirically linked with each possible action (see also Vrijling et al, 1998). However, they 
also stress that the outcome of the analyses is based on available statistics and that these can 
be faulty.
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So, although this approach represents common practice, there is also debate in scientific 
literature on the validity and applicability of quantitative risk assessment. Several authors, 
such as Fischer (2003) and Healy (2001), have objected to this quantitative standard based 
evaluation on acceptability of risks as they perceive them as a technocratic basis for risk 
management and design of risk policy. In their opinion, this way of analysing risks is a 
strategy based on a technical rational approach for centralised regulatory decision making, not 
adequately representing reality (Fischer, 2003). According to Healy (2001), it illustrates a 
scientific weakness5 to provide for an instrumental, calculative and purposive rationality. In 
the opinion of Fischer (2003) and Healy (2001) the concept of risk is much richer than can be 
expressed by some simple numbers. A broader view should be taken into account in decisions 
whether or not a real world situation is socially acceptable. To come to a better understanding 
of risks, Healy (ibid.) concluded that a more substantive dialogue between the natural and the 
social sciences is needed, by which is meant that it should not be technical analyses alone that 
determines risks.
Various other studies can be found in national and international literature, presenting 
similar and critical notes on the dominant approach to calculating risk (See e.g. Vlek, 1990; 
Suddle & Waarts, 2003). According to Bedford and Cooke (2001), risk analysts must bear in 
mind that the calculation of an fN curve is based on uncertain data and hence is no more than 
a rough estimation, rather than an exact presentation of risk results. Moreover, as expressed 
by Adriaansen (2006), it is hard to explain to civilians what risks mean when they are 
expressed in terms of abstract probabilities. For example, group risks or individual risks of, 
for example, 3.4 * 10"6 are not easy to understand unless one is an expert on the field of 
safety.
Laheij et al. (2003) compared five models by calculating risks for a hypothetical 
situation and found large differences in outcomes among the model used. The fact that this is 
not only a Dutch or a transport problem is shown by an earlier study by Mandl and Lathrop 
(1983). In a comprehensive review of over ten quantitative risk models developed and applied 
in four countries, these authors showed that there were large differences in the content of the 
reports for the procedure for siting a liquid natural gas terminal. Depending on the 
assumptions chosen, the models used and the formats for presenting the results, the risks 
estimated for residents near the site varied by a factor of eight. The authors explain this by 
how personal judgements influenced the analyses (see also Kunreuther et al., 1984). It is 
therefore of major importance that Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed that thinking in 
terms of uncertainty leads to large biases in judgements, and that this applies not only to 
laymen but also to experts. They conclude that consequently even fairly clear situations can 
produce a wide range of predicted risk values.
Vrijling et al. (1998) showed that the presented models and results are simplified 
depictions of reality and appealed for the use of a set of scenarios, to be brought in and 
considered by safety experts. Obviously, this generates new questions. While in reality the 
variety in scenarios is infinite, any analysis must necessarily limit itself. No matter how 
thoroughly and carefully an analysis is made, results therefore have their limitations 
concerning the number of scenarios taken into consideration. Kaplan and Garrick (1981) even 
go a step further by stating that it is not a matter of the identified scenarios making the results 
trustworthy, but of the not-identified scenarios forming a bottleneck in risk analysis.
The Hazardous Substances Council of the Netherlands (Adviesraad gevaarlijke 
stoffen) wrote two insightful reports on the quantitative risk assessment practice in the 
Netherlands (AGS, 2006; 2010a) in which the Council argues that decision making
5 Weinberg (1972) was supposedly the first to be critical about this ‘trans-science’, by which he meant to express
the difficulties in estimating low-probability events, as they often have no practical basis for precisely estimating 
the statistical chances and effects.
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concerning external safety needs to be reformed. The 2006 report concluded that 
improvements needed to be made concerning the transparency and the verifiability of the 
models and the accident frequencies. The 2010 report was even more critical than the first 
one. Not only the transparency and the verifiability were concluded to be insufficient, also the 
robustness, the validity and the relevance concerning improving safety are qualified as very 
poor, but nevertheless have formed the basis for safety policy and decision-making for 
transport by rail, road and water in the recent past. As such, the council concluded that:
‘Calculations with the prescribed model have degenerated to a ritual, creating a false 
sense o f  safety. Permits are granted i f  the arithmetic yield  a particular outcome rather 
than check i f  people have really thought about safety, let alone i f  the latest knowledge 
and insights are used’. (AGS, 2010b, translated from Dutch).
Moreover, the council states that the system in which the calculations are made, does not do 
justice to the complexity of the practice in which decision making takes place (AGS, 2010).
According to Fischhoff (1984) there are two archetypical ways to manage risks: 
decision making based on setting standards and decision making based on trade-offs. The 
basic difference concerning these two approaches concerns the way these approaches refer to 
acceptable risks. According to Fischhoff, decision making procedures attempt to rank order 
options according to their relative attractiveness, whereas standards simply categorise options 
as ‘pass/ no pass’. The act of adopting an option does not in and of itself mean that its 
attendant risks are acceptable in any absolute sense. Strictly speaking, nobody accepts risks, 
but we all accept options that entail some level of risk among their consequences. In other 
words, decision making attempts to identify the most desirable action in interaction with 
given circumstances in which trade-offs must be made with other aspects to be addressed in 
decision making, such as costs, time, the level of risk or political acceptance. Reliance on 
standards however, may lead to all options being acceptable or, in contrast, none. Therefore, if 
a government chooses to apply standards, this implies a choice for a specific safety 
philosophy or policy6. However, a choice for a process of evaluation in interaction with 
circumstances also generates certain decision problems.
According to Fischhoff et al. (1981), a number of recurrent issues are related to 
considering acceptable risk problems as decision making problems that impede the necessary 
trade-off between options. Suppose that a single individual is able to make a decision, that all 
risks and costs can be identified, characterised and assessed with certainty, and that the 
benefits of carrying out these options are identical. The only difference between the options in 
that case concerns differences in cost and level of risk. How can these options then be 
visualised? The visualisation made by Fischhoff et al. (ibid.) is shown in figures 14 to 17.
6 From a command and control perspective, the use of legal standards and organising control mechanisms is a 
well-known phenomenon in Dutch policy practice (see de Roo, 2003). These norms concern environmental 
matters like the prevention of air and noise pollution and the control of soil pollution.
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Figures 14 - 17: Possible choices among alternative risky options (Fischhoff et al., 1981)
Figure 14 shows the effect of the options considered on the choice made. Here, three cases (K, 
L and M) are depicted as an expression of a certain level of costs and a certain level of risk. In 
this case, the choice should be made between high costs and a low level of risk (K), and low 
costs and a higher level of risk (L). The level of acceptable risk, then, is either K or L. If, for 
some reason, a new option (M) is available that has a lower level of risk and a lower cost than 
the other options, this option is preferred. Figure 15 shows the effect of the decision makers’ 
values on the decisions made. If minimising risks is a goal, option K is preferable to option L, 
while if  minimising costs is the goal, option L is preferred. Figure 16 shows how new 
information on the costs and risks of M can alter the view of a decision maker. If M was 
already the preferred option, new information during the process might indicate that the level 
of risk is (much) higher than originally anticipated. If the decision has not yet been made, 
options K and L will be again considered and due to the altered position of M and based on 
new trade-off preferences might change. Evidently, the timing of and sensitiveness for this 
new information is very important.
Figure 17 is a more realistic representation of figure 15. In figure 15, all the options on 
the dotted lines have the same level of preference for the decision maker. In figure 17, case 1 
represents a decision maker with a preference for higher costs to create higher levels of safety, 
even if the benefits are small. In this case, K is preferred to L. Case 2 shows the opposite, 
which is based on a lower willingness to increase costs in exchange for a reduced risk.
By viewing acceptable risk problems as decision problems, one can see the 
disadvantages of simplistic solutions. Fischhoff et al. (1981) further illustrate this with the 
diagrams shown in figures 18 to 21.
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Figure 18 -  21: Possible choices among alternative risky options, clarifying the pitfalls of 
some seemingly easy solutions (Fischhoff et al., 1981)
Suppose there is a decision maker who pursues absolute safety. In principle, this could lead to 
the situations illustrated in figure 18, in which A is preferred to B, even if A has much higher 
costs than B. In figure 19, the diagram represents a situation in which the adopted option 
needs to be as safe as possible. Option C provides less risk than option D, but can only be 
implemented at a high incremental cost. A similar example is presented in figure 20, in which 
a safety standard is now presented. It is not difficult to imagine that a real world decision­
maker prefers option F to option E, despite the fact that F exceeds the safety standard. Finally, 
situations do exist as presented in figure 21. Here, option G may be preferable to option H in 
order to reduce the risk by only a quarter, even though the shift to G almost doubles the cost 
in order to reduce the risk by only a quarter. One might also prefer J to G, even though that 
shift buys more safety for less cost than the change from H to G. These preferences are 
consistent if  the decision maker feels that different trade-offs are appropriate at different 
levels of risk.
The brief theoretical exploration leads to the conclusion that decisions are taken on the 
basis of a choice between different alternatives and making trade-offs between various 
decision criteria. The choice for an option then depends on the full set of different positive 
and negative effects and there are no universally acceptable options (or risks, costs or 
benefits).
Figure 20 is a simplified representation of Dutch safety practice. In such cases, 
decisions are based on an assessment of the degree of compliance with a norm. Hence, the
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norm is considered as the criterion for acceptability. Still, despite good reasons to adopt a 
safety standard, there are numerous possible downsides to such an approach.
2.2.3 The ALARP approach
A dominant approach in practice is to model risks as a function of the probability of an 
accident with hazardous materials multiplied by the possible effect of such an accident. 
Expert insights into the system as well as statistics on system failures and effects are used in 
practice to define the applicable values. This resembles the third approach described in 
section 2.2.1 by Stirling (1999). A main concept here is that of ALARP (often also used as 
ALARA, As Low As Reasonably Achievable).
The ALARA/ALARP approach was first developed in the UK (Cullen, 1990; 
Melchers, 2001). It requires operators of a potentially hazardous facility to demonstrate that 
the facility is fit for its intended purpose, that the risks associated with its functioning are 
sufficiently low, and that sufficient safety and emergency measures have been instituted (or 
proposed). The ALARP approach can conceptually be explained as in figure 22. It shows an 
upper limit of risk that can be tolerated in any circumstances and a lower limit where risk is of 
no practical interest. This can easily be associated with quantitative levels of risk, which in 
figure 22 are used merely as an illustration. Note that the ALARP region can also be beyond 
the formally specified lower limit.
Figure 22: ALARP in relation to levels of risk (adopted from Melchers, 2001)
The term reasonability is often associated with the balance between costs and benefits. 
Bowles (2003), for example, talked about a ‘disproportionality ratio’, which, in his words, is a 
cost-benefit ratio that includes both economic and life safety benefits (see also Aven & K0rte, 
2003). Still, it would be very useful to see whether investments to reduce risks are reasonable, 
because there are various advantages to such investments (Bowles, 2003), such as:
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• Improved assurance that all reasonably foreseeable failure modes have been 
identified and adequately addressed.
• A stronger safety case for the risk reduction decision.
• A stronger business case for the risk reduction decision.
• A greater degree of defendability for the risk reduction decision.
Moreover, the ALARP approach ‘conveys the suggestion of bridging the gap between 
technological and social views of risk and also that society has a role in the decision-making 
process’ (Melchers, 2001, p. 202).
2.2.4 Summarising
In this section, the basic principles of risk management have been presented at an introductory 
level. Although we are aware of the fact that reality is more divers and complex than 
presented here (e.g. the combination of probabilistic and deterministic analyses, the variety of 
scenarios taken into account, or the diversity of stakeholders who are invited to participate in 
the risk analysis and risk management approaches), the preceding text depicts the dominant 
view and applied concepts and methods in practice. The core of risk management is the 
identification of potential sources of risk-inducing events and the analysis of the 
consequences. Scenarios and several methods for analysing chains of events are the standard 
tools for the risk analyst. Based on risk analyses and risk assessment, management strategies 
are developed to reduce risks to acceptable levels, if necessary.
In terms of the classification of Klinke and Renn (2002), the above discussed concepts 
and methods typically fit to problems that are either defined as simple (routine) problems (use 
of statistical data, potential negative consequences are non-controversial, remaining 
uncertainties are low) or problems that are dominated by a relatively low degree of 
complexity (difficulty with identifying and quantifying causal links, statistical variation, 
measurement problems).
Knowing this, the question rises as to how this general risk approach becomes reality 
in the world of external safety management. Is the approach effective? Is there a policy and 
institutional setting that is supportive to the approach? The following sections will explore the 
answer to this question. It starts with a brief historical overview of Dutch external safety 
policy.
2.3 A brief historical summary of Dutch external safety policy
In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the Netherlands experienced a number of explosions 
involving gunpowder resulting in a large number of casualties and wide-scale destruction. An 
explosion in 1807 in the city of Leiden, for example, killed 151 people (Ale, 2003). The 
French rulers became aware of the risks related to the transport and storage of gunpowder, 
and in 1810 Emperor Napoleon declared that a licence would be obligatory in the future for 
certain activities. In 1814, King Willem I converted this into a royal decree, which later 
became the 1896 Nuisance Act (Hinderwet). Then, in 1815 and 1875 respectively, the Acts on 
the transport of gunpowder and the Act on toxic substances were passed. The latter Act was 
the predecessor of the Hazardous Substances Act of 1963 and the Transport of Hazardous 
Materials Act of 1996 (Ministerie van VROM, 2006b, p. 1).
Dutch industry expanded very rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s; the dock areas and 
industrial estates began to cause increasing inconvenience to adjacent areas. The late 1960s 
saw the emergence of debates on environmental protection. It was no longer acceptable for 
industry to cause water or air pollution or to create hazards for the surrounding living areas.
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This led to the country’s first sectoral environmental laws.
Disasters at industrial plants in the 1970s (e.g. in Beek in the Netherlands and in 
Flixborough in the UK) also produced new insights into risks and cause and effect chains. 
This triggered the development of simulation models of the release and effect of hazardous 
materials and the quantitative analysis of related risks. It has since become common practice 
to investigate risks with quantitative models (Ale, 2003).
At the beginning of the 1980s, the need for a general risk assessment framework was 
stressed. The Norm Memorandum (Normennota) by the province of Groningen and later in 
the 1984 Integral Memorandum on LPG (Integrale Nota LPG) published by the national 
authorities were the first documents to use limiting values for risk. Here, the commonly used 
limiting value of 10"6 was introduced7. This policy was later adopted in the Indicative Long- 
range Programme for Environmental Management 1986-1990 and in the ‘Coping With Risks’ 
(Omgaan met risico’s) document, which was part of the First National Environmental Policy 
Plan (1989) (Ale, 2003). The Coping With Risks document formed the quantitative basis for 
external safety policy until the Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan (Vierde Nationale 
Milieuplan or NMP4; see section 2.3), due to the binding agreements on the limiting risk 
value of 10-6. The Coping With Risks document also extended the risk policy to such areas as 
nuclear power and exposure to toxic substances (Ministerie van VROM, 2006b, p. 2). 
Following the 1976 Seveso disaster in Italy, the European Commission released the Seveso 
Directive (1987), obliging companies to provide information on the risks they create for 
people in the adjacent areas. This directive is implemented in the Netherlands in the form of 
the 1999 Decree on Severe Accidents (Ministerie van VROM 2006c, p.1).
The Dutch attention to external safety gained momentum following the Amsterdam 
Bijlmer plane disaster in 1992 -  which killed 43 people -  and the explosion at the SE 
Fireworks depot in Enschede in 2000, which killed 22 people, injured 950 and destroyed an 
entire residential neighbourhood. This caused great social and political unrest with respect to 
the involuntary risks people are unwillingly confronted with.
As a consequence, a fact-finding committee investigated which institutional aspects 
did not function properly. One of the conclusions was that the risks in the Netherlands had 
increased due to the lack of an adequate legal basis regarding the impact of external safety 
policy on spatial planning policy. The committee concluded that the government had an 
obligation to create uniform rules, carry out adequate supervision and ensure consistent 
compliance with the regulations (Ministerie van VROM, 2006b, p.2). The Dutch authorities 
declared that they would adopt these conclusions. In accordance with the recommendations, 
the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Ministerie van VROM) was 
appointed as the coordinating Ministry after the explosion in Enschede. Within this Ministry, 
the External Safety Directorate was established. External safety, however, remained part of 
the integral safety policy, for which a number of ministries are equally responsible. What is 
new is that the External Safety Directorate must now ensure that policy is more coherent. 
Also actors within the external safety field must be more proactive and the directorate has a 
duty to keep external safety on the political agenda. The progress made must be reported 
periodically to the Dutch parliament also on behalf of the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat), the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid), the Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken).
7 According to Ale (2003), this value is widely used in international risk management, although the origin of the 
value is unknown.
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2.4 External safety and rail transport
Various (inter)national institutions have been implemented to ensure safety when transporting 
hazardous materials by rail. In this section, the important institutions will be explained from 
the international level to the local level of government. A full overview of the institutions is 
not given; the focus is on how rail transport of hazardous materials and external safety in the 
Netherlands is influenced by (supra) national rules.
2.4.1 International regulations
The transport of hazardous materials is subject to many international rules and regulations, 
and these affect Dutch transport institutions and, ultimately, local safety in urban areas. There 
are four major influences, which I will briefly explain below.
Free movement o f goods
One of the key principles of the European Union is to create a single market across its 
members’ territories. The common term used for this is the ‘Four Freedoms’, namely: the free 
movement of services and the freedom of establishment, the free movement of persons, the 
free movement of capital, and the free movement of goods. These principles state that 
discriminatory rules to hinder the transport of goods between Member States are not allowed. 
This implies, for example, that hazardous materials may be transported through Europe 
without restriction, except for those materials listed in the two annexes to the Règlement 
concernant le transport international ferroviaire de marchandises dangereuses (RID), or as 
long as the supposed restrictions do not conflict with the EU treaty.
Cotif
Cotif (Convention pour le transport international ferroviaire) is an international treaty on rail 
transport. It lays down communal law on rail transport for goods and people in 42 EU 
Member States. Moreover, it specifies the duties of rail regulators and the technical 
harmonisation between EU and non-EU countries. One of the derivatives is the RID, which is 
more important for this research.
RID
The RID (Council Directive 96/49 EC) is the European regulation that lays down the laws and 
rules related to transporting hazardous materials by rail. The RID has two annexes that create 
a framework to regulate the transport of hazardous materials between Member States. The 
two annexes include (European Union, 2004):
• Regulations concerning the merchandise involved, notably their packaging and labels 
(annex A).
• Regulations concerning the construction, equipment and use of vehicles for the 
transport of hazardous materials (annex B).
In practice, this means that the transport of hazardous materials is only allowed if it complies 
with the rules laid down in the RID. The regulation contains rules related to packaging 
materials, documentation, education of staff, design of packaging materials, checking the 
material, etc. Every company that transports materials in Europe must have a safety expert.
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Kemler codes and UN Numbers
Hazard identification numbers (or Kemler codes) and the UN 
numbers are used to identify materials that are being transported.
When transporting hazardous materials, tank wagons must be 
fitted with orange plates bearing the hazard identification 
number (here, ‘33’) and the UN number (‘1203’). The hazard 
identification number includes four numbers that indicate the 
nature of the transported material, while the UN number gives 
the exact identification of the goods. The hazard plate shown in 
figure 23 indicates that a highly flammable liquid (33) is being Figure 23- Example ° f  
transported, and that this liquid is petrol (1203). These numbers an orange hazard plate 
contrast with the categories as they are perceived in national policy documents. The 
Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, for example, refers 
to categories A (flammable gases), B2 (toxic gases), B3 (highly toxic gases), C3 (flammable 
liquids), D3 (toxic liquids) and D4 (highly toxic liquids).
2.4.2 National plans
In 2001, the fourth National Environmental Policy Plan was presented by the Netherlands 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. The plan devoted special 
attention to external safety due to the disaster that had occurred in Enschede in 2000. This 
becomes clear when looking at the seven main problems or challenges for the near future 
(until 2030). Of these problems, two are directly related to external safety or risks (Ministerie 
van VROM, 2001, pp. 47-91).
The policy plan announced the intention for implementation of the norms for group 
risk (GR) and individual risk (IR) to become statutory in the future. These norms also apply to 
the transport of hazardous materials. The plan states that these norms have their basis in the 
policy that is applied to industrial plants. As such, the norms that are used are the same, which 
also explains the ‘flexible’ use of the orientation value for the GR criterion. The policy itself 
is not aimed at controlling the transport modality directly (ibid., p. 285). Although at the time 
the norms were not legally binding (nor was the IR norm), external safety policy had to be 
‘taken into account’ in the context of spatial plans. The plan sets out seven basic principles for 
the future (ibid., p. 290):
• A minimum level of safety must be created for the living environment with regard to 
hazardous materials by making the IR norm legally binding.
• Public bodies and politicians must become more aware of risks and potential disasters. 
The acceptance of risks should be the result of weighing alternative plans and the 
possibilities for dealing with disasters, as well as weighing the costs and benefits of 
the use of the hazardous materials in relation to spatial plans.
• Social costs should be incorporated into the costs of hazardous materials.
• The policy for industrial plants should take transport risks into account. This means 
that production and transport of hazardous materials should be analysed in terms of 
chains and that safety within the chain should be improved.
• A limitation of transport routes should be established in accordance with international 
rules.
• The responsibilities of the various actors should be clarified and harmonised.
• Risk communication to the public should be improved and a duty to register risky 
situations will be established.
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In the case of situations where the risks are exceeded, the competent authorities should choose 
between allowing the risk bearing activity and allowing urban development in the respective 
area.
In the same year, 2001, the Dutch government published the fifth Memorandum on 
Spatial Development (Vijfde nota ruimtelijke ordening). In this Memorandum, it was 
suggested that urban land-use should be intensified in order to take the pressure off rural areas 
surrounding cities. This intensified urban land-use however contradicts the expectations 
related to the goals of the fourth National Environmental Policy Plan. However, the 
Memorandum was never really effectuated due to rapid political shifts in the Netherlands.
Five years later, the National Spatial Strategy (Nota Ruimte) (Ministerie van VROM, 
2006d) was published. According to this memorandum, the goal of the Dutch government 
was to remove possible barriers to economic growth while ensuring the safety of the 
population and ‘good’ spatial planning. The key principles of this plan stress the importance 
of a sustainable spatial development, one important element of which is safety. These key 
principles are (ibid.):
• Strengthening the international competitive position of the Netherlands.
• Strong cities and a vibrant, dynamic countryside.
• Preserving important national and international spatial values.
• Ensuring public safety.
The policy itself has barely changed compared with the fifth Memorandum. The main 
difference between the ‘fifth memorandum’ and the ‘strategy memorandum’ is mainly found 
in the ideas on governance. The National Spatial Strategy took a significant step towards 
decentralising decisions on spatial development to the local and regional level to assure a 
deregulated spatial policy in which the emphasis shifted from ‘spatial regulation’ to ‘spatial 
development’. This implies that local authorities receive more freedom to plan their urban 
environment.
With respect to safety goals, the memorandum states that constant improvement of 
safety is the goal of the Dutch government. Apart from this, the Dutch government states that 
safety goals will be codified and that responsibilities concerning the standards will be 
decentralised. Some issues will be primarily addressed by the central government, such as the 
transport of hazardous materials, clustering chemical production facilities and Schiphol 
Airport.
2.4.3 Transport of hazardous materials policy
The aforedescribed external safety policy framework also constitutes the setting in which the 
more specific field of hazardous materials transport is treated. The first important policy 
document in this context is the ‘Risk standardisation for the transport of hazardous materials 
circular’ (Circulaire Risiconormering Vervoer Gevaarlijke Stoffen) (RSHTM Circular). This 
document describes the national policy for the safety of the transport of hazardous materials 
by rail, and was therefore primarily drawn up by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management. The circular is closely related to the 2004 Decision on External Safety 
Decree (Besluit Externe VeiligheidInrichtingen; BEVI) for industrial plants. This Decision on 
External Safety Decree concerns (among others):
- The elaboration of the norms for the IR and their application.
- How matters are dealt with when the GR orientation value is exceeded.
- The personal emergency preparedness and justification duty concerning GR.
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- The assessment of a list of vulnerable objects and partially vulnerable objects.
In this respect, the RSHTM circular relates these issues to transport and most importantly, it 
defines the group risk (GR) and the individual risk (IR) norms to transport. It also states that it 
is a ‘forerunner for an ultimately legally binding risk policy’ (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat et al., 2004, p. 2). The IR is a limiting value in policy terms. This means that the 
norms should be complied with, but may be deviated from under specific circumstances. Due 
to the practice of this policy, it has become a rule of practice (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2005b, pp.18-19). It is nevertheless not a norm that civilians can use in court to 
exercise their right to a safe living environment.
There are several values for the IR to comply with. The circular refers to two 
situations, namely existing and new situations. New situations are divided into vulnerable and 
limitedly vulnerable objects. The IR values are either limiting values or guiding values. 
Limiting values give a minimum amount of ‘risk quality’ that has to be achieved. Guiding 
values should be achieved whenever possible. Table 2 shows the IR values for the two 
situations.
Table 2: IR values derived from the RSTHM Circular
Existing situations Limiting va lues 10-5 
(Aim for 10-6)
New
Vulnerable
objects
Lim iting va lue 10-6
situations Less
vulnerable Guiding va lue 10-6
objects
The orientation value for the GR is based on the risk of a certain number of fatalities per 
kilometre of a transport route per year. The orientation value is a ‘softer’ value than the IR 
norm and can therefore be more easily deviated from compared with the IR norm. Figures 24 
and 25 illustrate compliance and non-compliance to the orientation value. Figure 24 depicts a 
curve that does not cross the orientation value, while figure 25 shows a curve that does cross 
it.
Com pliance
Frequency(0
Orientation value transport risk 
Orientation value installations
Number of 
casualties (N)
N on-com pliance
Frequency (0
Onentation value transport nsk 
Orientation value installations
Number of 
casualties (N)
Figure 24 and 25: Representations of GR for installations and transport
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To calculate and estimate transport risks for water, road and rail transport, the Netherlands 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, provided a standardised risk 
model, the so-called RBMII model. RBMII is an abbreviation of the Dutch name Risico 
Berekening Methodiek II  (Second Risk Calculation Methodology). The RBMII model is the 
follow-up to the model applied in the past called IPORBM, and has several adaptations and 
improvements. To quantify risks, a number of standardisations are used to arrive at a risk 
value. This is laid down in a series of ‘coloured’ books: the Red Book describes the methods 
for calculating probabilities, the Yellow Book describes the methods for calculating 
consequences, the Green Book lays down how to describe damage, while the Purple Book is 
the guideline for performing a risk analysis itself, providing guidance on the use of these 
books, standard scenario selection and frequency attribution (RIVM, 2001; Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat et al., 2004).
When the GR is exceeded or increases, the responsible authorities must take this into 
account when deciding on new urban or transport plans. Because the orientation value is a 
guiding value, the responsible authorities must limit the increase in the group risk wherever 
possible. If this is not possible, they must reduce the risk following the ALARA/ALARP 
principle. The Circular states that it is recommendable to involve the fire department for 
advice.
Because of a number of difficulties and misunderstandings in practice regarding this 
deviation from the orientation value, a policy decision was published to explain in which 
cases decentralised policy makers may deviate from the orientation value (Ministerie van 
VROM, 2004b). This duty to give account is laid down in the Guide to the Group Risk 
Justification Duty (Handreiking Verantwoordingsplicht Groepsrisico). In practice, this means 
that the responsible authorities must take into account peoples’ personal emergency 
preparedness, possibilities to deal with possible disasters, alternatives to the proposed plan 
and possible risk reducing measures. Besides these four criteria, the justification must 
mention the use and the necessity of the plan and any possible changes in the risk situation 
over time. The justification can be done by a quantitative and/or a qualitative analysis of 
measures aimed at increasing safety.
The circular also describes the preferred risk approach as a way of defining the 
maximum risks for an area and takes the vulnerability of the area into account. The approach 
consists of four steps:
1) Identification o f risks: in order to define the risks, information must be gathered by the 
initiator (mostly a local authority) about transport flows (which materials are 
transported and in what quantities), spatial developments and population densities. A 
rough impression of risks can be found in one of the risk atlases in which (under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management) recent 
figures are published on transport risks in Dutch urban areas.
2) Risk analysis: if  the previous step elicits concern that a situation involves risks that 
might be higher than the standard, the risks must be analysed in depth and quantified 
by the initiator of the plan. This is currently done with the help of the RBMII model 
(although the circular mentions its predecessor, IPORBM).
3) Testing the calculated risks against the standards for IR and GR. The limiting value 
for the IR may be exceeded when urban developments are very important, when a 
situation exists that would make the transport of hazardous materials impossible, or 
when by applying the standards the external safety situation in other places would 
increase dramatically. For guiding values, deviation from the standards is possible 
when there are considerable interests for transport, spatial planning or the economy. 
Deviation from the norm is possible for the competent authorities after consultation
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with the actors involved and when there are solid grounds.
4) Risk reduction by analysing aspects of peoples’ personal emergency preparedness and 
aspects of relief: when limiting values are exceeded, mitigating measures are in 
principle always necessary. When guiding values are exceeded, the aim is to also take 
mitigating measures, which should be done integrally. This means that it is not only 
important to take transport, spatial developments or the infrastructure into account, but 
also the possibilities to offer relief or to ensure personal emergency preparedness. The 
cost of taking measures should be weighed against the benefits. This means not only 
benefits or costs for the national economy, but also costs and benefits for the local use 
of space. Measures should first be taken at the source of the problem, such as re­
routing the transport, reducing speed or traffic, improving the infrastructure, etc. 
Measures aimed at reducing the negative impacts of possible disasters are, for 
example, good escape routes or good communicative information. These measures 
should be paid for according to a ‘polluter pays’ analogy: ‘the causer pays’.
In 2006, the Transport of Hazardous Materials Memorandum was published. This document 
gives a further interpretation of the goals set in the Mobility Policy Document for the near 
future until 2011 (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b). The two main goals are to 
balance the interests between safety and spatial plans, and to implement more instruments to 
influence the level of safety. The first goal should be achieved by creating a ‘basic network’ 
for the transport of hazardous materials (this concept is further discussed in section 2.6). To 
achieve the second goal, an attempt must be made to continuously improve safety by adopting 
more and new policy instruments, such as incident registration and improved safety control 
systems. Both goals are set in a more decentralised way: stakeholders from the market and 
from the government have their own responsibilities (ibid., p. 11).
In relation to this idea of distribution of responsibilities, we refer to a third important 
document: the Rail concession main rail infrastructure (Beheerconsessie hoofdspoorweg 
infrastructuur) (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005d), in which the tasks and 
obligations of rail operator ProRail are laid down. The document also addresses safety 
elements, which are only indirectly related to external safety. The main safety aspects are the 
obligation for ProRail to maintain the railways and their safety. The relationship with external 
safety in this case is that ProRail is legally obliged to implement safety management systems 
which ensure the safety of all transports and not just transport of hazardous materials.
Summarising the preceding, the approach taken in these documents on risk 
management related to transport of hazardous materials is, as we expected, very much 
inspired by the general risk management approach as described in section 2.2. The approach 
is dominated by a focus on analysing and controlling risks, on the one hand by quantifying as 
accurate as possible the level of risk and by specifying risk reducing strategies and on the 
other hand by allocating responsibilities and implementing accountability procedures for risk 
management. The policy in the documents discussed in this section show a firm believe in the 
possibilities to more or less know the risks, understand their causes and effects and to manage 
them properly. The discourse therefore does not show much of a discussion about the 
existence of uncertainty and ambiguity (no explicit reference is made to the lack or unreliable 
data, confused stakeholders, mulptiple interpretations of institutional rules, et cetera). Instead, 
also here referring to the framework of Klinke and Renn (2002), the implicit perception of 
risks seems to be strongly linked to the concept of managing simple risks and, to a limited 
extent, complexity (in particular the focus on multiple causes and effects).
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2.5 Possible network solutions for reducing local risks
2.5.1 Introduction
Besides attempts to influence urban planning and decision-making at local level by 
implementing generic external safety standards and by reaching agreements with the rail 
infrastructure manager, the Dutch government has taken two major initiatives to reduce the 
tension between external safety policy and urban development in the context of hazardous 
transports. The first initiative concerns the decision in 1995 to build a dedicated freight 
railway line, known as the Betuwe line, because of the region it crosses. This railway line 
aims to bundle much of the rail transport crossing the Netherlands. The track has been 
designed and constructed to avoid crossing urban areas as much as possible. The second 
initiative is of more recent date (2005, but not yet fully implemented) and involves the 
introduction of the so-called Basic Network for the transport of hazardous materials. In the 
next subsections, these initiatives and their influence on safety and urban spatial planning will 
be described in more detail.
2.5.2 The Betuwe line
The Betuwe line is a dedicated freight railway that became operational in 2007. It was 
specifically constructed to transport all types of freight from the Port of Rotterdam to the 
German Ruhr area, and as such is expected to significantly relieve another railway -  the 
Brabant line -  from the need to accommodate the transport of hazardous materials. The 
Brabant line faces problems with respect to external safety, as figures 6 and 7 indicate. There 
are six fairly large cities located adjacent to the Brabant line, in all of which the quantified 
risk exceeds the orientation value for GR. These cities are (see figure 26) Zwijndrecht (1), 
Dordrecht (2), Breda (3), Tilburg (4), Eindhoven (5) and Venlo (6). The largest city is 
Eindhoven (almost 210,000 inhabitants), and the smallest is Zwijndrecht (just over 45,000 
inhabitants). Of these cities, Breda and Venlo exceed the GR orientation value by a factor of 
between 1 and 3 respectively. Of the other four cities, Zwijndrecht, Dordrecht and Eindhoven 
exceed the GR orientation value by more than a factor of 10. Apart from this, they all have 
several buildings located within the 10-6 contours. This is clearly due to the large volume of 
hazardous materials transported annually by rail through these cities.
Figure 26: The Betuwe line (solid line) and the Brabant line (dotted line)
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2.5.2.1 Effects of the Betuwe line on the Brabant line
The total volume of hazardous materials transported on the Brabant line in 2003 is shown in 
table 3. The names of the sections of the railway do not represent all the cities mentioned, but 
are derived from official railway documents and refer to their technical name in the railway 
network. However, the numbers (1) to (6) refer to the cities mentioned.
Table 3: Volume of transport of hazardous materials on the Brabant line in 2003 in 
numbers of tank wagons (ProRail, 2005)
Section of the Brabant line Realised transport in 2003 per category
A B2 B 38 C3 D3 D4
(1 ) K ijfhoek -  (2 )  D ordrecht 6350 100 0 13150 1800 1300
(2 ) D ordrech t -  Lage Zw aluw 6350 100 0 10700 1800 950
Lage Zw aluw  -  Z ev en b erg seh o ek 5 20 0 100 0 10000 1800 950
Z even b erg seh o ek  -  (3 ) Breda  
Aansluiting
2 75 0 0 0 820 0 1400 700
(3 ) Breda Aansluiting -  (4 ) Tilburg 
aansluiting
4 85 0 0 0 820 0 1400 700
(4 ) Tilburg aansluiting -  Boxtel 4 85 0 0 0 7150 1400 450
B oxtel - (5 )  Tongelre aansluiting 4 85 0 190 0 9 0 820 0 1400 500
(5 ) Tongelre aansluiting-(6) Venlo 4 65 0 50 0 6950 450 450
The total volume of rail transport is generally expected to grow in the future (Railcargo, 
2005). However, the growth figures are not clear with regard to the various classes of 
hazardous materials. For category B2 materials, a growth of between -10% and +16% is 
expected. For category A materials, from which the leading scenario is derived, a growth of 
25-80% in the period from 1996 to 2020 is expected (ProRail, 2003).
The estimated volume of hazardous materials transported on the Brabant line for the 
near future (2012) is given in table 4. Once the Betuwe line is fully operational, part of the 
flow will be moved from the Brabant line to the Betuwe line. In a document prepared by 
ProRail, the forecast for the transport of hazardous materials by rail is given for the year 2012 
and beyond. The estimated transport flows for all categories are based on current trends in 
transport and economy and include the Betuwe line in the rail system.
8 This refers to chloride gas, which is hardly transported in the Netherlands as a whole and not expected to be 
transported on this railway at all.
9 These numbers are due to a supply route from the south which crosses the Brabant Railway.
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Table 4: Future transport figures on the Brabant line (ProRail, 2003)
Section of the Brabant line _______________ Forecast for 2012 per m atter category_________
A B 2 B3 C3 D3 D4
(1 ) K ijfhoek -  (2 ) D ordrecht 450 0 100 0 3250 1150 2 00 0
(2 )  D ordrech t -  Lage Zw aluw 450 0 100 0 3250 1150 1000
Lage Zw aluw  -  Z ev en b erg seh o ek - - - - - -10
Z even b erg seh o ek  -  (3 ) Breda  
Aansluiting
550 0 0 0 1150 300
(3 )  Breda Aansluiting -  (4 )  
Tilburg aansluiting
440 0 0 0 0 1150 300
(4 )  Tilburg aansluiting -  Boxtel 285 0 0 0 0 1150 300
B oxtel - (5 )  Tongelre aansluiting 285 0 3 6 5 0 11 0 2500 1150 300
(5 ) Tongelre aansluiting-(6) Venlo 230 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5.2.2 Effects on the calculated risk
A comparison of tables 3 and 4 reveals important differences in the volume of transported 
materials. It has been pointed out that category A materials contribute most to the GR, 
because of the dominant BLEVE scenario. Category C3 materials mainly contribute to the IR. 
As is shown in table 4, the maximum number of tank wagons is 3250 per year in 2012, which 
is 9900 tank wagons fewer than in 2003. The resulting figure is little more than the 3000 tank 
wagons that (as noted before) is the minimum volume required to create an IR 10-6 contour 
outside the railway. However, the extra 250 tank wagons will not create a large contour 
outside the railway (AVIV & Royalhaskoning, 2005). Therefore, there will not be any 
vulnerable objects within this contour and the risks will be reduced to what is, in terms of 
Dutch policy, a ‘satisfactory’ level.
By comparing tables 3 and 4 for category A transports, percentages can be calculated 
for the reduction of volumes by dividing the estimated transport flows for the Brabant line in 
the future situation by the transport flows of the 2003 situation. These percentages illustrate 
the reduction in rail transport, indicating the factor that shows the expected reduction in the 
level of transport on the Brabant line as a result of the Betuwe line. Table 5 shows the present 
number of category A transports, the future number of transports, the differences expressed in 
a percentage decrease in volume and the actual transport figures in 2007 (see ProRail, 2003; 
ProRail, 2008).
10 The forecast is unclear on this part of the Brabant Railway.
11 These numbers are due to a supply route from the south which crosses the Brabant Railway.
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Table 5: Difference in volumes in numbers of wagons of transported category A 
materials on the Brabant line
Section of the Brabant line Situation in Future  D ifference in Transport
(2 0 0 3 ) situation p ercen ta g e  for rea lised  in 
______________________________________________________________ (2 0 1 2 )________ 2 00 3  and 2012___________2 0 0 7
(1 )  K ijfhoek -  (2 ) D ordrecht 6350 4500 -2 9 % 1 3,1 5 0
(2 )  D ordrech t -  Lage Zwaluw 6350 4500 -2 9 % 1 3,1 0 0
Lage Zw aluw  - 5 20 0 Unclear Unclear 1 1 ,4 0 0
Z even b e rg se h o ek
Z eve n b erg seh o ek  -  (3 ) Breda 2 75 0 550 -8 0 % 5900
Aansluiting
(3 )  Breda Aansluiting -  (4 ) 4 85 0 4400 -9 % 1 2 ,6 0 0
Tilburg aansluiting
(4 )  Tilburg aansluiting -  Boxtel 4 85 0 2850 -4 1 % 1 0,3 0 0
B oxtel - (5 )  Tongelre aansluiting 4 85 0 2850 -4 1 % 1 0,5 0 0
(5 )  Tongelre aansluiting-(6) 4 65 0 2300 -4 9 % 9300
Venlo
Based on the first four columns of table 6, the information suggests that the GRs should be 
lower for the total Brabant line due to the introduction of the Betuwe line. However, this does 
not necessarily imply that the resulting risk levels will fall below the GR orientation value. 
The way in which risk is calculated -  namely by multiplying the probability of an accident by 
the effects -  implies a linear relationship. Thus, if  the effects or the probability fall by a 
certain factor, the risk levels will fall by the same factor. Therefore, if  transport of hazardous 
materials is reduced by 29%, the risks will also be reduced by 29%, assuming all other 
conditions remain the same. However, if  the GR norm in the present situation is exceeded by 
a factor of 10, a 29% reduction will not be enough to improve the situation to a level that is 
lower than the norm.
Apart from this calculative consideration, there is another point to be made when 
looking at the final column of table 5. As can be seen, figures for all parts of the Brabant line 
from 2007 indicate a substantial increase (ProRail, 2008) rather than the pursued reduction. 
This is partly due to the fact that the Betuwe line was not fully operational in 2007 and 
therefore, one might expect an improvement soon. However, although it is likely that the 
Betuwe line will improve the situation on the Brabant line, it is nevertheless highly uncertain 
whether the Betuwe line will reduce the risks to acceptable levels below the GR orientation 
value.
2.5.3 The Basic Network
2.5.3.1 Concept and policy aims
The ‘basic network’ (Basisnet) for the transport routes of hazardous materials was recently 
launched by the Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. 
Although this network focuses on transport routes for hazardous materials transport by road, 
railway and waterway, the focus here is on rail transport. The basic network categorises 
transport routes and assigns a maximum volume of transport of hazardous materials by rail to 
these categories, measured in number of tank wagons. In this regard, an initial elaboration on 
the basic network was given in the Mobility Policy Document (Nota Mobiliteit; Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004). The document states that the government intends to create 
a basic network consisting of three types of routes that differ in importance to either spatial
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development or transport. A distinction is made between three main categories for transport of 
hazardous materials, with a different value of importance to either transport of hazardous 
materials or spatial development. These categories are:
• Primary routes with unlimited transport of hazardous materials. Urban development 
has major limitations due to safety zoning.
• Secondary routes where transport of hazardous materials as well as urban development 
have their limitations.
• Tertiary routes on which transport of hazardous materials is limited and next to which 
urban development should not be hindered at all.
In November 2005, the document was sent for approval to parliament by the Minister of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
2006c). The document mentions two strategies for improving safety. The first is the basic 
network, while the second is the constant improvement of safety. With respect to the basic 
network, the memorandum renamed the primary, secondary and tertiary routes as category 1,
2 and 3 routes.
In the draft version of 12 December 2005 of the ‘Decision on the Routing of the 
Transport of Hazardous Materials by Rail’ (Besluit routering vervoer over de spoorweg van 
gevaarlijke stoffen), a new distinction was made in five categories (categories 1, 2A, 2B, 3A 
and 3B) (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005b). The idea behind this distinction is the 
same as in the Mobility Document, but now the nature and volume of hazardous materials to 
be transported is more specified. Category 1 and category 3B are the extreme categories. For 
category 1 railways, there is still no limitation with respect to the nature and volume of 
hazardous materials transported, while category 3B railways are free from the transport of 
hazardous materials. These quantities constitute one of the two central principles of the basic 
network, namely the ‘user space’.
The following limitations are given for categories 2A, 2B and 3A:
Table 6: Proposed maximum number of tank wagons transported on railway tracks per 
year per category for the basic network (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005b)
Type of the transported  
hazardous material
Hazard Identification  
Num bers 
(Kem ler Codes)
Allowed num ber of 
transported per year
tank w agons
Category 2A 
railways
Category 2B  
railways
Category 3A 
railways
Flammable gases 
(M atter category A)
23, 263, 239 12,500 2500 350
Toxic gases 
(M atter category B2)
26, 265, 268 (except for 
UN 1017, Chloride gas)
6600 5400 1250
Highly toxic gases 
(M atter category B3)
268 (in this case UN 1017, 
Chloride gas)
0 200 0
Highly flammable liquids 
(M atter category C3)
33, X33 , 336 (except for 
UN 1093, Acrylonitrile).
5000 4000 1250
Toxic liquids 
(M atter category D3)
336 (in this case UN 1093, 
Acrylonitrile).
15,500 6300 1200
Highly toxic liquids 
(M atter category D4)
66, 663, 668, 886, X88, 
X886
1500 750 750
The other central principle of the basic network is safety zoning: a static safety zone is created 
where no vulnerable objects may be built. Examples of vulnerable objects are hospitals, 
homes and schools, since the level of peoples’ personal emergency preparedness within these
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buildings is relatively low. This zone is assumed to be three dimensional. Therefore, 
constructions cannot cover the rail infrastructure, unless the infrastructure is strengthened to 
withstand large explosions. The safety zoning is mainly intended for category 1 railways and 
is based on the occurrence of a pool fire, which has a maximum effect of about 30 metres. 
Hence, the safety zone for category 1 railways is set at 30 metres on either side of the railway. 
For category 2 railways, a smaller zone should be established according to the Transport of 
Hazardous Materials Memorandum (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b, p. 16). If 
an increase in the GR is expected near category 1 or 2 railways, a safety consideration should 
be made about external safety and the development plan up to a zone of 200 metres from the 
rail track in order to reduce risks. Beyond this zone there are, in theory, no limitations on 
spatial development.
The combination of these principles, limiting volumes and the Dutch railway network 
results in a map with the qualified railway tracks. What we see then is that almost the entire 
railway infrastructure in the Netherlands constitutes the basic network (see figure 27).
Figure 27: Map of the Netherlands showing the corresponding railway categories 
(based on Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005b)
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2.5.3.2 Advantages of a basic network
The basic network and the coordinating Transport of Hazardous Materials Memorandum is a 
specific answer to the two of the recommendations made by Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat 
& Vromraad (2003; see also Chapter 1): one should accept living in a risk society, but actors 
must continue to improve the situation with regard to external safety; decision making and 
communication should be transparent.
The basic network has two advantages. The first advantage is that it reflects a new 
approach to risk policy, facilitating solutions to bottlenecks in the rail network regarding 
urban development in the vicinity of those routes. This network provides a transparent 
overview of transport routes and transport volumes on those routes in the Netherlands, while 
also representing potential conflict locations near those routes where intensification of urban 
spaces is planned in the future. Obviously, the Betuwe line is part of the basic network. Since 
the use of the basic network will be less dependent on risk calculations and more on 
monitoring the actual volume of hazardous materials transported in order to compare this with 
the maximum permitted volume, the basic network has the potential to become a strong tool 
to prevent problems for local authorities wanting to implement urban plans but facing high 
calculated risks. Plans can be developed in such a way that the maximum permitted transport 
volumes are taken into account: the possibilities of urban development adjacent to the railway 
track are possibly easier to analyse. In other words, the basic network has the potential to 
fulfil the need for a transparent risk policy for local planners and political decision makers. 
The down side is that the transport ceilings could result in severe spatial limitations and limits 
to the ambitions of local authorities, especially in the case of locations along category 1 or 2 
freight railways.
The second advantage lies in the fact that the memorandum also strongly underlines 
that the Dutch government should strive to continuously improve safety. This should be done 
by focusing intensively on and registering incidents, improving legislation, good 
communication of risks and other specific measures (which are not important for the 
underlying case). This approach helps to more adequately communicate issues of risk between 
authorities and civilians. This is seen as an advantage since, as is also expressed by 
Adriaansen (2006), it is hard to explain to civilians what safety and risk mean. Each person 
has his or her own view on safety. Estimates such as GRs or IRs of 3.4 * 10-6, for example, 
are not easily understood without expert knowledge. It becomes even more difficult when 
new calculations show that risks have increased due to adjustments to the structure of the 
model that is used to give insight in the risk level. It is expected to be much easier to 
communicate to other parties or civilians that on certain parts of the basic network an 
agreement on maximum allowed volume of transport cannot be violated. The idea of a basic 
network could therefore serve as a tool for a more rational way of dealing with risks. This fits 
with the main notion of the previously mentioned report by the Dutch National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment (Coping Rationally with Risks; RIVM, 2003), which 
argues that a less rigid and emotional approach to risks is necessary for a sound risk policy.
2.5.3.3 Disadvantages of a basic network
The concept of a basic network has two main disadvantages. The first is that at several places 
in the network the number of permitted transports is higher than it is at this moment. Table 6 
shows the maximum volume (ceilings) of hazardous materials to be transported in the future 
on the designated railway tracks. A comparison of these ceilings with the present figures on 
transported volumes reveals that the future ceilings will be much higher in some parts of the 
network than the current transport volume. Cities where safety standards are already exceeded 
could face even higher risks due to doubled or even tripled transport volumes. This is
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illustrated by two examples. In the most recent transport figures, the cities of Roosendaal and 
Dordrecht had to deal with the transport flows as given in table 7. In the same table, the 
permitted future situation according to the basic network philosophy is given.
Table 7: Example of transport figures in the present and future situation in Roosendaal 
and Dordrecht (based on: ProRail, 2005; Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005b)
Exam ple 1: Roosendaal Exam ple 2 : Dordrecht
Type of 
transported 
m aterial
S ituation in 
2003
Allowed fu ture  
situation
Situation in 2003 Allowed
future
situation
Flammable gases 
(C a teg o ry  A) 4500 1 2,5 0 0 6350 1 2,500
Toxic gases 
(C a teg o ry  B 2) 100 6600 100 6600
Highly flammable
1850 5 00 0 1 3 ,1 5 0 500 0
liquids (Cat. C3) 
Toxic liquids 
(C a teg o ry  D 3) 4 00 1 5,5 0 0 1800 1 5,500
Highly toxic liquids 
(Cat. D 4) 2 00 1500 1300 1500
It should be noted that Roosendaal already has to deal with the fact that the GR norm is 
exceeded by a factor of between 3 and 10, while the current situation in Dordrecht exceeds the 
norm by a factor of more than 10 (AVIV & Royal Haskoning, 2005). Since there is a linear 
relationship between the volume of transported materials and the risks they cause, double the 
volume of transport will increase the risks by a factor of two.
For the GR, this means that the risk of the dominant BLEVE scenario will probably 
increase as a result of allowing more transport of flammable gases. This is also the most 
sensitive subject, and thus the most difficult subject to debate. In terms of GR, these high 
ceilings would probably be a problem in terms of exceeding the orientation value, as the 
ceilings are often higher than the present transported quantities.
The second disadvantage is a possible problem concerning the enforcement of these 
ceilings. The ‘Transport of Hazardous Materials Memorandum’ states that the Transport and 
Water Management Inspectorate (Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat) should monitor and ensure 
the safety of transport by rail. Monitoring the transport and enforcing compliance with the 
ceilings is the responsibility of ProRail (the rail infrastructure management agency). However, 
this monitoring is delayed or at least not done in real time. The available figures concerning 
the volume of transported materials are actually a snapshot of the past and consequently may 
vary in time. To give an example, the most recent figures for the transport of hazardous 
materials by rail in 2005 that were accessible to the public were the figures for 2003. It can 
therefore be argued that maintaining these transport ceilings will be difficult if  it is only 
concluded months later that more hazardous materials have been transported than permitted. It 
is also difficult to rely on trends in the increase of transport, because the transport volumes 
can vary enormously over a couple of years. Therefore, if  done properly, a more up-to-date 
enforcement method is necessary (e.g. a satellite-based tracking and tracing system).
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2.5.3.4 Feasibility of the basic network concept
Various questions have risen with respect to the feasibility of the basic network (Van der 
Vlies & Suddle, 2008). The questions concern the following issues:
1) International institutions (directives, legislation) form the starting point for the 
basic network
International institutions are very important for regulating transport and making transport 
safer. In particular, the EU ‘Free Transport of Goods Directive’ is relevant when it comes to 
safety. Pursuant to this directive, transport operating companies may transport their goods 
from country A to country B within the EU. A routing policy is therefore only possible when 
authorities have sufficient and acceptable alternatives (Asser Instituut, 2007). It is therefore 
disputable whether prescribed routing complies with these international regulations. 
Moreover, due to this European directive, transport companies may freely transport their 
materials through the territory of member states and consequently also the territory of local 
authorities. Consequently, local authorities cannot freely develop their territory, as they must 
comply with the rules regarding the GR criterion. Growing volumes of transport in the future 
will therefore reduce the possibilities of local authorities and the tension this creates will 
increase.
2) Market expectations on which the basic network is based are already out o f date 
The rail network administrator, ProRail, published future transport figures for the period until 
the year 2020 (ProRail, 2007). These figures are updated numbers for the ‘policy-free market 
prognosis 2003’. The latter forms the basis for the transport ceilings for the different parts of 
the basic network. At first, it seemed that the transport ceilings were much higher than the 
2003 market prognosis deemed necessary. However, the updated 2007 market prognosis now 
shows even higher numbers than the transport numbers on which the basic network is based. 
We now have to consider the consequences of a market that seems to be growing faster than 
assumed during the formulation of the plan and whether or not the fundaments of the plan are 
good.
3) Group risk considerations should still be made
Because GR considerations still need to be made for category 2 and category 3 railways, a 
problem arises when the transport figures increase so drastically. Due to the way in which 
risks are modelled, an increase in the volume of transported hazardous materials implies a 
higher risk, since the probability of a disaster increases. Moreover, additional housing and 
working developments near a transport route also increase risk due to the higher potential 
effect of incidents (generally more people are present near the transport route).
4) Permanent improvement o f safety is not embedded in the decision-making process 
It is very difficult to implement higher standards for transport companies without harming the 
competitive position of the transport companies. It is possible but not necessary for transport 
companies to take safety measures that are stricter than the European rules. However, a 
national government cannot force these companies to do so. Setting higher safety standards 
for the national territory would violate European directives. Also, the costs for transport 
companies related to the implementation of measures are only necessary for the Dutch 
territory, which only constitutes a small part of the wagons’ total coverage area. As wagons 
travel all over Europe, extra requirements for safety measures for the national territory of the 
Netherlands are hard to implement.
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2.5.3.5 Implementation of the basis network: the state-of-the-art
In July 2010, the Dutch government took a decision on the basic network (Werkgroep 
Basisnet Spoor, 2011). Through the years, the basic network was highly discussed by people 
and evolved into a concept that differs from the concept discussed above. First, the transport 
routes are no longer divided into primary, secondary and tertiary routes. Instead, the present 
design now distinguishes three different types of railroads, without mentioning an explicit 
amount of maximally allowed transported hazardous materials. Now they distinguish 
railroads, along which safety zones and the so called pool fire attention area (plasbrand 
aandachtsgebied, or PAG in short), may be constituted. Safety zones are the equivalent of the 
area measured from the centre of the bundle of railroads and the maximum 10-6 contour if 
applicable. The pool fire attention area is an area along both sides of a railroad of 30 meters 
wide, in which no vulnerable objects may be built.
The qualifications that are now given to these railroads are that of railroads with pool 
fire attention areas, which are railroads with a significant amount of transported hazardous 
materials (especially flammable liquids), railroads without poolfire attention areas and 
railroads that in principle only facilitate hazardous materials incidentally and in limited 
volumes. Adjacent to these railroads, there are neither safety zones nor pool fire attention 
areas.
Second, the implementation of a maximum alowed amount of transported hazardous 
materials per route category has been altered slightly into a maximum risk capacity per route. 
This means that until the maximum risk capacity is reached -  which, in theory, is constantly 
monitored and modelled and set to the orientation value - all materials may be transported up 
to the maximum amount of risk. In practice, this risk capacity is determined by creating a 
maximum amount of allowed transport, categorised into the regular different classes of 
hazardous materials (category A, C3 etc.). Therefore, the efforts of the Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management are now directed to lowering risks adjacent to the 
railroads. Here, the efforts aim to avoid the possibility of bottlenecks (knelpunten): spots with 
buildings within the safety zone (hence, within the 10-6 contour), or focus points 
(aandachtspunten), which are spots where the GR criterion is still exceeded. The avoidance of 
bottlenecks is a design requirement for a success of the basic network. The focus points may 
remain, although it is desired by the Ministry to lower the GR as much as possible.
The third noticeable thing is, that the total amount of projected transport for the year 
2020 (based on Prorail’s 2007 market forecast) is to be facilitated over the basic network. 
This implies that the foreseen increase of transport up to 2020 has to be accommodated by the 
basic network. To be able to anticipate future real estate developments, all affected 
municipalities were able to declare all their development plans to the Ministry, no matter how 
vague or uncertain they were. In return, the Ministry has to take these into account when 
calculating risks and designing the basic network.
Finally, the Ministry has started talks with transport operating companies in order to 
come to a covenant. This pursued covenant aims to make agreements on the composition of 
trains in order to ban LPGs from being transported together with flammable liquids. In this 
way, the warm bleve scenario can be avoided, which significantly lowers the calculated risks. 
It is difficult to achieve this for international transport: the transit of hazardous materials from 
countries outside the Netherlands cannot be included in the covenant. This is about 20% of 
the total transport. Other, mainly infrastructural measures such as implementation of switches 
and hotboxes to lower risks will also be implemented in the near future. This is done in order 
to facilitate all the projected hazardous materials.
With respect to the four critical notions on the feasibility of the basic network, only 
the second seems to have become of less importance, due to the implementation of the 
intended enforcement of the maximum risk capacity. Nevertheless, this is highly dependent
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on good monitoring in advance of transport of hazardous materials, which has not yet been 
developed. The third critical notion concerning group risk considerations is still present, 
although not as significant as before. The difference is that GR considerations are no longer 
dependent on transport forecasts, as for all routes maximum amounts of transport are 
instituted in accordance to the implementation of the maximum risk capacity. Nevertheless, 
these maximum risk capacities are for up to 10 situations above the orientation value 
(Werkgroep Basisnet Spoor, 2011).
2.6 Conclusions
The question posed in this chapter was: which institutions influence transport related risks, 
risk management and urban planning in the Netherlands? Firstly, I presented the dominating 
approach of risk management and indicated its relevance for this research. Next, I explored, 
within the general framework of risk management, the aspects of Dutch external safety that 
are relevant to the management of safety of transport of hazardous materials by rail. This 
chapter presented an overview of the institutions -  from a regulatory perspective, thus mainly 
formal rules and regulations - that shape external safety policy in relation to rail transport and 
ultimately affect the decisions made in the context of urban planning. In addition, I briefly 
also evaluated two major measures from the national government in the field of rail network 
design and network use, aimed at structurally reducing risks in the future.
At international level, there are rules and regulations aimed at controlling risks related 
to the packaging and merchandise involved in transport, whereas the free movement of goods 
rule aims to create a free market economy for the transport of all goods, and therefore also 
hazardous materials. This free market idea implies that if  the demand for hazardous materials 
increases, the transport companies are free to choose the modality that they prefer, even if this 
means an increase in transport through city centres.
With regard to the Dutch institutionalisation of external safety, it can be concluded 
that even though protecting citizens from disasters near potential hazardous installations 
seems to have a long history, the norm setting for external safety is relatively new. For the 
transport of hazardous materials by rail, the only rules that are binding to some extent are laid 
down in the Risk Standardisation for the Transport of Hazardous Materials Circular. The 
norms in this policy document are the IR and the GR, which form the core of external safety 
policy with regard to the transport of hazardous materials.
Due to this institutional focus, the quantitative approach to support policy making 
regarding the risks for the living areas adjacent to railways facilitating the transport of 
hazardous materials, has become dominant. Risks are calculated for particular spots using 
quantitative models and the outcome is a figure that is compared to the norm to determine 
whether this is a safe or an unsafe situation. Although qualitative analyses are increasingly 
added in practice (often based on expert knowledge on developed scenarios), this type of 
additional ‘soft’ analysis does not have a clear institutional position in the present context 
except for the duty of justification when the GR is exceeded.
Referring to the risk management classification by Klinke and Renn (2002), risk 
management in the Netherlands seems to be very much based on the classification of external 
safety problems as relatively simple risk problems. The assumption is that these risks can be 
controlled in a more or less routine way: risk norms are determined by policy rules and the 
core of risk management is to calculate the need for risk limitation and to ensure that this 
policy is enforced. This seems to fit well to a Dutch policy perspective on environmental 
issues, that is dominated by a regulatory approach based on generic norms that have to be 
lived up to (De Roo, 2003) in combination with strategies to cope with additional 
complexities. These strategies focus on (mainly regulatory) approaches to harmonise
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analytical methods (calculation models), to specify generic evaluation criteria (norms), to 
clarify the distribution of responsibilities and accountability among stakeholders. Although, in 
addition to the regulatory approach, the national government seeks for the implementation of 
certain network solutions to reduce local risks, these seem only promising in part. Even with 
the Betuwe line and the basic network, there are still many difficulties to overcome before 
urban project developments adjacent to existing railways meet the safety norms. For example, 
the Betuwe line might significantly reduce the risks along the Brabant line, but will not, as far 
as the GR is concerned, keep risks along the Brabant in line with the orientation value. 
Moreover, it is possible that the volume of transport of hazardous materials grows more than 
the Betuwe line can handle. With respect to the concept of the basic network, it was argued 
that although the network does seem to have some advantages, there are very substantial 
disadvantages. Therefore, the basic network concept should not be regarded as a panacea for 
local problems concerning external safety of hazardous material transport. Perhaps one can 
even say that these key solutions do not reduce complexity and uncertainty, but have the 
potential to add to this.
Now that it is clear what the key elements of the external safety management 
framework are, the question is how these institutions influence safety, transport and local 
urban development in practice. How is the institutional framework perceived and coped with 
in reality? Is the discourse in practice indeed simple or cognitive, or are actors in real world 
practices also struggling with serious uncertainties or even ambiguity? Can the norm -  even a 
‘soft’ norm, such as the orientation value -  be maintained in practice? If not, what is the 
impact of non-compliance? And what are the effects for the legitimacy of a policy if the 
responsible authority cannot maintain a strict external safety policy? To answer these and 
related questions, it is important to further investigate how external safety policy, rail 
transport and urban planning are approached in practice. Therefore, the next chapter will 
focus on the external safety risks as local problems to investigate how these risks influence 
local decision making and risk management. In the following chapter, some relevant cases 
from planning practice will therefore be analysed.
Chapter 3: 
Exploring planning practices: a multiple case study 
of urban planning projects in relation to external 
safety
3.1 Introduction
The analysis in the previous chapters suggested that certain features of the applied external 
safety institutions in the Netherlands seem, at least in theory, to add to the difficulty of coping 
with risk problems, in particular the understanding and application of safety standards, the 
existence of uncertainties in risk calculations and the creation of fuzziness in the allocation of 
responsibility for managing safety. This suggestion is not enough to draw firm conclusions. 
The question is whether these problems are also manifest in real world planning practices and 
if so, how do stakeholders in practice deal with them? How can external safety management 
in the operational planning practices be classified in terms of Klinke and Renn’s framework, 
as presented in chapter 1? Is this classification in line with the insights gained during the desk 
research described in the previous chapter?
In this chapter, as a second step in the explorative research part, I will therefore 
explore the risk management problems that are manifest within several Dutch urban planning 
cases where external safety of transport creates a potential conflict with urban development. 
Since this analysis builds upon the findings in the previous chapter, the focus in these 
analyses is not completely open. I am interested in how risk problems are dealt with in these 
real world planning and decision making processes. The aims of these multiple case analysis 
are therefore (a) to reveal the structure of the stakeholder arena, (b) to understand how safety 
analyses are performed and standards applied in decisions on building plans, (c) to explore 
whether the policy and institutional conditions in practice are sufficiently addressed in the 
planning process for the railway station neighbourhood development projects and (d) to
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observe whether the applied safety management process in the planning practice is adequate 
to solve the identified safety problems.
The choice of case studies is related to the Dutch policy of reconstruction and 
revitalisation of railway station neighbourhoods in various Dutch cities. This policy includes 
the concentration of economic activities in the direct surroundings of these station areas, 
creating new parking facilities and in a number of cases also new dwellings, both apartments 
and houses. The policy results from the 4th National Document on Spatial Planning Extra 
(1993), focussing among others on stimulating the use of public transport and improving 
(inter)national accessibility to major urban centres. The National Document identified various 
railway locations as so-called Key Projects. These projects include major investments in 
selected network nodes by the central government in the embodiment of the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment in order to prepare them for a connection to 
the international high-speed rail network. The goal of these Key Projects was formulated as 
follows (Ministerie VROM, 2003):
- To increase the position of the Netherlands as an international haven to attract new 
economic activities;
- To augment the vitality, safety and viability of the cities involved;
- To improve the quality of the use and planning of public space.
In total, the central government is investing 1.4 billion Euros to achieve these goals. 
According to Dutch spatial planning law, the local governments are responsible for the 
planning of these station areas. Apart from the cities with the Key Projects, in recent years 
several other cities have also started redeveloping their railway neighbourhoods to make them 
attractive for living and working. Overall, the reconstruction and revitalisation policy does not 
automatically fit well with the external safety policy. Therefore, tensions between urban 
development and transport appeared during the period of plan preparation in the nineties and 
the plan execution in the past decade.
It was decided to apply in-depth case analyses in the tradition as described by e.g. 
Eisenhardt (1989), who pleas for making systematic inductive steps from data to theory. One 
notion in this context is to apply different data sources to build up a relevant insight in the 
empirical reality. This approach is followed in the multiple case study approach in this 
chapter: documents on local policy decision making, advisory reports and interviews with 
involved stakeholders. Another notion is that the cases potentially offer a rich context for 
inductive learning on the general subject that is studied. The case studies were conducted 
under supervision of the author of this thesis in cooperation with various Bachelor’s and 
Master’s students of the Urban and Regional Planning Programme at the Nijmegen School of 
Management. The cases discussed here resulted in various theses. In this chapter, it is not 
possible to give extensive descriptions of the cases: these descriptions will be limited and 
consequently perhaps somewhere selective and strongly focused on the issues relevant for this 
study. The aim of the analyses is to get a feel for the struggle with safety in the real world.
The analysis in this chapter concerns 5 interesting cases. Figure 28 presents a map of 
the Netherlands showing the location of the cases. The numbers on the map indicate the cities 
as they are discussed per subsection (1= Arnhem; 2= Rotterdam; 3= Breda, 4= Eindhoven and 
5= Heerlen). Three of the cases concern Key Projects: Rotterdam, Breda and Arnhem. In the 
following, I will present the cases per subsection.
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Figure 28: A map of the Netherlands with the cities studied 
3.2 Case 1: Arnhem
Arnhem is a city in the east of the Netherlands, near the German border with a population of 
just under 150,000. The city functions as a hub for passenger transport in all directions as well 
as a place through which transport of hazardous materials passes on its way to Germany. In 
the early 1990s, Arnhem station was designated one of the Key Projects. About 20 hectares of 
the station area will be redesigned. Besides a new railway terminal, the new plan also involves 
shops, restaurants, leisure and office space in the direct vicinity. The total investment is over 
600 million Euros. The goal is to have about 110,000 travellers using the new public transport 
terminal on a daily basis in the year 2 0 2 0 .
17000m2 kartoren
14000m2 kartoren 24000m2 kartoren
Figure 29: An artist’s impression of Arnhem Central Station and the adjacent area
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The case was studied with the help of Petter (2005) using written documents and interviews 
for reconstructing the process until that moment. In his study, Petter found that safety risks 
were only subjected to any in-depth investigation before the final phase of decision making, 
just prior to the planned implementation of the plans. These calculations were ordered by the 
municipality and performed by research institute TNO. The risk calculations showed that the 
IR norm was not exceeded anywhere. However, the GR orientation value was exceeded for 
the suggested plans currently under discussion. On the basis of these findings, a joint working 
group was installed with representatives of the city of Arnhem, Prorail, TNO and the Arnhem 
fire service to value various risk reduction options. The working group had the aim and the 
intention to find solutions to lower the calculated risks. During their investigations, the 
working group found that the various participating actors did not differ in their goal, but 
differed strongly in their opinion of which measures were appropriate to take.
It was found that the municipality of Arnhem wanted the rail operating company 
Prorail to take measures that reduce risks at the source of the problem, such as to enforce 
driving trains at lower speeds and/or to allow for fewer transports and specifically fewer LPG 
transports. In turn, ProRail stated that the city of Arnhem should build further away from the 
railway, as this would have a direct and very positive influence on the risk level. TNO and the 
Arnhem fire service were positive about all measures. The city authorities considered 
measures such as improved signals and hot-box detection12 to be inferior, as they believed 
their impact on the level of risk was too small.
Petter (2005) revealed that these different opinions regarding the strategy to follow 
can be explained from the fact that the city of Arnhem and Prorail have different goals and 
perceptions on who causes the risks: the city wants to maximise their building potential which 
influences the effect of a disaster, while Prorail wants to maximise the transport capacity in 
Arnhem for the transport of passengers as well as goods. Although it was clear for all 
stakeholders that the external safety rules should be complied with, a deadlock situation 
seemed to appear in which none of the stakeholders really took responsibility for taking safety 
measures. During negotiations, the contribution of each of the potential measures to the 
improvement of the safety level remained too unclear and the uncertainty about the costs too 
substantial to reach a clear arrangement.
The interesting characteristic of this case is that this deadlock situation was more or 
less resolved due to an external event. Near Arnhem’s station area, an industrial site owned by 
the company BASF was shut down for economic and business reasons. The plant used 
hazardous materials in its production process. This event led to significantly lower transport 
scenarios for hazardous materials for the near future passing Arnhem station, at least on 
paper. Consequently, the seemingly unsolvable problem of violation of the orientation value 
of GR simply disappeared from the agenda. Although this appears to be a short-term solution, 
Van der Heijden & Van der Vlies (2006) argue that in the longer term an increase in transport 
of hazardous materials through Arnhem must be expected. This is because the railway line 
through Arnhem will be part of a dedicated freight transport network with the newly 
constructed Betuwe line between Rotterdam and the German border as the main route (see 
also section 2.5). This network includes a connection between the Betuwe line and the north 
of the Netherlands and Germany via Arnhem, resulting in more transport of hazardous 
materials crossing the central area of Arnhem. Although future developments concerning the 
transport of hazardous materials in Arnhem are difficult to predict, TNO (2008) had already 
calculated potential risks of up to 22 times the orientation value of GR in Arnhem due to this 
network concept and in the case of full use of available capacity. Consequently, the problem
12 These measures will be discussed in more detail in chapters 7 and 8. For here it suffices to note that the 
improved signals reduce the possibility of a collision and hot-box detection systems are able to detect overheated 
brakes.
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of exceeding the GR orientation value will probably return to the agenda in the near future.
Petter’s main conclusion concerning the discussion on the development of activities 
and infrastructures in Arnhem station area is that the negotiations between the different actors 
was strongly focused on the question ‘what causes a significant reduction of the safety level’ 
and ‘who pays for what’. The question ‘what is a good safety level in this specific context at 
this railway node in the network’ was hardly explicitly addressed. Moreover, the negotiations 
did not lead to an agreement on which measures should be taken, basically due to 
disagreement on who should pay for the costs. The closure of the BASF plant was therefore 
an unanticipated but very welcome event for the actors involved.
For our study, this case study teaches us the following. Firstly, the key stakeholders in 
railway development projects, notably the municipality and the rail infrastructure manager, 
had very different views on how to attain a good safety level. This is due to fundamentally 
different interests and perceptions of who causes the risks: the city which wants to build near 
the railway, or the transport flow crossing the city centre. In terms of the classification of 
Klinke and Renn (2001), this refers to significant uncertainty and a type of cognitive and 
evaluative conflict. Secondly, the pursued safety level was very much dictated by the fixed 
standards for IR and GR and is only linked to the unique situation in this node via the use of 
risk calculation models. Hence, the applied analytical tools belong to the domain of routine 
risk management problems. Thirdly, the stakeholders in practice were very much focused on 
negotiations about the costs of measures to be taken at the spot; very few arguments based on 
a network view were used in the debate. Finally, the analysis revealed that an acceptable 
short-term balance between risks resulting from urban development and transport could be 
reached, but due to uncertainty about long-term development in transport flows, this balance 
might not reflect long-term sustainable development for this spot.
3.3 Case 2: Rotterdam
Rotterdam is the second largest city in the Netherlands with nearly 600,000 inhabitants. Its 
central railway station is one of the largest in the Netherlands with over 140,000 travellers 
daily. Rotterdam’s station area was also selected as one of the Key Projects about 15 years 
ago and has an anticipated growth of up to 210,000 daily visitors. The present station cannot 
cope with these passenger flows and will therefore be rebuilt to accommodate future needs. 
The first area development plans and station designs were not approved due to cost factors. 
After about a decade of plan making however, a € 600 million plan design was approved in 
2005 (see figure 30). The total project measures over 20 hectares.
Figure 30: An artist’s impression of Rotterdam Central Station.
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An in-depth case study was conducted with the help of two planning students. Bekker (2005) 
and Raymakers (2008) analysed in detail how in the city of Rotterdam the process of planning 
and implementation of the urban development plan developed13.
A first central observation in both analyses is that the leading party in this process, 
Rotterdam municipality, made safety to one of the key factors to be taken into account. In the 
start-up phase of the project, Rotterdam first conducted an environmental impact assessment 
after which also a not-obligatory additional safety impact assessment was conducted. Both 
evaluation studies showed that this was a very good initiative to guarantee sufficient attention 
for the aspect of safety in the planning and design process. The safety impact assessment took 
all aspects of safety into account, not just external safety but also social safety and internal 
safety14 for example.
A second important observation is that the need to apply the ALARA principle was 
regularly mentioned in documents and interviews of stakeholders as one of the means to 
lower risks. However, it appeared extremely difficult to really grasp the operational 
elaboration and application of this principle in the process.
Thirdly, stakeholders stressed the need for transparency in communications about 
risks between stakeholders and between the project organisation and society. For example, it 
was agreed that if the actors involved concluded that certain planning options were 
unacceptable due to the resulting risks, there should be a systematic debate regarding whether 
the project should be carried out in the intended form.
In his analysis, Bekker (2005) specifically focused on the risk calculations. He states 
that in the original situation, the orientation value of GR at the central station area of 
Rotterdam is exceeded by a factor of 3.6. Based on the safety study performed by TNO, 
decision makers expected that future GR values would be reduced as soon as the Betuwe line 
opened for transport (which happened in 2007). This prediction was directly related to the 
expectation of a reduction of freight transport volumes. The city of Rotterdam conducted no 
additional research to investigate any potential growth of risk on the effect side of the risk 
calculation on account of their new plans. Bekker argues that with an equal volume of 
transport, risks will significantly increase due to a higher population density. Evidently, this 
increase will be even higher of Rotterdam is confronted with a growth of transport in the 
future, e.g. due to autonomous developments in the rail freight transport market. Much 
uncertainty thus concentrates on the questions (a) whether the reduction in transport of 
hazardous materials due to the Betuwe line is greater than the predicted autonomous growth 
in general for freight transport volumes and (b) what the balance will be between the change 
in hazardous materials flows passing Rotterdam and the growth in population density at the 
railway station. No explicit information on the possible consequences of these uncertainties 
for the Key Project ambitions was available in 2005, the time when the basic design of the 
area development was politically accepted. Consequently, it seemed that the decision in 
favour of the building programme was taken in a context in which there was a significant 
possibility that future risks would be higher than in the original situation.
From the additional analysis performed by Raymakers (2008), we learn that the city of 
Rotterdam ordered SAVE consultants to perform an additional risk analysis towards the end 
of 2005. This study showed a significantly lower level of risks compared with the earlier 
study. Instead of the original exceedance of 5 times the GR orientation value, the risks were 
calculated at an exceedance level of a maximum of 2.4 times the GR orientation value. 
Raymakers argues that the analysis by SAVE consultancy used a lower volume of hazardous
13 Raymakers’ study was a follow-up to Bekker’s study, aiming at getting a full evaluation of all Key projects, 
whereas Bekker’s study was a single case study. Both studies used slightly different analytical perspectives.
14 Social safety is the safety that people experience with respect to crimes. Internal safety is the safety of the 
users of the system; in this case passengers.
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material transport than was actually observed in 2005. The SAVE analysis anticipated the 
reduction of transport volumes in the future due to the opening of the Betuwe line and as such 
the study confirmed the assumptions of the municipality of Rotterdam underlying the decision 
making on the area development plan. However, Raymakers argues that until 2008 the trend 
shows a growth in hazardous materials transport, even after the opening of the Betuwe line. 
Her conclusion is that even in this new network situation, the uncertainties in the outcomes of 
the safety study are considerable. These uncertainties were barely taken into account in the 
decision process. This seems to conflict with one of the city’s own goals mentioned earlier, 
which is that future developments in transport should be made transparent and clearly taken 
into account in decision making.
Concluding on this case study, it is first noticed that in Rotterdam a pro-active 
approach was pursued with regard to safety issues. This brought together different 
stakeholders in a constructive process of planning and design. Secondly, also in this case risk 
calculations linking real world developments to prescribed norms played a very dominant 
role. However, despite the fact that the city itself claimed to value transparency in its 
communications and wanted to reflect future transport developments in its decision making, 
the actual decision-making process did not seem to systematically address the significant 
uncertainty in risk calculations caused by the substantial uncertainty in future developments in 
the volume of transport of hazardous materials. Consequently, the possibility of increased 
safety problems in the future due to the implementation of the building programme could not 
be excluded. Finally, although the concept of ALARA was suggested on paper as an 
important way to reduce risks, it was not explicitly operationalised and traceably implemented 
in policy advises and decisions. The conclusion is that, similar to the previous case, the more 
reflective the debate in decision making becomes, mainly focussing on important 
uncertainties and the possibilities to apply precautionary measures, the more there seems to be 
a mismatch between the applied instruments for analysis and the aimed outcome of the 
decision making process.
3.4 Case 3: Breda
The third Key Project investigated is the Breda station area. Breda is a city in the south of the 
Netherlands with over 170,000 inhabitants. This project not only involved the station itself, 
but also a large-scale revision of the area surrounding the station (see figure 31). In total, 
about 160 hectares are involved in this redevelopment project, which should be finished in 
around the year 2 0 2 0 .
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Figure 31: The total Breda station area that will be redeveloped
More detailed information on this project is provided in Raymakers (2008). Breda is located 
along the Brabant railway line, until recently the major freight rail connection between the 
western part of the Netherlands and Germany. As one of the Brabant line cities, Breda is 
confronted with huge volumes of transport directed through its city centre. Nevertheless, 
based on consultancy reports Raymakers (2008) argues that in the original situation -  before 
plans were made to redevelop this area -  there was no problem with the IR standards or the 
GR orientation value.
The station area was selected by the national government to become a New Key 
Project in 1998. This triggered a process of planning and designing the redevelopment of the 
area. The process involved the city of Breda, real estate developers, Prorail, the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment. In practice, according to Raymakers’ analysis of the process, 
the only actors that played a significant role were Prorail, the Ministry of Transport and the 
city authorities of Breda.
External safety issues were taken seriously in the decision making process. From the 
year 2 0 0 0  on, due to changing scenarios for transport and changes in the plan, various risk 
analyses were made to review the impact of possible urban development plans on risks. The 
risk analysis for the final plan (in 2004) indicated that the risk norms would be exceeded 
significantly (up to a factor of 4.5). Therefore, the city authorities stressed the need for risk 
reduction measures to meet the GR orientation value. These measures included a lower 
maximum speed for freight trains carrying hazardous materials and lower volumes of 
hazardous material transport. Further, it was argued that measures would be taken to increase 
personal emergency preparedness in the development area. Finally, the ALARP principle 
would be implemented in the further detailing of the plans, although the question of what is 
low and/or reasonable was not explicitly elaborated.
New studies assuming the implementation of this set of risk lowering measures 
resulted in the city authorities concluding that the problems concerning violation of the risk 
criteria could be solved. Raymakers showed that this conclusion was also based on the fact 
that the risk calculation assumed significantly lower transport figures than the trend: the 2003 
forecast showed a number of transported wagons of 4400 for the year 2020 for the dominant
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material category, category A, while in 2004, the city used a number of 3850 wagons in their 
calculations for the year 2020. According to Raymakers, city officials were irritated when 
they needed to conduct new risk studies using the figures from the 2003 policy-free market 
forecast, as requested by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. 
The outcome of these calculations showed a factor of exceeding the GR criterion of 1.7. A 
new market forecast was published in 2007, indicating higher volumes of hazardous materials 
to be transported through Breda than expected in 2003. This caused more tension in the 
relationship between the city authorities on the one side and the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management and Prorail on the other side.
The case study shows that the city authorities of Breda took potential risk problems 
very seriously, explicitly addressing safety aspects at a very early stage in their plan 
development. However, the city authorities felt very dependent on the information provided 
and actions taken by Prorail and the Ministry. Transport forecasts changed in time and risk 
reduction measures were mainly taken within the domain of Prorail. This perception of 
dependency of the local policy on the behaviour of non-local stakeholders created significant 
tensions between the stakeholders in the process. The higher transport forecasts with which 
Breda was confronted evidently resulted in risk increases and limited the decision space at 
local level. The Breda officials -  or at least the people they commissioned to conduct the risk 
analyses -  seemed to insufficiently reckon for the uncertainty in transport forecasts when 
performing the risk calculations. Again, the risk analyses based on the standardized analytical 
tools appeared to have had limited value for the support of the decision making process, since 
crucial questions for some players were not answered in a satisfactory way. This eventually 
resulted in lack of transparency during the decision making process and the conclusion that 
the ALARP principle was not firmly embedded in the urban plans.
3.5 Case 4: Eindhoven
Eindhoven is one of the larger cities in the Netherlands with over 200,000 inhabitants. The 
city of Eindhoven faces the highest risk with respect to the GR. It exceeds the orientation 
value up to a factor of about 97 times (AVIV & Royal Haskoning, 2005). This can be 
explained not only because of high transport volumes, but also due to the PSV Eindhoven 
football stadium, a number of buildings belonging to the Philips company and a significant 
number of office buildings. The city of Eindhoven nevertheless planned a rebuilding of a 
shopping mall called the Piazza Center directly adjacent to the railway.
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Figure 32: An aerial photo of Eindhoven with the PSV stadium (left arrow) and the 
Piazza Centre (right arrow). (Source: Google Maps)
Wenink (2006) describes how the city started planning the extension of the mall in 1997, a 
time when there was less attention for external safety. The city therefore thought it was 
unnecessary to review external safety as the building plan fitted the city’s strategic urban 
development plan and because the Province of Noord-Brabant, the province in which 
Eindhoven is situated, had already approved the extension plans for the mall. Later in the 
process, the response to the outcome of risk calculations in 2005 revealing the significant 
violation of the GR orientation value was that compliance with the GR orientation value was 
not binding. The Province, claiming that additional urban facilities and the improvement of 
urban quality outweigh the higher risks, accepted this explanation. In early 2003, construction 
company Rodamco started building the extension of the mall.
The national inspection of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment, however, disapproved the plans in the summer of 2003, because according to 
the Ministry, the city of Eindhoven wrongly thought that the high risks could be accepted. A 
task force was then appointed to settle the difficult situation as the Minister of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment considered it unreasonable to stop the construction 
work that had already started. Participants in the task force included the Mayor and Aldermen 
of Eindhoven as well as people from Prorail, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment and high officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Later, Prorail stopped participating in the 
negotiations as they ‘did not feel the need to contribute to solving this problem’15. The task 
force suggested a number of measures to lower risks. Remarkably, lowering the maximum 
speed for transport to 40 kilometres per hour was the most important one16. Other risk 
reducing solutions were derailment-conducting measures, gutters for quick removal of
15 This statement is based on the opinion of other interviewees. Wenink (2006) states that in his research he was 
unable to get cooperation from Prorail for an interview.
16 According to Wenink (2006), it later appeared that the trains could not travel faster than 40 kilometres per 
hour at this railway section anyway.
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flammable liquids, hot-box detection systems, heat resistant facades, more fire fighting 
material and plans for better coordination of railway crises. Interestingly and noting the 
absence of Prorail in the debate, the first four measures could only be taken by Prorail, 
although it should be said that the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management ultimately has the authority to impose this on Prorail. Eventually, it was decided 
in 2004 that the measures should be carried out within three years. Later that year, the 
renewed Piazza Centre was opened to the public.
Wenink (2006), based on document analyses and interviews with stakeholders, 
concludes that safety considerations were given insufficient attention in the decision making 
process on the Piazza renewal plan. Given the available information, safety should have been 
given higher priority in decision making on the project than it was given in practice. The city 
authorities wrongly assumed that they could approve the plans because of the legal, though 
conditional, possibility to exceed the GR norm. As Wenink says: the city ‘made ultimate use 
of the free interpretation of the orientation value’. Given the high level of exceedance of the 
orientation value, the question is whether the city authorities (as well as the Provincial 
authorities) give weight to the knowledge that this does not fulfil the objective of external 
safety policy.
In addition to the findings of the previous cases, the case of Eindhoven mainly teaches 
us about fuzziness in interpreting applied norms and the rules on dealing with these norms 
and the reluctance of local authorities to take full responsibility for problem solving. This 
finding shows elements of what Klinke and Renn label as the normative type of conflict, 
related to the impact of not only complexity and uncertainty, but also elements of ambiguity.
3.6 Case 5: Heerlen
Heerlen is a small border city in the south east of the Netherlands with just under 100,000 
inhabitants. The city of Heerlen wished to redevelop their station area by adopting a plan 
called ‘Maankwartier The area currently creates a barrier in the city, while at the same time 
there are many problems with drug users from the Netherlands as well as from Germany. The 
city asked renowned architects to redesign the station area so as to improve safety and remove 
the barrier from the city. Moreover, a mega cinema, large-scale retail facilities and a world 
trade centre should be incorporated into the design as well as homes and office space and 
small leisure facilities.
Figures 33 and 34: Models of the Maankwartier project in Heerlen
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According to van Aaken (2006), with respect to external safety there only was a problem with 
a small amount of hazardous materials that were transported from the Sabic and DSM 
industrial plants to Germany. In 2005 there were just over 1000 LPG wagons transported 
through Heerlen city centre. The risk calculations showed that this led to a maximum value 
for the GR criterion of 0.46 times the orientation value in the present situation. In the future 
situation, the city would increase the average population density from about 1790 people in 
the area to over 3400. This would increase risks to a factor of 0.64 of the orientation value. 
This information led the city to conclude that there was basically no problem with risks in the 
development area.
In early 2006, however, both Sabic and DSM told the city that they were planning to 
increase their transports to over 3600 wagons. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment recommended that the city perform a new risk calculation to see how this 
would affect the total amount of risk. It was then discovered that the GR would increase to 
2.53 times the orientation value in the present situation and to 3.27 times the orientation value 
for the future situation (the year 2020). Dissatisfied with the outcome and because it had 
virtually approved the plan and was unwilling to change it, the city started looking to see 
whether they could lower risks themselves by removing factors that increase the possibility - 
not the effect - of an accident. The city of Heerlen considered options such as track-change 
removal and logistic measures such as specific timetables for transport. However, the 
outcome of these measures was unsure, as Sabic and DSM are responsible for taking logistic 
measures. Negotiations followed, resulting in unclear outcomes. It appeared to be impossible 
for Van Aaken to discover the outcome before he finished his study. The plans were still 
implemented however, judging the Masterplan Maankwartier (Heerlen, 2008), which says 
little about the safety measures taken to reduce risks except for removing several houses 
planned above the railway.
What can be concluded from this case is that the plans made by the city authorities of 
Heerlen were unexpectedly hindered by the autonomous increase of transport of LPGs from 
Sabic, a private player applying the generic rules for free transport. The new risk calculations 
showed an exceedance of the orientation value for the GR criterion, causing problems for the 
authorities of Heerlen in deciding on their urban development plans. Hence, the decision 
making process was disrupted by new transport conditions that were unexpected or uncertain 
and difficult to assess. Municipalities were then forced to negotiate with other stakeholders on 
measures to be taken by others in order to safeguard municipal interests and plans.
3.7 Conclusions of this multiple case study
The aim of this chapter was to explore the extent to which the theoretical problems related to 
the management of external safety are recognised in real-world planning practices on a local 
level in the Netherlands. Five real world cases, selected for the fact that they are known for 
having to cope with a potential violation of risk norms in a context of urban development 
programs, have been evaluated to gain insight into this real world. As said, the descriptions in 
this chapter are brief and selectively focused on the elements relevant in our exploration of the 
problems of risk management related to area development and transport of hazardous 
materials transport. For the extended descriptions, it is referred to the mentioned theses.
In general, the cases confirm that the three policy fields of external safety, freight 
transport and urban planning firmly influence each other due to their interconnected nature. 
What happens in one area can seriously influence developments in the other areas. Not only in 
theory but also planning practice, it can be very difficult to build in city areas where transport 
of hazardous materials takes place. The interesting question is how stakeholders in practice 
cope with the interconnections between different policy fields.
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The case analyses aimed at (a) revealing the structure of the arena of stakeholders involved, 
(b) understanding how safety analyses are performed and standards applied, (c) exploring 
whether the policy and institutional conditions in practice are sufficiently addressed in the 
planning process for the railway station neighbourhood development projects and (d) drawing 
conclusions on whether the applied safety management process in the planning practice is 
adequate to solve the identified safety problems.
With regard to the first aim (a), the cases systematically revealed the structure of the 
stakeholder arena: the key actors, their formal and informal positions and their mutual 
relations. Firstly, the city officials are involved as it is their territory that will be rebuilt. It is 
in their interest that the station area becomes an attractive area for housing, offices and 
leisure. Given the potential added value for the city’s economy, they are willing to invest in 
these projects17. Secondly, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
was an important actor in various cases. They initiated and coordinated the Key Projects and 
as such were involved in three of the five cases. In the city of Eindhoven, the Ministry was 
involved in negotiations in the existing deadlock. It is in the interest of the national spatial 
policy that the projects are built, given the aims of stimulating economically competing urban 
networks and the further increase of the density and use of urban centers (see chapter 2). The 
cases further show that the coordination of external safety for rail transport now lies with a 
third actor, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. This actor 
basically aims to maintain transport policy and to create room for and facilitate more 
(international) transport flows. As shown, this easily conflicts with the spatial development 
goals. A fourth actor involved was Prorail. Prorail’s intention is to build and maintain 
infrastructure. Prorail is therefore often invited to join the local negotiations as this actor has 
the ability to implement various safety measures. The fifth group of actors is the group of real 
estate developers. This group plays an important role in the context of local area development. 
The interest of this actor is to build houses and offices so as to ensure a good return on their 
investment. The sixth group involved concerns the consultancies commissioned to advice on 
risk management. They are not involved in the decision making itself, but they do provide the 
local authorities with information on the (calculated and expected) risks. Finally, the last 
group of actors concerns the emergency services (fire services, etc), which respond to the 
plans with regard to issues of controllability in case of an emergency. Transport operating 
companies are often not present in these negotiations, although the Heerlen case made an 
exception to this rule. The cases show that, in practice, the local authorities, real estate 
developers, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Prorail and the 
consultancy firms are the inner-circle actors involved in the planning process. It is clear that 
their goals, interests and means of influencing the process, might differ considerably.
With respect to the second aim (b) the conclusion is that given safety standards 
constitute a major focus point and decision criterion in decision making on urban 
development in the neighbourhood of railway stations. Consequently, risk calculation models 
play a significant role, which is in line with the findings of the desk study. According to the 
outcomes of these models, all studied cases are hindered by high risks, either due to transport 
and future growth of this transport or due to an increased population near the railway as a 
result of the building plans. Except for the city of Heerlen where the final outcome is unclear, 
it appears that the other cases struggled with the risk assessment methodology. The case 
analyses suggest that significant uncertainty in the (interpretation of the) outcomes of the risk 
calculations does exist. This uncertainty is more or less systematically interpreted by local 
decision makers in the benefit of the local interests. This is concluded from the fact that, in 
the end, all cities that have been analysed have been able to come up with building plans and
17 For more on municipal growth ambitions be advised to read Needham’s (2007) comprehensive book on Dutch 
land use planning.
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have them carried out, irrespective of the fact that in all cases the orientation value of GR was 
violated during planning (except for Heerlen) as well as after implementation. What causes 
much confusion is that forecasts for transport of hazardous materials, a major input in the risk 
models, change relatively quickly. On the one hand, this causes serious tensions between the 
local municipal interests and national interests of Prorail and the Ministry of Transport. On 
the other hand, the impression from the cases is that uncertainty in transport scenarios triggers 
selectivity in the use of such scenarios. Here we tend to observe a bias towards the local 
interests. In terms of the framework of Klinke and Renn, this points at problems between the 
analytical assessment approach that assume the availability of reliable data on flows, 
probability of incidents and the effects of incidents, whereas in practice these are subject of 
many debates, of uncertainty and of diverging interpretations. The conflicts in the debates are 
of a cognitive and partly also evaluative nature, whereas the supportive tools and the risk 
assessment criteria fit to the perception of risk as a relatively simple or routine class of 
operations. The discourse, assumed by the applied analytical approach, is not (in terms of 
Klinke and Renn) internal and simple but instead bears a much more reflective nature.
With respect to the third aim (c) the analyses suggest that in practice the major policy 
and institutional issues are addressed in the process, although in a very imbalanced way. As 
said, the safety standards play an important role and receive much attention from the 
perspective of: ‘do we meet or violate the standards?’ In contrast, the ALARA principle 
which is linked to the precautionary approach that is suggested by Klinke and Renn as an 
adequate approach in case complexity and uncertainty play an important role in the risk 
debate, is sometimes mentioned, but not clearly operationalised and explicitly addressed in 
decision making. What also fits the precautionary approach is that attention for external safety 
at an early stage leads to a more balanced and better integrated plan. At least, it helps to 
understand the interests of the different stakeholders better and to get a better feel for the 
conditions of plan development. Although in the case studies attempts to follow such an 
approach have been found, no firm conclusions on the extent to which the early integration of 
safety really improves the risks, the decision making and the urban plan, can be drawn.
Also with respect to the fourth aim (d), it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. As 
mentioned above, as a result of the way in which risk assessments were carried out, plans 
were formulated in a context of uncertainty on the actual and future risk levels. It is therefore 
not easy to identify whether risks were managed properly to lower levels. Risk management 
approaches sometimes rely on measures to be taken in the future, without strong 
commitments of the participants (e.g. to be taken by Prorail, whereas this stakeholder does not 
always participate in the deliberations). It also became clear that the various stakeholders are 
reluctant to take full responsibility for reducing risk levels in a context of urban development 
adjacent to railway stations. The reason is that in practice, taking responsibility almost 
immediately is interpreted by the stakeholders in terms of the willingness to bear the costs of 
reducing risks, which is certainly not a necessary implication. The cities that want to 
redevelop their station areas in the described cases tend to state that the rail operator Prorail is 
responsible for taking measures to reduce the possibility of a disaster. The opinion of city 
officials is that the risks are not caused by the cities, but are caused by the transport of 
hazardous materials. In contrast, Prorail does not feel responsible for taking first action, as 
this actor feels that the cities should build further away from the railways to lower the risks.
This debate between the local authority and the national stakeholders clearly addresses 
normative issues: who should bear which part of the risks? The case studies suggest that this 
debate is not concluded in a satisfactory way in practice. The study instead suggests the 
existence of several situations in which nobody tends to take full responsibility, producing a 
decision making vacuum. The framework of Klinke and Renn (2002) use the term ambiquity 
in this context (what do the outcomes of the risk assessments imply for whom) and suggests
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that in that case a participatory management approach should be followed, which was (in the 
studied cases) certainly not standard practice.
The results of the multiple case study lead to believe that external safety issues are 
much more complex and uncertain (and in certain respects also ambiguous) than that they are 
currently treated in the urban policy making debate. This is attributable to the interaction 
between the prescribed risk calculation approach, the simple norm setting and the focus on 
norm compliance, the lack of a structured elaboration of a precautionary risk management 
approach and the ambiguity in position and responsibility of the local (municipal) level and 
the national level. In sum: various institutional rules or principles seem to contribute to 
uncertainty, complexity and even ambiguity. The findings in this chapter are rather consistent 
with the global hypothesis formulated in section 1.5 that the institutional setting in this field 
contributes to the fuzziness or wickedness of external safety problems in urban development. 
The case analyses therefore appeared very valuable for building a better picture of the tension 
between urban development and external safety caused by rail transport of hazardous 
materials and urban planning. This value is in particular related to the fact that a different 
research method was used.
However, the in-depth exploration of the problems with external safety is not finished 
yet. Thus far we have not depicted how actors taking part in real-world planning processes 
experience the coping with external safety in the context of planning and decision making 
processes regarding urban development projects. It therefore provides great added value to 
obtain direct feedback from the experts participating in such processes to investigate the 
extent to which they feel that these cases and the associated observations and conclusions 
indeed represent reality or should be complemented or corrected with other insights. 
Therefore, in the next chapter we will analyse the personal experiences of several experts 
representing different stakeholders with regard to various issues related to external safety 
policy.
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Chapter 4: 
Expert opinions on the management of external 
safety in urban planning practice
4.1 Introduction
To complete the exploratory phase of this study, a systematic consultation of experts was 
organised in order to investigate whether and, if  so, to what degree the problems related to the 
management of external safety, as described in the previous chapters, are recognised by 
experts. This investigation constitutes the third step in the exploration of problems of external 
safety management in interaction with urban development at local level, using different 
methods: (a) literature and statistics (Chapter 2), (b) case studies (Chapter 3) and (c) expert 
consultation (this chapter). In this chapter, I describe the set-up and results of two so called 
group decision room (GDR) sessions that were conducted to explore experts’ experiences 
with the present external safety framework, in particular (given the results of the previous 
analyses) the institutional and policy aspects. I first outline what a GDR session is and why 
this method has advantages for the intended investigation. Secondly, I clarify the way in 
which the sessions were organised. I then present the main outcomes of the sessions and end 
the chapter with conclusions and a reflection.
4.2 What is a GDR session?
Experts can be consulted in various ways. A frequently applied approach is interviewing. 
Another approach is having experts fill in questionnaires (e.g. according to the methodology 
of the Delphi method). Interviewing can be time consuming when many experts have to be 
consulted. The basic problem with questionnaires is that it is difficult to monitor who fills in 
the forms. Consequently it is possible that not all the important actors are consulted.
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However, a more significant criticism regarding both methods is that they do not allow for an 
interactive debate between different experts. In particular, this interactive debate and the 
resulting images and positions are considered of great interest for our exploration of problems 
in practice.
An also frequently applied approach that helps to generate expert opinions and 
facilitate debate is organising workshops. In this respect, there are two ways of organising 
workshops: a) workshops based on verbal interaction and b) workshops based on electronic 
interaction (so called Group Decision Room (GDR) facilities). As mentioned, this study has 
chosen to use GDR facilities. GDR sessions are structured meetings involving groups of 
people who meet to discuss problems, statements or anything that is brought to their attention. 
An electronic tool based on a computer network is used to support these sessions by offering 
tools for organising brainstorming, classifying arguments or voting. During brainstorming, for 
example, the participants express themselves by anonymously typing their ideas or comments 
on these or the ideas of other participants in a chat screen on their PC or terminal. This 
electronic tool is called a group decision support system (GDSS) (de Vreede, 1995).
The use of a GDR session is found to have certain advantages (van Genuchten & 
Schuwer, 2007). Firstly, people have more time to discuss ideas, as each participant can have 
his or her say at any moment and does not have to wait until other participants have stated 
their arguments. Secondly, the comments are made anonymously (if wanted) which might be 
an advantage in the case of very sensitive debates. Theoretically, people who are usually less 
dominant during meetings can provide as much input as other, often more verbally dominant 
participants. Thirdly, GDR sessions are thought to induce more creativity among the 
participants, as more ideas can be generated due to the more efficient use of the time allocated 
to brainstorming. Other advantages are that by storing comments electronically, a group 
memory is created which can be consulted at any time (de Vreede, 1995). It is also possible to 
have parallel and open discussions to find out the degree to which the experts have shared 
values. Finally, the software makes it possible to vote on outcomes and immediately 
calculates some basic statistics, such as frequencies, the average and the standard deviation.
This does not mean that there are no difficulties with this approach (van Genuchten & 
Schuwer, 2007). When participants have a different view on the goal of the meeting, for 
example, a GDR session is less useful. Another possible problem is that people might focus 
too much on creating ideas; for example, they might come up with 300 ideas even though the 
chair is only interested in the 10 best ideas. Furthermore, it is important to beware that the 
technology does not become dominant and to remember that a normal discussion following 
the sessions can be equally valuable as one on the computer. Also, by communicating 
electronically, subtle remarks that would normally be interpreted correctly when 
communicated verbally may be interpreted incorrectly or out of context (de Vreede, 1995).
By using this approach, it is possible to create face validity for previously elaborated 
ideas and concepts. In this study, this means that if the participants come up with the same 
observations as in the previous chapters using different methods of research (document 
analysis and case analysis), the outcome of the GDR session is in line with the previous 
exploration of problems and their implications. As such the GDR sessions contribute to the 
problem specification using multiple sources of data. This is in line with suggestions made by 
e.g Marshall & Rossman (2006), Viswanathan (2005) and Willis et al. (2007) for exploring 
fuzzy problems.
The experts were invited to meet in the VISA Skills Lab at Radboud University, 
Nijmegen in the Netherlands. This multimedia laboratory depicted in Figure 35 has twelve 
terminals in a local network, each of which has specific research software installed. In this 
case, we used the ‘GroupSystems for Windows’ software, which is an electronic meeting 
program. All computers are connected to a server, which is controlled by a facilitator.
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Figure 35: Representation of the VISA Skills Lab at Radboud University
When planning the expert consultation, it soon became clear that one single session with 
experts from various backgrounds might run the risk of not adequately representing the 
potential range of views held by the experts. We therefore selected two groups of experts, 
namely a group of experts with a mainly commercial background in transport and logistics or 
risk consultancy and a group of experts with a civil service background, in particular experts 
working for municipal and provincial authorities. Therefore, two smaller sessions were 
organised instead of one larger session. The experts are all professionally involved in external 
safety management relating to the transport of hazardous materials by rail and form a 
representative sample of people working for local authorities, provinces, consultancies, rail 
network managers and transport organisations. In total, fifteen professionals participated in 
the two sessions. The first session (23 May 2007) was attended by eight experts with a 
commercial background, while the second session (20 June 2007) was attended by seven 
experts with a background mainly in governmental bodies.
The two sessions, each covering a day’s meeting, were practically the same in terms of 
set-up. Both started with a short introduction to enable the participants to become acquainted 
with each other and with the GroupSystems program. After this introduction, the session 
progressed according to the following agenda:
- Discussion of problems concerning external safety policy (45 minutes)
- Exploration of the causes of the problems and who pays for the problem solving (45 
minutes)
- Lunch break
- Valuation of a number of propositions (10 minutes)
- Investigation of possible improvements based on a set of principles selected from 
previous analyses (70 minutes)
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- Final plenary discussion (45 minutes)
The morning session was used to establish which problems the professionals encounter in 
their day-to-day routine and the causes of these problems. This part of the session allowed me 
to explore whether the results of my desk research matched the real-world experience and 
whether or not certain views or issues were missing. The valuing of propositions was mainly 
used for some extra input and was included in the programme in order to make a fresh start 
after the lunch break, before the participants started on a long discussion about possible 
improvements and solutions to the problems they encounter in practice. The day was 
concluded with a plenary discussion about the value of the session and to check whether or 
not anything important had been left unsaid.
Figures 36 and 37: The first GDR session
In the following sections, the two sessions will first be described separately, before the results 
are compared. The reason for separate descriptions is to address the debate in both expert 
groups coherently and to the extent required to properly understand both perspectives on local 
external safety management. By only focusing on the similarities and differences in an 
integrated description of both sessions, important details might get lost.
4.3 The first GDR session
4.3.1 Problems and causes
We started the session by asking the participants what they thought the problems are in
Chapter 4: Expert opinions on the management of external safety in urban planning practice 75
external safety management and what causes these problems. From the very start, each 
participant typed away, describing possible problems and their causes. The outcome of the 
discussion showed that there were six different types of comments, namely comments about:
1) The use of norms
2) The risk calculation model
3) The perception of risk
4) Uncertain transport flows and quantities of transported goods
5) Policy and governance problems
6 ) Other difficult to categorise comments.
There was some overlap between some of the comments in the various categories, and 
especially between categories 2 and 5. However, this is not addressed further in the following. 
All the comments cited are translations from Dutch into English and were naturally translated 
as accurately as possible. The comments are not clarified unless they are interesting 
statements that are in contrast to the original comments.
Category 1: The use o f norms 
This category included the following comments:
1. ‘Risk norms are too high.’
2. ‘Risk norms are not harmonised in the EU.’
3. ‘Risk norms are interpreted as the truth.’
4. ‘Risk norms are only probability oriented.’
5. ‘The norm for the IR is based on a non-realistic situation [nobody in the Netherlands
resides unprotected in an open field for 24 hours] in the living environment.’
6 . ‘The IR and the GR do not guide the design plans.’
The participants did not comment much on each other concerning this topic, and when they 
did, the other participants tended to refute the original comment. Comment 4, for example, 
received the remark: ‘Cause: local responsibility for safety lies with the mayor [in relation to 
suppressing the effects], because of which every mayor makes local considerations and takes 
measures, and national indicators are hardly taken into account.’ This in turn received the 
comment: ‘The norm takes into account the number of deceased people and is therefore based 
on the effect.’ Also comment 5 was disputed: ‘These aspects are taken into account in the GR 
criterion.’
Comment 6 is fairly concrete. The clarification is that: ‘The calculation of IR and GR 
is obligatory. Due to the timing of the calculation for the GR, there is hardly a solution within 
the planning area and the scope of the plan. For the IR norm, you only need to build outside 
the 10"6 contour (...).’ This remark shows that the moment of calculating the risk value comes 
too late in the process, hindering the smooth integration of safety and urban or spatial 
development. This received the following comment, however: ‘Measures are not guaranteed 
in a land-use plan (...) and are therefore not maintainable (.. .).’ Another important remark 
was that ‘Risk norms are interpreted as the truth’. The norms should also be put into 
perspective, because they are ‘multi-interpretable’ and ‘do not have any relation with 
casuistry.’
Category 2: The risk calculation model 
This class of comments included the following statements:
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1. ‘The calculation method is too permissive and is easily influenced by political 
interests.’
2. ‘The two-dimensional approach is out of date, as it is necessary to build over and 
under infrastructure from an environmental and spatial development point of view.’
3. ‘The calculation method is an absolute black box, which makes the discussion 
difficult.’
4. ‘GR considerations are made on the wrong scale.’
5. ‘GR considerations are too permissive.’
6 . ‘It seems as though risks are spirited away in new calculation methods.’
7. ‘The use and the effect of calculations [RBMII] are grossly overestimated.’
None of the participants seemed to basically disagree with the first comment. All the remarks 
made with regard to this comment used such words as ‘estimates’, ‘theoretical’, 
‘questionable’ and/or ‘assumptions’. One expert seemed to disagree, but still remarked that 
‘calculations and model results need to be strongly nuanced’. The importance of calculations 
is that ‘calculations make a decision politically acceptable’.
The ‘black box’ comment (comment 3) is an interesting one, as are some of the 
remarks about it: ‘The discussion is mainly done by outsiders with regard to the subject of 
calculation method. In practice, this constantly leads to misunderstandings. Apart from that, 
the calculators and the politicians often do not understand each other well.’ The other remarks 
support this. One remark gives a good summary: ‘It is useful if  there is an agreement about 
the basic assumptions for calculations and if the outcome is not seen as the truth. A model is a 
policy tool.’
Concluding, everybody agreed that there are limits to the calculations. Participants 
from different backgrounds also expressed different notions about the value of the model and 
its usability for policy support. The experts agree that the methods do not produce an 
indisputable assessment of the level of risk.
Category 3: The perception o f risk 
This category included the following comments:
1. ‘Risk concept/perception is an abstract concept which, by definition, hinders the 
discussion.’
2. ‘The problem is mainly emotional and politicised. It is also deliberately misused by 
politics.’
3. ‘There is little appreciation for the vigorous efforts by the business community to 
make the transport of hazardous materials safe.’
4. ‘Risk acceptance for the transport of hazardous materials by rail is lower than in the 
case of other modalities.’
5. ‘Disasters must be mediagenic.’
6 . ‘An increase in rail safety is possible but will have little psychological effect.’
7. ‘Local authorities have no understanding whatsoever, let alone the ability to 
communicate to the public what the GR criterion really is. Therefore, the need to make 
a GR assessment is not clear (at the cost of political health).’
8 . ‘External safety policy emphasises possible effects. Socialist Party: “there could have 
been thousands of fatalities”.’
Most of these comments did not generate much further discussion. There were some 
interesting remarks on two comments, however. Comment 3 was followed by a short 
discussion about the business community. It was said that: ‘There is a great sense of social
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responsibility in the chemical industry’, followed by: ‘That is also logical. The chemical 
industry cannot afford any incidents with regard to transport.’
Comment 5 was followed by a discussion that disasters are mediagenic: ‘Every 
disaster is mediagenic by definition. This also accounts for a near disaster. How nice does the 
header “.escap ed  from a disaster” sound? And this is exactly the instrument that politicians 
and journalists -  who have some sort of lethal embrace -  love to use. Not because they really 
want to do something in favour of safety. Are you joking!? On the contrary, I would say. The 
disaster or near disaster are now used to win votes or to write the umpteenth hasty article in a 
newspaper (.. .).’
Finally, the following remark is interesting because it pinpoints a clear obstacle in the 
policy (this could also belong to category 5, but it was made as a remark on comment 8): ‘Our 
inability to explain risks in an understandable manner eventually leads to a situation where, in 
the case of a disaster, the authorities are pinpointed as co-offender, when in fact we accept a 
certain risk of a disaster in this society.’
The conclusion on the issue of perception is that, according to the participants, the 
authorities involved do not clearly tell the public what the risks are or how the authorities 
should cope with possible liability issues. Consequently, perceptions vary and are difficult to 
deal with. The participants seemed to agree that the media does not help make the concept of 
safety insightful or to objectively cover or understand what a risk is.
Category 4: Uncertain transport flows and quantities o f transported goods 
This class of comments included the following statements:
1. ‘The present transport flows are not meant to be transported from city to city, like rail 
transport was originally intended.’
2. ‘It is difficult to enforce transport agreements/the routing of hazardous materials.’
3. ‘It is unclear how transport flows are managed.’
4. ‘The rail sector is often blamed, as it is the only modality that the government can 
direct in capacity.’
5. ‘With respect to expectations for the future: we face varying prognoses concerning the 
nature of transport flows and their volume (.. .).’
6 . ‘Directing the actual transport is not possible in controllable organisations.’
7. ‘Routing policy is not effective: there will not be a litre less transported.’
8 . ‘There is an absolute disproportion between the attention to rail transport on the one 
hand and (...) the incidents with hazardous materials with respect to rail transport on 
the other hand.’ [this is also a comment that could be made in category 3]
9. ‘The transport prognoses were given in 2004. However, these already deviate from the 
transport in the actual situation. At the moment new prognoses are being made for the 
basic network, but we cannot use these for urban plans. What then do local authorities 
need to take into account?’
This category generated very little debate. Nevertheless, there are some conclusions to be 
drawn here. The participants apparently agreed on the use of the routing of flows on the 
network. However, everyone agreed on the status of the transport prognoses and their 
disadvantages, namely that they vary over time and are too uncertain to support robust policy 
development.
Category 5: Policy and governance problems 
This category encompassed the following comments referring to policy practice:
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1. ‘Social costs related to the transport of hazardous materials are not taken into account 
in the decision-making process.’
2. ‘A bottleneck exists due to poor harmonisation at the level of national government 
(Ministry of Transport vs. Ministry of the Interior vs. Ministry of Housing).’
3. ‘Rail is the one which gets the blame, as it is the only modality that the government 
can direct in capacity.’ [also a comment that could be put in category 4]
4. ‘The justification duty for exceeding the GR criterion has not yet been fully 
crystallised.’
5. ‘GR considerations are made on the wrong scale.’ [also a category 2 remark]
6 . ‘GR considerations are too permissive.’ [also a category 2 remark]
7. ‘Fire departments (the keepers of national security) do not accept mere compliance 
with the GR or the IR norm as safe enough.’
8 . ‘The authorities want to avoid getting blamed.’
9. ‘Politicians need to make a decision, but they seem to want to get proposals from the 
industry, transporters, planners involved, etc. It is doubtful, however, whether this will 
give a satisfying result, if  one considers the different interests.’
10. ‘Laws and rules alone are not the solution, but they do work as guidance.’
This is a difficult category for finding similarities between the comments. The first two 
comments are interesting, because they make two things clear. The first (about the social 
costs) stems from the discussion on whether there is consensus about who is responsible for 
risks. Moreover, the discussion continued on which Ministry should be responsible for 
coordination (comment 2). The ‘poor harmonisation’ comment in combination with 
comments 8 and 9 may explain why the participants seemed to feel that the authorities dare 
not take responsibility for the choices they make. Moreover it may explain why it is difficult 
to plan urban planning projects, as there is a lack of allocation of responsibilities creating a 
situation in which no one seems to take responsibility for risks.
Another interesting remark is that the fire departments reason that ‘the probability of a 
disaster = 1’. Hence, this expert follows a more deterministic approach, which implies a focus 
on the effect of a potential disaster. Finally, the remarks on the GR criterion are important, as 
they make clear that it is not an obvious and fully applicable criterion in practice. The main 
conclusion from this category of remarks is that none of the experts seemed fully satisfied 
with the role played by local and national authorities because the authorities are too flexible 
with regard to norm enforcement and tend to avoid situations where they have to take 
responsibility for risks.
Category 6: Other comments 
These comments have no added value as they did not go into detail, were not strongly focused 
on the problems and causes in the external safety policy field, or were unclear.
4.3.2 Who pays the costs?
Having made the inventory of the problems, the next activity in the session focussed on 
causes of the problems and who pays the costs. However, due to the fact that many of the 
earlier comments were already related to the problem causes, the main focus was on who pays 
the costs of risks. The debate related to this question resulted in a simplified picture of who 
pays for safety measures. Instead of simply arguing that local authorities should pay, for 
example, the participants made it clear that it is the citizen who pays, either as a consumer or 
as a tax payer: ‘The citizen always pays: as a victim, as a tax payer to the government or as a 
consumer of the final products delivered by the companies.’ Or: ‘Ultimately, it’s the
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consumer who pays. When barrels are not transported lying down due to regulations, fewer 
barrels are transported and the price increases, which is balanced in the product price.’
An expert with a different opinion was criticised by the other participants: ‘The 
developer bears the costs of buildings’; ‘And balances this simply with the price for the 
buyer/user.’ Also: ‘The chemical industry [producer and distributor of hazardous materials] 
pays for safety measures itself: controlling processes, quality of staff, installations etc.’; 
‘Which are passed on to the products and therefore to the buyers and the consumers.’; ‘Of 
course these costs are passed on to the consumer. If the chemical industry didn’t do this, it 
would have negative financial results and the industry would either stop or go to another 
country for its production. What would be the economic impact of this on the Netherlands?’
And: ‘Actually, only a little is invested in safety. A measure every once in a while, 
like an extra wall to make a plan possible.’; ‘I think that the preceding statement excels in 
ignorance of what is taking place in spatial and real-estate development.’; ‘The first statement 
perhaps accounts for spatial planning, but rail transports, tank wagon constructors and the 
chemical industry all invest in safety. (...) Choice of materials, safety systems, educational 
programmes, checks, etc. But this is often forgotten. It’s always possible to do it better. But 
then you get an asymptotic marginal return.’
A final interesting comment (which perhaps belongs to the first part of the agenda, 
‘Problems and Causes’) is the following: ‘The polluter pays has always been a good motto. 
However, in the case of GR aspects, it is not clear who the “polluter” is.’
Thus, the experts concluded that ultimately society itself (citizens, producers, 
consumers) pays for safety. The participants found this logical: ‘That’s simply the investment 
in quality by society. I cannot think of anything against this.’; ‘Why do we in the Netherlands 
always want something for nothing?’
4.3.3 Valuing a number of propositions
After the break, a short round was initiated in which the experts were asked to evaluate ten 
propositions in terms of strongly agree (SA; 5 points), neutral (Ne; 3 points) to strongly 
disagree (SD; 1 point). The GroupSystems software then calculated the mean and the standard 
deviation (STD). The propositions were clustered into three categories (actor perspective, 
technical perspective, governmental perspective). The propositions were mainly based on 
insights acquired through the desk research in chapter 3 and a lack in clarity from the policy 
documents analysed in earlier stages of this research (e.g. propositions 1.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1). 
These were deliberately exaggerated to trigger a clear response (see propositions 1.2 and 1.3). 
This round was introduced to refocus the experts on the session after lunch, before they were 
asked to type comments in the next round. On the other hand, this was also an interesting way 
to gain insight into how the experts valued statements related to rail transport and risks. Table 
8 shows the propositions and the generated scores.
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Table 8: The propositions and the outcomes after voting in the first GDR session
1 Actor perspective
Primary List
1.1 Local authorities deliberately seek the 
limits of what is permissible when it comes 
to planning near rail transport nodes.
1.2 The safety culture within the transport 
sector must improve.
1.3 Because people voluntarily live near 
railways, they are not entitled to speak 
about risks.
2 Technical perspective
SA(5)
3
A(4)
4
4
Ne(3)
3
D (2)
1
4
2
SD(1)
3
Total
33
24
16
Mean 
4.13 (A)
3 .00 (Ne)
2.00 (D)
STD
0.99
1.07
0.93
N
8
8
8
Primary List SA(5) A(4) Ne(3) D (2) SD (1) Total Mean STD N
2.1 The transport of hazardous materials by
rail is not as risky as people think it is. 3 2 2 27 3.86 (A) 1.35 7
2.2 A different system than the IR /G R  is
necessary for judging risks. 3 2 2 1 23 2.88 (Ne) 1.13 8
2.3 It  is not possible to take risk calculations
as a starting point for policy, because the 1 2 1 1 3 21 2.63 (Ne) 1.6 8
calculations are too vague.
3 Governm ental perspective
Primary List SA(5) A(4) Ne(3) D (2) SD (1) Total Mean STD N
3.1 There is not a good instrument to give
an insight into the costs and benefits of 1 4 1 2 28 3.50 (A) 1.07 8
lowering risks.
3.2 New projects are too negotiated, and
higher risks are the consequence. 5 1 2 27 3.38 (Ne) 0.92 8
3.3 Too much attention is paid to external
safety with regard to the transport of 2 3 2 1 27 3.38 (Ne) 1.51 8
hazardous materials by rail.
3.4 The desire to carry out a project always
wins over the possible higher risks. 1 3 3 1 24 3.00 (Ne) 1.41 8
The participants were given the opportunity to make comments about the propositions. These 
comments did not seem to be relevant to the outcome of the voting.
The scores in table 8 reveal several interesting points. There were three propositions 
that on average scored an A (‘agree’), indicating that the experts feel:
- that local authorities deliberately seek the limits of what is permissible (prop 1 .1),
- that rail transport is not as risky as is sometimes thought (prop 2 .1),
- that there is not a good instrument that enables a costs and benefits appraisal (prop 
3.1).
One comment concerning 1.1 is interesting: ‘Local authorities want both: safety as well as 
maximum urban development. Obviously they seek the limits.’ This reflects the observation 
made in Chapter 3 on the selected urban planning projects that there is a tendency within 
municipal decision making to interpret the considerable uncertainty in risk calculations in 
favour of the municipal building interests. On the other hand, the STD scores on proposition
3.4 (suggesting that the desire to build the project systematically causes the acceptance of 
larger risks) generates much dissensus among the experts. Interestingly, there is a fair degree 
of consensus on the lack of a good cost-benefit appraisal method that might be very helpful in 
such local debates and decision making processes (proposition 3.1).
Further, it is observed that, where the scores for the propositions 1.1 and 3.1 have a 
relatively low STD, there was not a high level of agreement on proposition 2.1, considering 
the STD of 1.35. This indicates a fairly large sensibility of the average opinion on the degree 
to which rail transport of hazardous materials should be considered as a risky activity.
Only one proposition (1.3) scored an average of D (‘disagree’): the participants 
disagreed with the proposition that people are not entitled to complain about risks as they 
voluntarily live near railways. Moreover, this proposition had the second lowest STD (0.93).
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This is interesting in terms of the responsibility of local authorities for explicitly contributing 
to the external safety of the built environment.
The experts appeared to be (on average) neutral with respect to the other propositions. 
However, quite systematically, in these cases the STD is relatively high. For example, looking 
at the scores and the standard deviation for proposition 1.2  (‘the safety culture in the transport 
sector should be improved’), fairly opposing opinions were expressed: 4 experts agree, 4 do 
not. Also the outcome for proposition 2.3 is illustrative. There is apparently no consensus at 
all on whether calculations can be taken as a starting point for policy. The final average score 
is in the neutral area and the STD is high (1.6). This seems to contrast somewhat with the 
earlier discussion about the problems of local external safety management and their causes. 
However, it also complements the earlier discussion: there is a shared belief that the 
calculation method has its flaws, but there is no clear alternative in the present situation and 
thus no clear consensus on the supportive value of the calculations for policy decision 
making.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from these propositions is that experts in 
external safety management with a more commercial background (consultancy, rail sector) 
express significant lack of consensus on the majority of the propositions. There is relative 
consensus on other propositions expressing a somewhat negative perception of the role of 
local authorities and the risk increasing consequences of local urban planning (in particular 
propositions 1.1 and 3.2). The experts consider the norms for external safety to be useful 
(proposition 2 .2 ), but express a clear need to improve the instruments to analyse risks and 
support planning and decision making (propositions 2.3 and 3.1).
4.3.4 Improvements
After evaluating the propositions, the experts started with the final part of the GDR session. In 
this part of the session, we wanted to trigger the experts to make comments aimed at 
improving the present situation. We therefore handed out a sheet with four possible avenues 
for improvements on external safety policy to measure their reaction. The fifth option was that 
the experts themselves would mention possible improvements.
The experts were first given a sheet with five possible avenues for improvement:
• Better enforcement of transport rules and regulations
• Discard the GR norm
• Improve the planning process
• Serious implementation of the ALARP principle
• Other options
The possible improvements were felt to be rather provocative and were intended to elicit 
comments from the participants. The first proposition was based on the idea that better 
enforcement of rules would make transport safer and result in fewer accidents. The second 
was meant to encourage the participants to discuss the use of a norm that, in practice, is very 
often exceeded. Improving the planning process was based on the notion that if  attention is 
paid to aspects of safety in the early stages of the planning process, it is easier to address 
them. Implementing the ALARP principle was chosen because it has not been seriously 
implemented. The first four were accompanied by a brief explanation. In category 5, the 
participants themselves could suggest other possible improvements.
The sheet is reproduced below:
82 Rail Transport Risks and Urban Planning
1) Better enforcement o f transport rules and regulations: When there is better 
supervision of the transported materials and of the transport company employees, the rail 
traffic control and the planning regulations, the risks will decrease, because the risk of a 
disaster will decline. Therefore, there should be better inspection and enforcement of rules 
and regulations.
2) Discard the GR norm and work only with the IR norm: Because the GR norm is rarely 
met and because it is a day-to-day risk, it could be eliminated and only the IR norm could be 
used. After all, this norm also shows a level of risk.
3) Improve the planning process: The planning process could do with some 
improvements. It is obvious that the sooner attention is paid to safety, the better safety will be 
taken into account in urban design. Therefore, several design options should be compared, 
similar to what is common practice in environmental impact assessments.
4) Serious implementation o f the ALARP principle: There is currently no real 
implementation of the ALARP principle. A transparent method should be designed that 
enables the weighing of the costs and benefits of investments in reducing risks, aimed at 
providing insight into these investments. This could also mean that risk causers can pay other 
parties to reduce risks if this means that there is a better cost benefit ratio.
5) Other options: This category could be used by the participants to put forward their 
own ideas for improvements in the policy field.
Better enforcement o f transport rules and regulations 
This option did not create a heated discussion. Some participants slightly agreed with this 
option. There were comments like: ‘Enforcement of the safety of transport of hazardous 
materials has come too much to a dead-end, too general’; ‘When supervising the transport of 
hazardous materials, just recently a number of failures were found. It doesn’t all go as well as 
the transporters want us to believe.’ There were also some experts who did not see the added 
value of this option: ‘I don’t think this is a good idea. This is only inspiring in a reluctant 
environment and this is not the case.’
An interesting debate was the following: ‘The tendency is that there are too many 
checks on “the outside”, as long as the paperwork is correct. This fits in with the whole idea 
of bureaucratisation and accountability. More import is the genuine test for what really 
matters: the content.’; ‘I agree. It is important that everyone working with risky activities 
understands his business and has a proper mentality. There can therefore never be a reduction 
in education.’ (...) ‘It’s just like raising children, dogs or guinea pigs: punishment is good, but 
indoctrination is even better. Safety must therefore be in the genes.’
As a conclusion it can be said that the experts think it is not a matter of supervision 
alone: practitioners should explicitly incorporate safety into their work culture.
Discard the GR norm
The reactions to this possible improvement were much more direct than reactions to the first 
one. The first two comments were fairly typical of the rest of the discussion: ‘Bad option’ and 
‘completely absurd’. Another comment was: ‘Bad idea: even though the IR is clear and 
usable, risks are mainly drawn up by the GR. It facilitates a confrontation between transport 
and spatial development!’
Other comments went deeper into this matter, such as: ‘Maybe we should get rid of 
the GR calculation, but the consideration about the choice of location must stay. Of course,
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this does not need to be done under the name of GR.’ And: ‘Despite the amount of discussion 
about how you calculate the GR, the justification procedure has at least one useful aspect 
(beside the absolute level of risk), which is the increase of the GR as a result of the 
development of an urban planning project.’ And: ‘Strong, or absolute increase of risk is not 
the issue; the issue is to gain insight into the factors that cause increased risk.’
The other remarks regarding this option were quite detailed and sometimes repeated 
the problems that had been formulated in the first part of the GDR session. The conclusion 
that can be drawn here is that the participants were against the idea of narrowing down risk 
evaluation to the IR, because of the importance of the GR criterion for showing where the 
problems and effects of new spatial plans are for the size of the risk. The particular benefit of 
GR calculation is the insight into how an urban planning project influences the risk.
Improve the planning process 
This option led to little discussion. Nevertheless, the participants did not seem to have much 
confidence in this option, even though the voting round after the break painted a different 
picture. The participants had varying opinions about this option. Its supporters said: ‘With 
respect to spatial development: (...) the advantage is that human life and external safety are 
embedded in an early phase of the design process (...). This could lead to more balanced 
decision-making.’ And: ‘A safety impact assessment as an improvement of the planning 
process is useful only when there is an explicit consideration of interests and a search for 
solutions. It should not start to resemble an environmental impact assessment, which is only 
meant to discuss one moment in time.’
However critics of this option said: ‘A safety impact assessment for development along rail 
tracks generates a great deal of unnecessary paperwork for local authorities. It does not add 
anything to the level of safety.’; ‘Alternatives already have to be well-founded. When the 
rules and regulations are complied with, planning processes should already be good.’; ‘In the 
world of spatial planners, certainly near railways, there is already early attention to external 
safety. Therefore, there is no process improvement.’
The conclusion is that the experts differ in opinion on the suggested improvement.
Serious implementation o f the ALARP principle 
Some experts were sceptical when it came to operationalising the ALARP principle: ‘The 
crux is in the word “reasonably”. To get a clear picture of costs and benefits should not be a 
problem.’; ‘ALARP for spatial development is not possible.’
Other experts, however, said they think it could be a good idea: ‘This seems to be a 
good idea. I can picture it: local authorities pay ProRail for the costs of driving slowly in an 
urban area. My objection, however, is the labyrinth of local considerations and agreements 
that need to be taken into account and/or maintained.’
The discussion on this option mainly stressed the practical problems with 
operationalisation of the principle, which would make it difficult to handle in planning 
practice.
Other options
This category did not include any significant or surprising insights. A useful comment was 
that there should be more attention at national level to the impact of measures taken at local 
level. This is given too little attention in practice.
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4.3.5 Prioritise the possible improvements
This part of the GDR session was included to see which of the possible improvements was 
valued as the most useful to improve the present practice. The outcome was generated by 
asking the participants to evaluate the four possible improvements. They were given 10 points 
that they could divide among the 4 options with a value from 0 to 10, with a total of 10 points. 
If they had already given a total of 10 points to one option, the other three options could not 
get any points. The outcome is given in table 9.
Table 9: Outcome of the prioritisation in the first GDR session
Total Mean STD
Process im provem ent 30 3.75 2.43
ALARP 27 3.38 1.6
Better enforcem ent 18 2.25 1.28
Discard the GR 5 0.63 1.19
This table shows that ‘Process improvement’ and the ‘ALARP’ option scored considerably 
better than the other two options. The STD for ‘Process improvement’, however, was quite 
high and shows what the earlier debate had already shown, namely that the opinions about 
this option differed significantly. This might be attributable to the fact that the notion of 
‘process improvement’ in the interpretation of the experts might refer to a broad set of 
aspects, varying from systematic involvement of stakeholders, using better risk models or 
taking responsibilities up to a different use of risk standards. The experts had shown no clear 
consensus on several of these aspects in the previous debate and this is reflected in the scores 
in table 9. It differs from the three other, more focused, avenues for improvement.
4.4 The second GDR session
This session took place on 20 June 2007 with seven experts (nine experts agreed to come, but 
unfortunately two cancelled at the last moment). The experts were mainly from local 
authorities (see Appendix 1 for the list of participants).
The agenda for this session was the same as for the first session, with the exception of 
a few additional propositions to be evaluated after the lunch break. These propositions (3.1 
and 3.4 in table 11) were posed after insights had been acquired during the first session; they 
were intended to gain additional insight into the governmental perspective on external safety.
4.4.1 Problems and causes
As in the first session, the outcome showed a diverse range of problems and causes. They are 
categorised as follows:
1) Problems related to transport flows
2) Local governance problems
3) Non-local governance problems
4) Arithmetical problems
5) Problems due to conflicting interests
6 ) Other difficult to categorise comments.
There appeared to be fewer overlaps within these categories than in the first session.
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Category 1: Problems related to transport flows 
In this category, the following comments were made:
1) ‘Limited insight into the actual transport of hazardous materials by rail and its 
development.’
2) ‘Ongoing uncertainty about the (future) transport figures.’
3) ‘No possibilities to regulate the (international) transport.’
4) ‘Discrepancy between actual use and allowed use.’
5) ‘Large difference between the volume of the transport for risk calculations of spatial 
developments and the actual (current) transport, leading to an underestimation of the 
present risks.’
6 ) ‘Large discussion on the assessment of the volume of future transport. Everybody is 
waiting for the outcome of the basic network, but what do we use in the intervening 
period when preparing spatial development?’
7) ‘Great dependence on ProRail for the transport figures to be used in risk calculations. 
(...) These figures seem to be quite different from the figures given a short while ago 
in a different case along the same rail track.’
8) ‘Transport companies invest no/limited effort in safety for people along the railway. 
They work from an existing situation where there are no limits on transport and in 
which they cannot be limited. They hide behind European agreements, because they 
are frightened that the price of transport will become too high. They use European 
rules to explain why things cannot be done, while those rules also give possibilities to 
route transport (Asser Institute Report).’
The comments clearly show that there is much uncertainty at local level with regard to the 
present and future volume of transported hazardous materials. This apparently leads to 
problems in several situations: ‘The Dordrecht-Zwijndrecht safety study used transport 
figures from 2002 for their 2004 calculations. Estimates were also made for the transport 
figures in 2010. These had already been far exceeded in 2005. It seems impossible for either 
ProRail or the authorities to give a good prognosis on transport figures. It is therefore very 
difficult to develop policy for future developments along railways.’ Or as another expert puts 
it: ‘There will always be a difference between the figures for the present and those for the 
past. I assume that the most recent figures are used and that calculations are made on the basis 
of optimal forecasts. This, in my opinion, is crystal-gazing and dependent on many factors.’
The experts also expressed the feeling that transport companies put too little effort into 
making transport safer. It was also asked what should get priority -  transport or spatial 
development? ‘This “inability” to regulate routing is often used as an argument by ProRail 
and transport companies, as a result of which prognoses are made for the future that are based 
on large growth (because we ‘cannot control transport quantities’) (...) by doing so there are 
limitations in the possibilities for developing adjacent to railways, when it is unsure whether 
transport volumes will ever be this high. The important question then is (...) what has 
priority: urban development or the growth of transport of hazardous materials?’
There were no other fundamental comments, nor was there a big discussion about the 
comments made. The problems were, however, clearly indicated.
Category 2: Local governance problems 
This category contains the following comments:
1) ‘Desire to combine many functions.’
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2) ‘Insufficient understanding among local politicians of the possible consequences of 
their building ambitions.’ [mentioned twice]
3) ‘Double problem for local authorities: concentrate development near railways versus 
safety. This creates a situation in which the environmental theme, in this case safety, is 
usually inferior.’
4) ‘(...) In the past it was normal to build directly adjacent to railways and this takes 
place even now, because land-use plans are decided on before the rules and regulation 
for external safety are made clear (...).’
5) ‘Insufficient political understanding about remaining risks and the situation for 
emergency services in the case of an incident.’
The participants were fairly sceptical about how local authorities deal with external safety in 
practice. One participant stated: ‘Insufficient knowledge about external safety is the cause of 
this problem.’ Other participants are not convinced: ‘Some politicians do have sufficient 
understanding, but they give more weight to economic interests than to safety interests.’ And: 
‘The justification duty for the GR is viewed by many politicians as a rightful justification of 
their decisions. The politician has no idea what it means when the orientation value is 
exceeded by a factor of 10 (.. .).’
This means that there can be a discrepancy between how politicians decide and what is 
considered sensible in terms of safety. Again, there was little discussion on the various 
comments.
Category 3: Non-local governance problems 
The experts stated the following comments:
1) ‘Insufficient steering by national government: responsibility lies too much with the 
local authorities.’
2) ‘Fragmentation of national policy due to shared responsibility for safety by the 
Ministries of the Interior, Transport, and Housing.’
3) ‘European pressure to equalise the transport of hazardous materials through all 
Member States and thereby equalise densely populated countries with less dense 
areas.’
4) ‘The standard is too one-sided and too limited to achieve the ambition of a safe basic 
network on which more materials can be transported and at the same time develop the 
urban area (...). More instruments are needed to generate tailor-made solutions. For 
example, by making it possible to impose additional physical safety demands on 
buildings in the area concerned. This is not possible under the existing rules and 
regulations ( ...).’
5) ‘One cause is that after Seveso, European legislation was intended for industrial 
plants, and transport was not taken into consideration.’
6 ) ‘The national government made external safety a spearhead of its policy, but does not 
try to make a success of it in the short term (it has been debated since 20 0 1  and we 
still cannot grasp the risks regarding transport) and is not prepared to spend a lot of 
money.’
This category of comments seems fairly diverse. The common notion is, however, that 
national and international institutions are not well aligned to each other. Moreover, there is 
fuzziness about which governmental body is ultimately responsible for safety. The rules and 
instruments also seem to be inadequate to control safety.
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Category 4: Arithmetical problems 
In this category, the following comments were made:
1) ‘Insufficient certainty about the reliability of the applied calculation 
methods/programs.’
2) ‘The influence of safety-increasing measures (which prevent people near railways 
from becoming victims of a disaster) in the area concerned and in buildings cannot be 
measured by the calculation models. Therefore, the calculated risk remains the same 
while in practice the risks are lowered.’
3) ‘Too much attention is paid to analysing and calculating risks (...). This is especially 
noticeable in local urban planning projects.’
There were fewer remarks made in this category than in the first GDR session, and it is not 
possible to draw up a single conclusion, except for the limited use of the calculation models. 
The following additional remark, however, is quite remarkable: ‘After the transition from the 
IPORBM risk calculation model to RBMII, the calculated risks were reduced. A follow-up to 
RBMII is currently being designed. Therefore, developments from the past that were not 
allowed will now be possible.’
This comment implies that changing models (by using other parameter values) 
systematically results in lower risks for unchanged situations, compared with the past. In 
other words, the calculated risks become more compliant with the norm. This, of course, does 
not necessarily imply that the real world is also actually safer. If this remark is a common 
thought, this could mean that stakeholders take the outcome of the calculation models very 
seriously and interpret this as a ‘true’ risk, when in fact the methodology is based on a series 
of assumptions (see also chapters 3 and 5). However, another comment was: ‘Do we need to 
base our judgements solely on the models? In the end, it is all about acceptability and the 
ability to control the incident in the case of an emergency.’
Category 5: Problems due to conflicting interests 
This category contains the following comments:
1) ‘Guaranteeing the implementation of agreed safety-increasing measures.’
2) ‘Imbalance between the interests of spatial development, transport and safety.’
3) ‘Unclear who is financially responsible for interventions on the railways that can also 
increase safety.’
4) ‘Own responsibility of developers is not guaranteed (sanctions are necessary).’
5) ‘Too little attention is paid to the transport of hazardous materials from and to 
industrial sites when new industrial plants are planned.’
6 ) ‘Within governmental bodies, the approach is too divided. Everybody has his or her 
own area of interest. Safety can only be optimised when an integral approach is 
applied (...). Consequently, this leads to a situation in which the authorities are mainly 
internally oriented, while major safety gains are to be made possible with other parties 
(transport companies and real estate developers).’
Again, there are no univocal conclusions to be drawn from the above. The participants clearly 
recognise the conflicting interests between transport operating companies, land development 
and local authorities. However, the experts did not mention ideas that would prevent these 
conflicting interests from happening.
88 Rail Transport Risks and Urban Planning
Category 6: Other problems 
Here, the comments were somewhat unclear or less relevant. The following, however, are 
interesting: ‘ProRail is reserved about providing information about the use of rail. Driving 
slowly (<40 km/h), certainly near stations (or in other situations with numerous rail switches) 
is often already included in internal instructions, while ProRail wants risk calculations to use 
a standard of more than 40 km/h.’ And: ‘It seems that ProRail (when studying the risks) tries 
its best to maintain the possibilities for transport and does not have any attention for lowering 
risks by taking source measures. (...) These are the measures which are interesting for the 
design of a safe Basic Network (...) Safety is possible, but there is a price to be paid.’
These complaints were directed towards ProRail and emphasise the vagueness that 
stakeholders outside ProRail can experience when it comes to the information that ProRail 
should provide.
4.4.2 Who pays the costs?
A number of the comments made regarding the issue of costs in this session were similar to 
those made in the first session in terms of the message that is communicated. Again, the 
experts mentioned that the consumer or the citizen pays the costs of safety: the consumer pays 
when the costs of transport increase, and the citizen pays when the costs are paid from taxes. 
There were, however, also other comments: ‘Costs of adequate crisis control (including 
proaction, preparation etc.) are paid by the local authorities.’; ‘Costs of urban projects are paid 
by the project developer (including safety increasing measures). But they want to keep the 
costs down.’; ‘Costs of safety improvement in existing urban areas are to be paid by the local 
authorities.’
A few other interesting comments were made. One option mentioned, for example, is 
that more dedicated railways such as the Betuwe line should be constructed. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to see ideas being proposed such as the polluter pays principle should be applied 
and that the names of ‘bad’ transporters should be published: ‘In my opinion, the “polluting” 
parties should be stimulated to improve their performance under the threat of publicity.’
The strange thing about these comments is that they seem to ignore the fact that local 
authorities also have their responsibilities when it comes to the dimension of ‘effect’ in the 
risk formula. However: ‘We should realise that it all stops somewhere. If we want to work 
above the tracks or even live on top of them, who should pay for safety? A degree of 
acceptance for the interests of others (even if this means for transport companies) is not 
wrong. After all, we live in a society with risks and we don’t let our children play on a 
motorway either. (.. .).’
Finally, an interesting remark was made about cost-benefit analyses: ‘Cost-benefit 
analyses for the justification of the GR criterion might be a good idea. (...) they help to make 
the effects of measures visible. A human life should also be valued in these calculations.’
4.4.3 Propositions
After the break, the experts were asked to score ten propositions, ranging from strongly agree 
(SA; 5 points), neutral (Ne; 3 points) to strongly disagree (SD; 1 point). The Group Systems 
program then calculated the mean and the standard deviation (STD). The propositions were 
clustered into three categories (actor perspective, technical perspective, governmental 
perspective). Compared to the first GDR session, a few propositions were added. Propositions
3.1 and 3.4 were added as some comments had been made in the first session that implied that 
politicians do not want to be held responsible for risks, and that they react to risk issues rather 
than actively anticipate them in safety policy. Although these propositions cannot be
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compared with the findings from the first session, these propositions and their outcomes are 
interesting for the analysis as they came from a number of representatives of local authorities. 
Table 10 shows the propositions and the scores.
Table 10: The propositions and outcomes of the voting round in the second GDR session
1 Actor perspective
Primary List SA(5) A(4) Ne(3) D (2) SD (1) Total Mean STD N
1.1 The safety culture within the
transport sector must improve. 3 3 1 30 4.29 (A) 0.76 7
1.2 Local authorities deliberately
seek the limits of what is 4 1 2 23 3.29 (Ne) 0.95 7
permissible when it comes to
planning near rail transport
nodes.
1.3 Because people voluntarily
live near railw ays, they are not 1 6 8 1.14 (SD) 0.38 7
entitled to speak about risks.
2 Technical perspective
Primary List SA(5) A(4) Ne(3) D (2) SD (1) Total Mean STD N
2.1 The transport of hazardous
materials by rail is not as risky as 1 2 1 3 22 3.14 (Ne) 1.21 7
people think it is.
2 .2 It is actually not possible to
take risk calculations as a starting
point for policy, because the 1 2 3 1 20 2.86 (Ne) 1.46 7
calculations are too vague.
2.3 A different system from the
IR/GR is necessary for judging
risks. 1 1 5 19 2.71 (Ne) 1.25 7
3 Governm ental perspective
Primary List SA(5) A(4) Ne(3) D (2) SD (1) Total Mean STD N
3.1 Administrators are afraid to
take responsibility when it comes 1 5 1 28 4.00 (A) 0.58 7
to safety in urban projects
3.2 There is not a good
instrument to give insight into the 3 2 1 1 26 3,71 (A) 1.6 7
costs and benefits of reducing
risks.
3.3 New projects are too
negotiated, and higher risks are 5 2 24 3.43 (Ne) 0.98 7
the consequence.
3 .4  Provinces and local
authorities act reactively when it 2 2 2 1 23 3.29 (Ne) 1.6 7
comes to external safety and
anticipate risks in new policy.
3.5 The desire to carry out a
project always wins over the 3 2 2 22 3.14 (Ne) 0.9 7
possible higher risks.
3.6 Too much attention is paid to
external safety with regard to the 2 1 1 3 16 2.29 (D) 1.38 7
transport of hazardous materials
by rail.
The voting round clearly confirms what had been brought up in the morning session, namely 
that the experts from local public authorities are very critical about the role of the transport 
sector in external safety policy. They tend to disagree with the idea that too much attention is 
paid to external safety related to transport of hazardous materials (proposition 3.6), and the 
average score for proposition 2.1  (this type of transport is not as risky as generally thought) 
tends to disagree more strongly than the experts in the first session. Further, the average score 
of 4.3 and the low STD of 0.76 on the proposition whether or not the safety culture of 
transport companies should be improved (proposition 1 .1), is in clear contrast with the score 
in the session of experts with a commercial background, where the average score for this 
proposition was 3.0. Another remarkable difference appeared with regard to proposition 1.2 
stating that local authorities deliberately seek the limits of what is permissible. The experts
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with a mainly governmental background in this session scored an average of 3.3, while in the 
previous session it was 4.1. Clearly these differences on these propositions between the two 
sessions express the different backgrounds of the two expert groups and their (theoretically) 
opposing interests.
As in the first session, the experts disagree with the statement (1.3) that people living 
near railways voluntarily experience risk and are thus not entitled to protest. This can be read 
as a clear appeal to corporate actors such as the municipality to take responsibility in this 
matter. Remarkable in this context is the high average score (4.0) and the very low STD on 
the added proposition 3.1, indicating that the experts strongly supported the suggestion that 
administrators are afraid to take responsibility when it comes to urban planning and risks. 
With respect to the active or reactive role of local and regional authorities (proposition 3.4) 
the scores express great lack of consensus in opinion.
Looking at propositions concerning support for decision making, it is observed that 
within this group of experts of civil servants, a lack of consensus exists about whether risk 
calculations can be taken as a starting point for policy making (proposition 2.2): the STD is 
quite large and the average score neutral. Further, the average score on the proposition about 
the lack of a cost-benefits instrument (proposition 3.2) was virtually similar in both sessions 
(3.7 versus 3.5 in the previous session), meaning support for the ideas expressed in the 
proposition. Compared with the first session, however, the STD is larger, suggesting that the 
experts hold more controversial views on this issue. No comments were added to the 
propositions.
4.4.4 Improvements
After scoring the propositions, the participants started the final part of the GDR session. They 
were given a sheet with five possible improvements, which were similar to the first session 
and which are explained in section 4.3.4 (i.e. supervision, discard the GR norm, improve the 
planning process, implement the ALARP principle, other options). The outcome of the 
discussion is as follows.
Better enforcement o f transport rules and regulations 
The participants differed considerably in their opinions about this option. Those with a 
positive stance said that human factors have a great influence on the cause of accidents and 
that with adequate control many safety gains can be achieved. Also, if maintaining implies 
that the whole regulation process will be monitored, this might result in a higher level of 
safety.
However, the critics did not feel that this gave any comfort, because the discussion 
within provinces and local authorities is mainly about arithmetic phenomena and compliance 
with norms rather than analysing the intrinsic safety of transport. Maintaining should not, 
however, be a goal itself. Maintaining is not the main issue, or as expressed in somewhat 
Utopian terms: ‘If we reach an agreement (law, rule or deal) and this agreement leads to a 
factual safer situation, then we should have enough discipline to ensure that the agreement is 
kept and that it does not become watered down under the influence of issues of the day or 
political games.’ And: ‘We need to go back to the essence of risks (together with the 
numerical calculation of risks, these are the source of risks) and the adjacent area [the effect], 
and make clear rules that are maintainable.’
Discard the GR norm
This option evoked little discussion, apart for remarks that the participants did not agree with 
the option. In contrast, the experts preferred to discard the IR norm by stating that a couple of
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metres more or less do not matter for safety. They also stated that the budgets that would then 
become available could be used for risk-reducing measures.
Improving the planning process 
This option was valued fairly highly. The experts feel that in practice, it is not common to 
explicitly take safety into account in the decision making process: ‘There is still insufficient 
understanding among land-use planners that safety should already be taken into account at an 
early stage of the planning process. In practice, safety only seems to become an issue when 
planning is slowed down due to insufficient attention to safety. The disadvantage is that safety 
is viewed as an obstacle, but this should be taken for granted at the beginning of the 
processes.’ And: ‘Safety is more of an obstacle at a later stage than at an early stage. In 
practice, I have already experienced several cases in which only a couple of days before an 
urban plan was to be decided on by the city council, the fire department indicated that 
insufficient account had been taken of aspects of disaster fighting. And this is a real obstacle. 
If we do this at an earlier stage, you can have more constructive negotiations and better 
solutions.’ When it comes to explicitly requiring safety impact assessments, the participants 
were slightly negative, as they felt this would lead to sluggishness.
Serious implementation of the ALARP principle 
This option generated the least debate. Although it was supported, there were some comments 
about its feasibility. One participant said that the idea of transport companies paying 
settlements for possible disaster recovery to local authorities is interesting.
Other options
The comments made here are not relevant to this research.
4.4.5 Prioritise the possible improvements
This part of the session was used to see which of the possible improvements was regarded the 
most useful for reducing risks or increasing safety benefits. The participants were asked to 
assess the added value of the four options in lowering risks. They were given 10 points to 
allocate to the four options. The outcome is given in Table 11.
Table 11: Outcome of the prioritisation in the second GDR session
Total Mean STD
Process im provem ents 34 4.86 1.35
Better enforcem ent 19 2.71 1.35
ALARP 17 2.43 1.27
Discard the GR 0 0 0
The table shows that the participants have the most confidence in improving the planning 
process and no confidence whatsoever in discarding the GR. As already noted in the 
description of the former session, ‘process improvements’ is a broad notion. We have to 
interpret this score in terms of the debate described above, which differs in focus from the 
first session.
If we compare the other results with those of the first session, we can see some small 
differences. Whereas in the previous section the idea of better applying the ALARP principle 
scores better than enforcement, here this sequence is the other way around: enforcement
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scores better than ALARP. This reflects the background of the experts (representatives from 
local public decision making) that is embedded in a culture of specifying and maintaining 
clear rules. The lack of support for the idea of discarding the GR criterion also reflects that 
culture.
4.5 Conclusions and reflection
The structured consultation of experts by using the GDR methodology results in the 
observation that experts from both a commercial and public policy background were quite 
critical about the current external safety management practice. A range of problems regarding 
the present safety management framework was mentioned. The comments of the experts can 
be summarised into six categories, each of which reflects a certain consensus on the origin of 
the problem. The problems are related to:
1) The use of norms
2) The risk calculation model/arithmetical issues
3) The perception of risk
4) Uncertain transport flows and transport volumes
5) Governance issues
6 ) Conflicting interests
1) Problems related to the use o f risk norms
The experts indicated that the norms for allowable risks are difficult to interpret and to control 
in practice. Especially the GR norm is debatable and subject of different interpretations: it is 
often exceeded in practice, and there are few possibilities to prevent this. The consequence of 
exceeding norms is that the options for urban development are severely limited. On the other 
hand, local authorities, having problems interpreting the results of risk calculations, tend to 
interpret them in favour of the local interests of urban development.
2) Problems related to risk modelling
The experts agreed that there are numerous problems related to the prescribed RBMII model. 
These problems are a result of what several experts called the ‘black box’ nature of risk 
modelling, the use of the calculated risks and the use of the model in policy practice. It is 
therefore difficult in practice to understand how the complexity of risk situations is modelled, 
how the risk levels are calculated and how these figures should be interpreted.
3) Problems related to risk perception
A negative perception is easily created. Near misses, for example, receive a great deal of 
media attention and it seems rather difficult to communicate about risks to other parties. There 
is no evident strategy to create positive attention to the way risks are reduced.
4) Problems related to uncertain transport flows and transport volumes
Stable and reliable forecasts are important to create a stable and reliable picture of future risks 
in urban areas. Risk calculations largely depend on how much material is transported. 
However, the available forecasts are experienced as being unreliable and actual data are often 
not available or not up to date. Moreover, the transport of goods is in principle unlimited 
within the EU. These transport figures differ significantly from year to year (see e.g. ProRail 
2003; 2005; 2006; 2008). The resulting uncertainty has a direct consequence for the reliability 
and the usability of the calculated risk for a certain spot.
Chapter 4: Expert opinions on the management of external safety in urban planning practice 93
5) Problems related to governance issues
All experts underline that the corporate stakeholders must take responsibility in managing 
risks: people living adjacent to railways do have their rights. This class of problems also 
refers to comments from the experts stating that local authorities hesitate too much to take 
responsibility to reach decisions, whereas the national authorities put too little effort into 
harmonising the institutions.
6) Problems related to conflicting interests
As a consequence of the previous issue, the various actors involved (transport companies, real 
estate developers, local authorities) have different interests that tend to conflict with each 
other. This is caused not only by different goals from their respective positions, but may also 
be strengthened by the way in which the different policy fields are institutionalised, as 
reaching the goal for one actor (for example transport operating companies) means more 
problems for another actor (for example an increase of risks in a municipality).
Although the experts from different background shared many ideas, it also became clear that a 
difference in culture exists between those who work for municipalities, developing projects 
adjacent to rail infrastructure, and those who operate transport services or advise on such 
projects. For example, experts from the public sector appear to be more worried about the 
safety culture in transport than the commercial experts, whereas experts from a more 
commercial background largely agreed that local authorities seek the limits of what is 
permissible. Also, civil servants tend to put more weight on the use of norms. This became 
particularly clear from the exploration of opinions on possible improvements. A better 
enforcement of transport rules and regulations in both sessions was not badly valued, although 
not seen as the key solution. Few of the experts wanted to discard the GR norm as it has an 
added value to decision making, whereas there were comments that make clear that the IR 
could be discarded. Although the case studies indicate that early attention in the decision 
making process does not necessarily mean better decisions, this option received many positive 
comments by the experts. The implementation of ALARP is seen as a possible improvement, 
although not every expert believes this to be an applicable concept. The option of process 
improvements unfortunately appeared to be a notion with too much room for interpretation 
between the experts of both sessions, making it impossible to make a good comparison 
between both sessions.
The results of the expert consultation are in line with the results of the findings in 
chapters 2 and 3. More particularly, interpreting the opinions and experiences of the experts, 
various aspects of the institutional framing of external safety policy seem to contribute to the 
increase of complexity and uncertainty in the context of risk management. It also confirms 
that the risk analysis tools that are prescribed do not seem to offer a very solid support. With 
these observations, we can finish the explorative phase of this study, which was based on 
three very different analyses. The main conclusions regarding the exploration will be 
summarised in the following intermezzo.
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Concluding Part I
Comparing the results from the first chapters
The first part of this study focused on exploring the problems of local urban area development 
in the Netherlands arising from the rail transport of hazardous materials. This search was 
triggered by the intensifying debate on external safety issues in spatial planning in the past 
decade. An open mind was chosen for the in-depth explorative analysis of these conflicts in 
the first part of this thesis. The analysis focused on identifying the relevant issues at the local 
level, the stakeholders, the nature of conflicts between these stakeholders, the applied 
institutions and the resulting policies using different methods and sources of data.
The first part of this research was built up by perceiving the risks related to the 
transport of hazardous materials in terms of the framework introduced by Klinke and Renn 
(2002). This framework was chosen for its comprehensiveness and view on the richness of 
risk problems. These authors introduced a classification of risks. First to mention is the 
category of simple (routine) risk problems. These risks require nothing more than routine 
actions by regulators to assess and control risks and hardly deviate from traditional (linear, 
top-down) decision making. Data is provided by statistical analysis, law or statutory 
requirements determine standards and the role of risk management is to ensure that all risk 
reduction measures are implemented and enforced. For this type of risks yields that the 
potential negative consequences are obvious, the values that are applied are non-controversial 
and the remaining uncertainties are low. Based on the various analyses, we concluded that the 
problems studied in this thesis do not fit within this category. We therefore conclude that 
generally, risk problems as addressed in this study, are non-simple or non-routine risk 
problems.
Klinke and Renn use three perspectives to classify such problems. The first 
perspective is that of complexity, which refers to the difficulty of identifying and quantifying 
causal links between a multitude of potential accidents and specific adverse effects. Low 
complexity implies that risks have little statistical uncertainty, low catastrophic potential,
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small numbers when the product of probability and damage is taken and a low score on 
ubiquity of consequences. High complexity logically is characterised by the opposite. The 
second perspective is that of uncertainty. Uncertainty differs from complexity, as it comprises 
different and distinct components such as statistical variation, measurement errors, ignorance 
and indeterminacy which all have one feature in common: uncertainty reduces the strength of 
confidence in the estimated cause and effect chain. Uncertainty increases when complexity 
cannot be resolved by scientific methods. Finally, the third perspective concerns ambiguity (or 
ambivalence). Many scientific disputes refer to the question what the outcome of different 
methodologies, measurements and dose-response functions mean for human health and 
environmental protection, without contesting the value of the scientific methods in itself. This 
term therefore denotes the variability of (legitimate) interpretations based on identical 
observations or data assessments.
Based on the classification of risks by Klinke and Renn, it was hypothesised in chapter 
1 that institutions do matter. The institutional setting, interpreted in this study from a 
regulatory point of view, theoretically has a significant influence on the occurrence of 
complexity (e.g. the relation between transport forecasts and risk calculations), of uncertainty 
(e.g. multi-interpretable character of the strict risk standards or unclear nature of the ALARP 
principle) and of ambiguity (fuzziness about the trade-offs to be made and what is acceptable 
or not). Therefore, the role of institutions has been taken as a special focus of this research. It 
is recognized that with this choice certain issues and complexities in the field of risk 
management are excluded, such as the issue of public perception of risk, the societal shock­
waves due to incidents or the influence of communication strategies on public decision 
making. This does not imply a denial of the relevance of these issues, but is merely an 
expression of the desire to focus the energy on a limited set of potentially explaining factors: 
those that are related to the formal institutions.
Next, it was explored from this more institutional perspective how the problems 
occurring from the interaction between rail transport of hazardous materials and local urban 
development can be characterised. This was done using different research methods: literature 
and desk research (chapter 2), case studies (chapter 3) and expert consultation (chapter 4). 
Following this approach we are now able to summarise the main findings of this problem 
exploration.
The document analysis resulted in the identification of notable problems with risks in 
urban areas. Various documents identify that several cities in the Netherlands face high risks 
due to transport of hazardous materials by rail, as the transport is routed through city centres. 
These problems exist today and in some cases the risks will increase due to the growth of 
transport in the future. Adaptations made to the rail network, such as the introduction of the 
basic network for freight transport of hazardous materials and the construction of the Betuwe 
line aimed at the reduction of safety risks in various places are not expected to fully solve the 
violation of the GR criterion in some cities. Consequently, in various locations along the rail 
network, local authorities will continue to experience limitations in redeveloping the adjacent 
urban areas. This is a worrying situation, especially since urban redevelopment is high on the 
spatial development agenda in the Netherlands and the rail network is dense and relatively 
intensively used.
Next, the inventory of the institutional framework revealed that the major institutions 
(resulting in the specification and application of the IR and GR norms) basically assume a risk 
situation that can be understood in terms of relatively well-known cause-effect relations, that 
have low levels of uncertainty and complexity, and that allow the applicability of generic 
quantitative models for risk assessment against a background of fixed quantitative safety 
norms. In terms of the scheme of Klinke and Renn presented in figure 10 in Chapter 1, the 
institutional framing and related analytical tools for risk management are mainly at the left
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side. This contradicts with the more complex and uncertain nature of the problems, found in 
the debate on risk management in the literature and confirmed in the additional two analyses: 
the multiple case analyses and the expert consultation. According to these analyses, the 
problem setting appears to be positioned more at the right side of Klinke and Renn’s scheme.
Although the description of the cases in chapter 3 is limited (basically, they are 
summaries of more extended descriptions in separate reports), the findings of the multiple 
case analyses were in line with several findings from the document analysis. It was found that 
in selected cases local authorities struggle to overcome the tension between transport and 
urban development ambitions. By going into detail in the analyses, it was found that this 
struggle is largely attributable to fuzzy rules, an overly technical application of prescribed risk 
models, uncertainty about transport flow forecasts and the flexible or biased interpretation by 
different stakeholders of the outcome of risk calculations in interaction with risk standards 
that appear to be difficult to interpret. Local authorities sometimes appear to seek the limits of 
what is formally permissible in order to be able to redevelop their urban territory. Moreover, 
where risk standards are violated, local authorities expect ProRail and/or transport companies 
to take measures to reduce risks, whereas actors related to rail transport expect serious 
adaptations of urban plans. The case studies therefore support the idea of conflicting interests, 
insufficient communication, some distrust and a dominant position for risk models and risk 
norms. Also, the cases helped to identify the main players: the municipal authorities, the rail 
infrastructure company (ProRail), the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management, often supported by consultants, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment or fire services.
The findings of the previous analyses suggest a series of problems of a practical and 
institutional nature. The consultation of experts in the third step of the problem exploration 
was organised to investigate the face validity of this problem identification. The selected 
experts in the GDR sessions were also critical with regard to the applicability and problem 
solving power of the institutional framework for external safety policy in practice. For 
example, a major problem is the limited possibilities for authorities to control risks related to 
freight transport, as European legislation requires freedom of transport. The experts overall 
confirmed the problems concerning the lack of transparency of models, considerable 
uncertainty about future transport flows, the difficulty of interpreting norms, conflicting 
interests and hesitating authorities.
To summarise, the analyses in the first part of this study resulted in a fairly coherent 
picture of the risk management issues influencing the practice of urban development adjacent 
to railways accommodating hazardous materials transport. These analyses have enriched our 
view on the difficulties that planners and decision makers face in practice. Formal risk 
management approaches in the Netherlands tend to be very much based on the 
conceptualisation by regulatory authorities of external safety problems as relatively easy to 
grasp risk problems. The assumption is that these risks can be known by applying a 
standardised analytical approach and can be controlled by applying generic risk norms. Due 
to that, the core activity in risk management currently is to calculate the risks, to determine 
the need for risk limitation up to the level of the norms and to ensure that this policy is 
enforced. However, as the analyses in part one have shown, external safety management is 
much more fuzzy than this. Various institutional rules or principles appear to contribute to 
uncertainty, complexity and in certain situations even ambiguity. In terms of the framework 
of Klinke and Renn, this observation strongly suggests a mismatch between the analytical 
assessment approach that assume the availability of reliable data on transport flows, 
probability and the effects of incidents, and the nature of decision making, which in real 
world is too frequently dominated by a debate on the size and nature of uncertainties, 
diverging interpretations of rules and fuzziness about who is responsible for what. The
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discourse, implicitly assumed by the applied analytical approach, is not (in terms of Klinke 
and Renn) internal and simple but instead bears a much more reflective nature. It is therefore 
that we conclude that the complexity and uncertainty of external safety policy is high and that 
sometimes even ambiguity can be observed. This is demonstrated by examples such as the 
different outcomes of risk models, the indeterminacy to take responsible decisions in order to 
reduce risks and the existence of different interpretations of the outcomes of the risk 
assessments of different actors.
Following this conclusion implies that when it is searched for improvement of risk 
management in the context of the interaction between local urban development and rail 
transport of hazardous materials, adaptations should be made to the institutional framework. 
Such adaptations are assumed to cause changes in decision behaviour of stakeholders, as real- 
world practice shows. The challenge is to provide for such an institutional setting that 
stakeholders involved in the decision making process are enabled to assess and manage risks 
more properly than in the present situation. Clearly, following the findings so far, the 
institutional setting should enable stakeholders to better cope with the complexity and 
uncertainty of the identified external safety problems. The aim of the remainder of this study 
is to translate this challenge into further scientific analyses. We see the following three major 
scientific challenges in this translation.
The first scientific challenge is to explore whether and how the present framing of the 
decision making process can be reframed. As argued, the present decision making practice 
does not seem to be effective enough with respect to maintaining risk standards and does not 
result in an obvious and for all stakeholders transparent allocation of responsibilities. The 
analysis in part 1 suggests this to be causally linked to the core of the risk management 
approach: the risk analyses. Problems related to the use of the norm, the model itself and the 
uncertainty regarding model input (e.g. transport flows and volumes) have been mentioned. 
Underlining that risk management is all about taking decisions (see e.g. Fischhoff et al, 1981), 
the parallel that can be drawn with generic theories on (spatial) planning decision making is 
that there is a need for a change of the present dominant approach in decision making from 
checking calculated risks against fixed and generic norms to an approach of carefully 
choosing from a range of planning options supported by elaborated trade-offs between social 
costs and benefits, aiming at a decision that is acceptable in the unique circumstances of that 
place and that receive a good support from the relevant stakeholders. The first goal of the 
analysis in the second part of this study is therefore to come up with a different perspective on 
decision making concerning the management of risks related to urban planning in areas facing 
transport of hazardous materials. This view on decision making pursues a shift from a focus 
on the hypothetical optimal solution to a focus on a satisfactory solution, given the local 
particular circumstances. Another consequence is that the nature of decision making shifts 
from a technical optimisation approach to a process approach where structuring the debate 
with relevant stakeholders with different interests and preferences is crucial and where not the 
technical optimum alone, but social satisfaction is a main criterion for success as well.
The second scientific challenge relates to the way the institutions are dealt with. The 
main problem here is the dominant role that the free transport of goods principle plays with 
regard to local risks. This creates a situation in which (inter)national as well as local actors are 
defending their interests instead of trying to have a constructive debate on making urban areas 
or rail transport safer. One observation is that the violation of the GR orientation value in 
specific urban situations today has very little effect on the activities of transport companies, 
irrespective of the fact that logistics decisions could positively influence risk levels. In this 
context, transport companies generally refer to their institutionalised focus on safety due to 
the fact that they have to operate under European law which imposes regulations concerning 
(among others) packaging, driver education, technical equipment functionality and
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maintenance and monitoring of all of these. Complying with these institutions is crucial to 
being granted a licence to transport. To state it more strongly: thanks to these institutionalised 
rules and diversion of responsibilities within the transport sector and the system of 
enforcement, rail transport has become considerably safer. The downside, however, is that 
due to fierce competition, in the debate with local authorities these transport companies do not 
seem to be willing to go further than required by the European rules. Only new generic 
regulation will change the behaviour of this stakeholder, not the local needs and requirements. 
To summarise, transport companies find support for their primary motive for behaviour in 
their institutional embedding in European rules and the European directive on unhindered 
transport flows.
Another observation is that also the behaviour of the rail network provider (ProRail) is 
not clearly influenced by violation of the GR orientation value. Referring to ProRail’s 
position as a national player facilitating national economic interests by accommodating 
international transport, ProRail is successful in shifting debates on adaptation of the local rail 
infrastructure (rail tracks, switches, other infrastructures, speed regulation, other safety 
systems) to the second part of the agenda that structures the debate between the stakeholders 
in a local project. In many cases, they even seem to be able to eliminate such debates from the 
agenda.
So ultimately, this leaves the local authority to primarily solve the risk problems. This 
imbalance between institutionalised international interests (transport companies), national 
interests (rail infrastructure provider) and local interests (municipal authority) frustrate the 
debate between the stakeholders. The second goal for the remainder of this study, and 
evidently related to the first goal, is therefore to study possibilities for reducing the impact o f 
the (institutional) imbalance between the urban planning policy sector, the transport policy 
sector and the external safety policy sector, on the changes in risk level in local situations.
Finally, the third scientific challenge is to formulate an answer to the observation that 
many of the debates concerning urban redevelopment are not, or insufficiently, about risk 
management, but about the urban planning project being carried out. The economic motives 
for the local authorities generally dominate the positions regarding safety issues. In the 
present situation, this often results in a debate on who should pay the costs of reducing risks 
or even who is responsible for reducing risks in the first place. The third goal of the remainder 
of this study is therefore related to the previous ones (the adapted perspective on risk 
management and the reduction of the institutional imbalance) in the sense that we need to 
study instruments or strategies that enable all stakeholders to take better responsibility for the 
outcome of decision making for the local situation than is currently the case. Although this 
should be the case for all stakeholders involved, it is particularly important for local 
authorities. Referring to the findings in part 1 of this study, it is recognised here that local 
authorities operate under the pressure to renew urban space through initiating real estate 
development, even when they know that the environmental impact might be less acceptable. 
When local authorities start explaining their decisions by referring to what might change at a 
national or European policy level without being able to sincerely initiate a discussion with 
representatives of these policy levels, this easily results in a situation where the stakeholders 
hesitate to take full responsibility for what is happening in terms of changes in risk levels. To 
change this in a positive way implies providing the stakeholders (in particular local 
authorities) with the means to produce attractive solutions with broad support and the 
information to make trade-offs for the best of the local situation.
The main conclusion the first part of this research is that complexity and uncertainty in 
itself cannot be (fully) solved, but it is assumed that they can be better coped with by 
institutionally adjusting the ramework for decision making, risk management and risk 
analysis. Therefore the importance of the formulated scientific challenges and goals for the
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second part of this study lie with studying the structure and dynamics of an institutional 
framework that enhances a fair and balanced decision process for all stakeholders involved 
and at the same time, creates opportunities to deal with the identified complexity and 
uncertainty of external safety risks.
Outline of the remainder of this study
In chapter 5 the main focus will be on decision making under risk and on giving an answer to 
the question how the institutional framework might be altered. Furthermore, the goal will be 
to present an adapted perspective on decision making regarding rail transport of hazardous 
materials and urban planning that aims to address the problems as identified in the first part of 
this study. Next, chapters 6 and 7 will provide the set-up and the results of the empirical 
testing of this adapted perspective. Finally, Chapter 8 will summarise the main conclusions of 
this research and give a reflection on these findings.
PART II:
Towards an alternative perspective on rail transport 
risks and urban planning

Chapter 5: 
Changing the institutional framework for risk 
management
5.1 Introduction
This chapter constitutes the starting point for developing thoughts on how risk management 
in this field of study can significantly benefit from an alternative approach to the leading 
institutions. Does such management benefit from eliminating certain institutions, adding 
new ones or reinterpretation of existing institutions? We will label our thoughts regarding 
these questions as an adapted view on rail transport risks management in relation to urban 
development. Earlier, I identified three goals that should be pursued with such an adapted 
view: a) to create a different perspective on decision making in which, b) that the imbalance 
between different policies in the field of freight transport, external safety and urban planning 
is reduced and c) that challenges local authorities to take more responsibility for producing 
safer urban planning plans. In this chapter, I will elaborate the idea that these goals can be 
reached by redesigning the institutional framework, where the word redesign is used here as 
a broad label for notions such as (re)interpretation, elimination or construction, 
reconfiguration, et cetera. Such a redesign can be considered as an intervention in the system 
with the aim to modify the behaviour of the system.
This chapter therefore has two goals. The first goal is to reach an understanding of 
how institutions can be changed in relation to the formulated goals. I will reflect on the issue 
of institutional change and what this might imply for the creation of a more effective 
framework for decision making in the context of risk management. Here, I will give a basic 
analysis of what the concept of institutional (re)design encompasses. In section 2, I will
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elaborate on institutional change and how this is related to this research. Then, in section 3, I 
will argue that the three above mentioned goals of the institutional intervention, are not 
directly transferable to changes in the institutional framework. We need to elaborate them 
into institutional principles that structure the adapted institutional view. The second goal is 
therefore to elaborate these principles in the context of risk management regarding urban 
development in the adjacent area of rail transport of hazardous materials. In this respect, in 
section 4, I will discuss four mutually linked institutional principles. These principles are 
either new principles or existing principles that need reinterpretation and/or better 
enforcement.
One of these four institutional principles requires a good understanding of the notion 
of reasonability, which has a clear link with the notion of cost-effectiveness of risk 
mitigating investments. Therefore, section 4 is especially dedicated to conceptualise this 
notion. This elaboration consists of the presentation of a model, which expresses the 
reasonability of measures to lower risks. Section 5 will then present a hypothetical example 
of the use of this model. Finally, in section 6 , the conclusions of this chapter will be 
presented.
5.2 Institutions and institutional change
5.2.1 Introduction
As stated, there is a need for an adapted view at the present set of institutions and the basic 
framework for risk management in order to avoid the serious decision problems that have 
been described in Part 1 of this thesis. The challenge is to find an answer to the question 
how and to what extent it is possible to cope with the issues of complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity that were identified and further illustrated in the first part of this research. The 
matter under discussion in this part of the research is how to conceptualise the best angle to 
find such answers. The exploration here starts with understanding what institutions are and 
how these can change over time. Throughout the last decades, a large body of literature on 
this subject has been published. The aim of the exploration here is not to give an exhaustive 
summary of what all these scholars have written. The goal is to give a defendable and 
comprehensible argumentation of the steps that are taken in this study to reach the 
formulated goals.
In the following, institutions and the strongly related term policy (at least for some 
scholars, see for example Dixit (1996)) will therefore be viewed from the perspective of 
change. Next, the notion of institutional change will be presented. I will conclude this 
section by focusing on the concept of institutional design and relate this concept to the goals 
of this research.
5.2.2 Institutions, stability and change
In chapter 1 it was already stated that, according to North (1991, p. 97; see also North, 1990; 
Scharpf, 1997) institutions are:
(...) the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist o f both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions and codes o f conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights).
Institutions play an important role in determining social and political outcomes (Hall &
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Taylor, 1996). Moreover, institutions constitute the arena in which policy making takes 
place whereas institutions divide powers and responsibilities between the organisations of 
the state (John, 1998). As Besley & Case (2003) state, institutions affect policy, which 
means that if institutions change, policy domains change as well. Political institutions 
distribute political resources in a specific way: they determine or modify individual 
preferences through control of a wide range of symbols, myths and rituals, they define the 
rules of the game and they impose order in a policy domain (Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 
2000). As such, the dynamics in a specific policy domain is based on what the social 
sciences call the ‘policy theory’. A policy theory can be defined as the combination of all the 
hypotheses and assumptions that underlie a certain policy (Leeuw, 1989, p. 91). The policy 
theory may focus on the social aspects of policy (such as the behaviour of individual or 
corporate actors), as well as to the functioning of organisations or to economic aspects of 
policy. The policy theory is generally expressed in terms of causal relations (cause and effect 
relations) and final relations (goal and means relations). Apart from these relations, 
normative relations are also important in policy theories. These relations are based on 
political principles (norms and values) on the one hand, and expected, existing or intended 
situations on the other. All these relations are basically subject of change and literature 
suggests that institutional changes can cause such changes, although always differences in 
speed and the degree of change in the various relations within the policy theory will occur.
To understand the influence and scope of institutional change on changes in the 
policy theory therefore requires an underlying conceptual model of the policy process. Daily 
interactions between policy actors are assumed to gradually develop into more or less stable 
patterns, which may also include the substantive delineation of the problem at stake and its 
possible solutions. These interactions between the actors are structured by the formal and 
informal rules according to which these processes take place. This process is often referred 
to as institutionalism (Liefferink, 2006, p.47). In general, institutionalisation is the process 
of production and reproduction of policy arrangements, by which rules of the game are 
formed and defended (Van Tatenhove & Arts, 2006). Institutionalism is characterised by its 
emphasis upon the institutional context in which political events occur. As such it 
emphasises the extent to which political conduct is shaped by the institutional landscape in 
which it occurs, the historical legacies bequeathed from the past to the present and the range 
of actors’ strategic orientation of the institutional contexts in which they find themselves 
(Schmidt, 2005). This is why in urban, regional and environmental planning, following the 
debates in sociology, economics and political science, increasing attention is given to the 
role of institutions (e.g. Arts & Leroy, 2006; Buitelaar et al., 2007; Huijtema & Meijerink, 
2009). Alexander (2006) even stated that institutions are critical for planning and 
understanding institutional transformation is therefore vitally important for planners.
As mentioned, institutions affect policy. Nevertheless, according to John (1998) 
institutional approaches to policy tend to reduce political actions to institutions and therefore 
do not offer a satisfying explanation of variations between policies, nor does institutionalism 
provide a convincing account for policy change. In the next section we will therefore focus 
on policy stability and change.
5.2.3 Policy stability and change
Policy science literature reveals many ways of explaining and conceptualising policy stability 
and change, both incremental and radical or fundamental (John, 1998; Meijerink & Huitema, 
2009). In the classic view policy change is related to a linear-rational process where, based on 
a thorough problem analysis, various alternative policy interventions are designed, studied in 
terms of potential impacts and ex-ante assessed in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The
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best solution for all is then chosen and implemented. This model has been criticised seriously 
and alternative conceptual models have been proposed. One of the theories that has gained 
much popularity in the past decades is the multiple streams framework (MSF) (see e.g. 
Kingdon, 1995 and Zahariadis, 1999). This framework distinguishes three relatively 
independent streams in a policy domain: problems, potential solutions (policies) and political 
events. The problem stream is related to the outcome of work of actors recognizing and 
framing problems. New research outcomes, policy programmes or shock events may cause 
the reframing or recognition of problems. The policy stream is based on the work of experts 
and analysts who think about potential interventions and who propose solutions for identified 
problems. Finally, the political stream, deals with the ‘political mood’ and other factors such 
as administrative or legislative rules and turnover and interest group pressure.
The MSF argues that change is established when problem definitions, certain solutions 
and political mood come together in a harmonic way. To create opportunities for the three 
streams to ‘meet’ each other (to get connected), so called windows of opportunity should be 
created or can suddenly emerge. The MSF therefore makes the exploitation of windows of 
opportunity to the core of its approach. It explains policy change by focusing on these critical 
moments when advocates of new policies have opportunities to draw attention to their 
problems. These critical moments are often shock events or the election of a new 
administration. The stronger these streams converge, the bigger the probability is that an item 
enters and rises on the political decision making agenda.
Another body of literature is about the organisation and impact of epistemic 
communities. Epistemic communities are networks of experts who have expertise and 
competence in a certain policy domain. The theory mainly focuses on change through the 
input of new scientific information and how this influences policy-oriented learning. It 
addresses the mechanisms by which new ideas and knowledge about problems, cause and 
effect relations or the effect of policy options enter the arena and influence policy-making. 
When problems and solutions are uncertain, policy-makers consult epistemic communities to 
proliferate their ideas (see e.g. Haas, 1992, 2001; Veenman 2008). In this way significant 
policy changes might occur. Policy change by the work of epistemic communities is based on 
an observation that evolutionary changes to structures, once in place are largely irreversible 
and virtually determine the array of subsequent choices available. This implies that the effects 
of epistemic involvement on policy change cannot easily be reversed.
Also, the punctuated equilibrium framework (PEF) aims to explain stability and 
radical policy change, but posits the notion that fundamental policy change only occurs rarely 
and rapidly in brief spurts that establish new policy paths that branch off from the existing 
dominant policy paths. Within this approach it is said that in most policy processes common 
patterns can be observed, as long periods of relative stability are punctuated by brief periods 
of radical policy change (see also True et al., 1999). Policy change can occur if policy 
opponents manage to fashion new ‘policy images’. These policy images can be viewed as new 
perceptions or frames of the issues at stake and are able to successfully exploit the multiple 
venues that are generally present in a policy domain. ‘Venue change’ refers to changes in the 
strategies policy actors follow in pursuing their interests. The advocates of policy change have 
to search actively for venues where chances for getting support for their newly fashioned 
policy image are the highest. This behaviour is called ‘venue shopping’. If these advocates 
succeed in getting support for a new policy image in a venue, this may induce significant 
policy change if the venues or arenas are at a higher administrative level (see also Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003).
A fourth body of literature is that of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF 
approach identifies actors as members of a dominant umbrella group promoting a particular 
policy configuration or type. The main propagators of the ACF are Sabatier and Jenkins-
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Smith (1993; 1999) who focus on policy-oriented learning in different coalitions with shared 
beliefs. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that advocacy coalitions include both state and 
societal actors at the national, subnational and local level of government. Their shared 
knowledge of a problem and common interest in pursuing solutions draws policy actors 
together. All the participants then pursue their (self-serving) goals with use of the 
government machinery. Actors within these coalitions share sets of normative and causal 
beliefs that can be seen in terms of a belief system.
Belief systems are organised into a hierarchical tripartite structure, with 
higher/broader levels often constraining more specific beliefs. Firstly, the ‘deep core’ of the 
shared belief system includes basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the relative 
valuation of individual freedom versus social equality, which operate at virtually all policy 
domains. Secondly, ‘policy core beliefs’ represent the basic normative commitments and 
causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or subsystem. These include fundamental 
value priorities such as basic perceptions concerning the general seriousness of a problem 
and its principal causes and strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem, such 
as appropriate division of authority between governments and markets, the level of 
government best suited to deal with the problem and the basic policy instruments to be used. 
It also deals with policy preferences and the priority of various policy instruments, such as 
regulation, insurance or tax credits. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) argue that policy core 
beliefs and not the deep core beliefs are the fundamental glue of coalitions because they 
represent basic normative and empirical commitments within the domain of specialisation. 
Thirdly, the ‘secondary aspects’ of a coalition’s belief system are the less than subsystem- 
wide beliefs concerning problems, causes and remedies. They embrace a large set of 
narrower beliefs related to the importance of specific aspects of the problem or the relative 
importance of various causal factors in specific locales, policy preferences regarding 
desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, the design of specific institutions, and the 
evaluations of various actors’ performance (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, pp. 121-122, 
133). Secondary aspects are the instrumental decisions and information searches necessary 
to implement the policy core. The deep core and the policy core are fairly resistant to 
change. Deep core beliefs should be regarded as rigid (like religious conviction), while 
policy core beliefs are less resistant to change and therefore change can occur when 
experience shows serious anomalies. According to Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993), a 
radical policy change needs a serious external system event. Policy core beliefs are less 
resistant to change and therefore change can occur when experience shows serious 
anomalies. Beliefs concerning the secondary aspects are assumed to be more receptive to 
short-term modification in light of new data, experience or changing strategic 
considerations.
A final theoretical concept for understanding the issue of policy stability and change 
is that of Policy Arrangements. Policy arrangements are defined as ‘the temporary 
stabilisation of the content and organisation of a particular policy domain’ (Liefferink, 
2006). On the one hand, policy arrangements are produced by human agencies in interaction, 
resulting in accepted rules, coalitions and discourses. This concept aims at the analysis of 
institutional patterns of change and stability for the mid term, instead of explaining day-to- 
day policy processes (Leroy & Arts, 2006). Also, policy arrangements link changes that 
occur through agents in interaction, as well as through long-term structural transformations 
in a political domain in contemporary society. In this respect, structural transformations are 
directly linked to the concept of political modernisation (see i.e. Van Tatenhove et al., 2000; 
Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2006).
The two main aspects of policy arrangements are the organization and the substance 
of policy arrangements. Organization refers to social systems, namely sets of actors that are
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nested in structures of rules and resources. Substance refers to the policy discourse. These 
four elements (actors, rules, resources, discourses) need some further explanation.
The term ‘actor’ refers to societal institutionalised actors and their policy coalitions, 
as players do not act individually in policy practice, but mostly in concert. Policy coalitions 
consist of a number of players who share interpretations of a policy discourse in the context 
of the rules of the game. These coalitions therefore share quite similar policy goals.
The ‘rules of the game’ co-determine how actors operate in organizations and thus 
reproduce and modify these rules at the same time (ibid., p. 57). Rules of the game define 
the possibilities for and constraints on policy actors to act within a policy domain that is 
currently in operation. This means that rules determine how politics is played, which norms 
are legitimate, how policy outcomes are achieved, by which procedures, by which allocation 
of tasks and by which division of competences between actors and organizations. This 
accounts for both formal and informal rules (institutions). It is not difficult to distinguish 
between these two types of rules, as formal rules are laid down in legal texts or documents, 
while informal rules are part of the predominant, and changing, political culture. These rules 
of the game describe how the political game is played, how decisions are made, how 
measures are implemented or which interests are dominant. In other words, the rules of the 
game encompass all modes of production and interpretation of meaningful and legitimate 
conduct in policy arrangements, implying the self-conscious application of normative and 
interpretative schemes, or discourses, by the actors involved, which are included in 
sanctioning procedures (Arts et al., 2000, pp. 61-62; Liefferink, 2006).
Resources relate to power in organizations. ‘Power’ refers to the mobilization and 
deployment of available resources and influence, whether it is money or knowledge or 
something else, to determine policy outcomes. This is an essential dimension of social and 
political life. Power has to be regarded both as the ability of actors to mobilize resources and 
as a relational and a structural phenomenon of social and political systems. The former refers 
to political power as a more or less permanent capacity of actors to maintain and transform 
their social or physical environment, and more specifically, to achieve certain policy 
outcomes. Power can have a decisive influence when it comes to determining political 
decisions, dominating public debates, defining policy issues, setting agendas, or even 
changing the rules of the game at the national or international level. However, resources are 
also distributed asymmetrically among actors in social systems, which is more a structural 
phenomenon than an exception (Arts et al., 2000, pp. 59-60; Liefferink, 2006).
Substance is operationalized in terms of policy discourse. Discourse generally refers 
to the concepts, ideas, views, buzzwords and such like that give meaning to a policy domain. 
According to Liefferink (2006, p. 47), discourses entail the views and narratives of the actors 
involved, such as norms, values, definitions of problems and approaches to solutions. This 
includes both formal policy plans and the programmes and language practices that support or 
challenge them (Arts et al. 2000, pp. 55-56). A policy discourse can be defined as dominant 
interpretative schemes, ranging from formal policy concepts to popular story lines, by which 
meaning is given to a policy domain. In general, a policy arrangement can be characterized 
by one dominant policy discourse, the content of which is continuously challenged by 
elements of competing discourses (ibid., p. 63). In this respect, vagueness of terminology 
can leave a discourse open to different interpretations, due to which the mobilizing capacity 
can become greater and the consensus building ability can increase. Story lines, being the 
attractive and often seductive one-liner versions of policy discourses, may therefore enable 
various or even opposing policy actors to join forces (ibid., pp. 63-64).
Figure 38 visualises the relations between these four elements of policy arrangements. The 
relations between the four are shown in such a way that it is clear that a change in one of the 
dimensions implicates a change in the other three.
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resources
Figure 38: The interconnectedness of the four dimensions of a policy arrangement 
represented in a tetrahedron (Liefferink, 2006)
5.2.4 Reflecting on stability and change with respect to this research
Roughly speaking, all of these theories explain stability and change from a perspective of an 
arena of actors contributing to the specification and implementation of a policy in a certain 
institutional context. The theories provide answers to questions such as how a policy domain 
may change, under which circumstances and influences and what driving forces are behind 
these changes. The theories provide perfect insights for researchers who wish to evaluate ex 
post what has happened in a policy domain and under what circumstances. Most of these 
afore mentioned theories argue that under normal circumstances policies are quite stable and 
only develop or change incrementally. This is often called ‘normal policy’ (Meijerink & 
Huitema, 2009). However, as argued, radical change is also possible and can be explained 
from a stance of different theories.
One of the explanations for change provided by these theories is the happening of 
large events. However, such events are not a guarantee for change. In the field of our study, in 
the past there have been such events that could have triggered change of external safety 
policy. The fireworks disaster in Enschede of 2000 triggered a stronger focus on maintaining 
the already existing rules and regulations (see section 2.3), instead of fundamentally changing 
external safety policy. Events such as the Viareggio rail disaster (2009) and near misses in the 
Netherlands in Delfzijl (2000), Amersfoort (2002), Tilburg (2007) and Barendrecht (2009 and 
early 2011) did so far not trigger radical changes in policy.
The question then arises whether it is possible in this research to focus on the thought 
of bringing together multiple streams and to the question how to organize windows of 
opportunity for linking these streams for altering external safety policy. Alternatively, the 
focus could be on the role of epistemic communities of experts. The question then would be 
how to trigger changes in the position of such a community in the context of societal decision 
making on external safety and/or to change the discourse of such a community in interaction 
with other stakeholders in such decision making processes. This might result in the 
introduction of new ‘policy images’ or advocacy coalitions or even possibly new belief 
systems.
Both approaches are attractive to reflect on, but are very difficult to study as an 
intervention, implying a before-after empirical study to identify potential impacts of such an
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intervention. Inherent to the multiple streams/windows of opportunity approach is, according 
to the relevant literature, that this is hard to organise and very dependent upon a complex 
setting of political powers. With regard to the community approach, we already can observe a 
development in practice where experts in the field of external safety regularly gather and 
discuss developments and issues that should be on the agenda for behaviour of professionals 
in practice, education of new professionals, development of new analytical tools, and so on. 
This is a long ongoing process of further professionalising the role of external safety experts. 
As noted, so far the effects of this development on institutional and political changes have 
been rather limited.
So, these theories are less helpful to provide a scientific basis for arguing in which 
direction we should seek for opportunities to change the external safety policy or its 
underlying institutional framework. These theories give insufficient support for scientifically 
studying, in the context of this research, the impacts of an institutional intervention aimed at 
establishing a institutional framework that generates less complexity, less uncertainty and less 
ambiguity. The most helpful theoretical framing of such a study seems to be the policy 
arrangement approach that to a certain degree combines various views into a global indication 
of the effects of processes of change on the relevant dimensions of a policy domain. The 
approach refers to the dynamic relations between rules, discourses, actors and resources, the 
four basic dimensions of an institutionalised policy domain represented by the four corners of 
the tetrahedron. From the theory we learn that the arrangement may be subject to a dynamic 
process of re-institutionalisation if one of its four elements is changed. As it has been argued, 
the present rules of the game significantly contribute to the observed problems in the policy 
domain. If an alteration were to be implemented, this should be done by changing the rules of 
the game. According to the policy arrangement theory, this intervention is believed to have 
influence on the other three dimensions. Depending on the type of change of the rules, also 
more actors might be included in the debate, or the relationship between the present actors 
might change. In this respect we refer to the conclusions of part one, where according to 
Klinke and Renn, the intrinsic complex and uncertain nature of risk management basically 
requires a more structural involvement of other stakeholders. Finally, changes in the rules, 
discourse and possibly involved actors, will have impacts on the power and resources 
dimension too. Therefore, building on the change concept provided by the policy arrangement 
theory and insight gained in part 1 on the important role of the institutions, we will continue 
in the remainder of this study with studying the potential impacts of purposefully changing 
the rules of the game. The question then is how this can be done and justified from a scientific 
perspective. Therefore, we turn to the theory of institutional design.
5.2.5 Institutional design
Apart from descriptive-explanatory empirical analyses of institutional and policy change 
using the afore described theoretical perspectives, a.o. Alexander (2005; 2006) pleas for 
more analytical attention for institutional and policy transformation from a design 
perspective. Hence, institutional analyses should not only be about ex-post analyses and 
explanation but also ex-ante analyses of how potential changes might work out in the future. 
According to Carton (2007), the term design indicates a conscious, deliberate activity to 
make changes to a certain system. Institutional design therefore implies a focus on 
institutional transformation based on a deliberate intervention (Bromley, 1991; Alexander, 
2005). Alexander (2006) sees institutional design as the devising and realisation of rules, 
procedures and organisational structures that will enable and constrain behaviour and action 
so as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives or execute given tasks. 
Institutional design can be recognised in the creation and transformation of all formal
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institutions (constitutions, laws, organisations, regulations, plans and programmes of action) 
that did not evolve spontaneously or informally.
Then, what is institutional design and who ‘does’ it? According to Alexander (2006), 
intentional institutional change is based on a craft where practitioners bring to bear their best 
knowledge, intuition and situated experience. There are three different levels of institutional 
design, the macro, meso and micro level (Alexander, 2005; 2006; 2010). On the macro level, 
institutional design is applied to whole societies or addresses macro-societal processes and 
institutions. This is sometimes called ‘constitution writing’. At the macro level, statesmen 
and politicians are involved in institutional design, often supported by administrators. At the 
meso-level, institutional design involves planning and implementation structures and 
processes. This level of institutional design is associated with professional planners’ fields 
of practice: physical planning and land development, transportation and infrastructure, 
environmental policy and the like. At the meso-level, not only elected decision-makers and 
officials have leading roles, but also experts and administrators in the respective fields are 
important actors. Finally, at the micro-level, institutional design involves intra- 
organisational design, addressing organisational sub-units and small semi-formal or informal 
social units, processes and interactions such as committees, teams and work groups. This 
kind of institutional design is involved in establishing and managing planning processes and 
policy, plan or project implementation (also see Alexander, 2007).
Alexander (2006) argues that there is little knowledge based on theory and practical 
experience, which can be usefully applied to institutional design in real-life contexts. 
According to him, this is caused by three reasons. Firstly, there is ignorance. As it is a 
relatively new concept with little evolvement and not recognised as a sub-discipline or field 
of practice associated with an identifiable body of knowledge, very little work has been 
published regarding the set up and implementation of ‘institutional design’ approaches. Only 
pieces of information, snippets of theory and method can therefore be borrowed from other 
more established disciplines and practices.
Like all design, institutional design is not merely scientific and should be regarded as 
a craft of applying reasoning to intuitive knowledge based on experience. The second reason 
therefore is that the nature of design makes practical applicable knowledge about 
institutional design inherently problematic, as it is very difficult to translate abstract 
scientific models into practice. Examples therefore have to be created and evaluated for 
‘goodness of fit’.
The third reason is complexity. Every institutional design problem is highly situation 
specific and each case is unique. It is therefore difficult to apply universal abstract 
knowledge and impossible to base institutional designs on validated scientific 
generalisations.
Due to this uniqueness of problems, the ultimate test of any possible solution is 
whether it ‘fits’ into its known context and whether it is adaptable to unknown futures. In 
practice, however, even modest attempts to alter institutions often fail (Mandelbaum, 2007). 
According to Mandelbaum, the paradoxical difficulty of institutional design lies in the 
density of rules and of the rule-making networks. It is also difficult to distinguish between a 
modest deviation from a current practice and a new regulatory intervention.
Institutional transformation through institutional design thus implies a more normative 
approach to change, in which one pretends to know how to effect intentional change in order 
to achieve pre-set goals. This implies two positions for the remainder of this research. Firstly, 
I will suggest an adapted institutional framework as an alternative for the present one. 
Secondly, this implies that the new suggested institutional framework is assumed to be 
‘better’ than the present one, in the sense that it is assumed to influence decision making in 
the actor network in a sense that this results in a more effective approach of external safety in
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the context of the conflict of local urban development and the transport of hazardous 
materials. To prove whether this hypothesis is valid, it is necessary to measure the added 
value of the adapted institutional framing. The empirical test of validity will be described in 
the chapters 6 and 7. Now, I will first elaborate the features of the adapted framework.
5.3 Specifying the adapted institutional principles
The three goals presented in the conclusion of part 1 of this thesis are not directly transferable 
to changes in the institutional framework. It is therefore necessary to elaborate them into 
institutional principles that can be used to adapt the institutional framework. To meet the three 
goals, four institutions and their interpretations will be discussed in this section. Together, 
they constitute the renewed view on the institutional framework for external safety, transport 
and urban development.
The institutions will look familiar, as some are used in, for example, environmental 
policy, or even in risk management, as well. As such they are not new, but the interpretation 
for the field of external safety, and due to that their mutual interaction, differs from current 
practice. The differences are explained for each institution separately below.
The first suggested institutional principle is that fixed risk norms should no longer be 
needed to base decisions on. This does not imply that decision making does no longer need 
supportive risk calculations nor imply a denial of their potential value. It is undesirable to 
frame the debate on risks in terms of a dichotomy of safe or unsafe situations; instead the 
debate should focus on how situations can become safer. In the present situation, the 
standards are used in an absolute sense: the practice is to calculate risks and to test them 
against the standard to see whether they exceed it. Instead, risk calculations should be used in 
relative terms. By this it is suggested that alternative building plans should be compared to the 
present situation (the situation as it is ‘today’, without implementation of the plan) in order to 
review which plan will contribute more or less to a change in the level of risks. It is then no 
longer necessary to check whether calculations stay within the norms, but to evaluate the 
project in terms of its own pros and cons and how the project influences risks. Moreover, the 
degree to which transport increases over time is no longer important for the risk calculations, 
because the projects are judged on their own contribution to risks.
This focus on the relative use o f risk calculations and using the information obtained 
in planning and decision making constitutes the first institutional principle. By doing so, risk- 
modelling tools are not used by analysts to merely check compliance with the standards, but 
should be used more dynamically and interactively with decision-makers to structure the 
agenda for decision making and to generate decision-supportive information (see for example 
Geertman, 2006; Van Kouwen et al, 2009). An advantage of using calculations in a relative 
way is that the input for the calculations need not be as accurate compared with the focus on 
absolute safety levels and standards. If the most recent transport figures are uncertain, for 
example, it is possible to use older (but validated) transport numbers without losing the value 
of risk calculations, as is the case in the present situation. Making relative comparisons is 
valid as long as all the input variables and their functional relations remain the same, except 
for the levels of the independent variables representing the features of the alternative plans.
The second institutional principle is to implement a stand-still principle for the 
increase of risks caused by developing or redeveloping urban areas affected by rail transport 
of hazardous materials. The stand-still principle implies that the risk level of an area may not 
deteriorate due to the intended building programme. This is an analogy of the more generally 
formulated stand-still principle for environmental deterioration (see Kuiper, 1997). If a 
change in the spatial-physical configuration of the area reduces environmental quality -  or in 
this case, increases risk -  compensation is needed to achieve the stand-still principle.
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The introduction of the stand-still principle on the decision making agenda helps to sharpen 
the focus in the debate on the intended development better than when abstract standards are 
used. The stand-still principle guarantees that the adapted institutional framework is not 
considered as a licence for unlimited urban development along the railway. Consequently, the 
principle strengthens the idea that decision makers can be held accountable for their decisions, 
encouraging them to take responsibility.
This leads to a third institutional principle. In environmental law and economics, the 
‘polluter pays’ principle is a commonly known principle which serves the goal of 
internalising environmental costs and reflecting them in the prices of the polluter’s products 
(see OECD, 1973; Stenis & Hogland, 2002; Rahman & Edwards, 2004). In risk management 
a similar principle is that the risk causer pays for mitigating risks. Here, I propose the 
implementation of a derivative principle for risk management, which can be refered to as the 
risk mitigator should be rewarded principle. The idea stems from one of the ideas that the 
Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management wants to implement 
for transport companies (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b). The idea is that safety 
improvements due to efforts and investments made by the transport companies should be 
rewarded by allowing more transport volumes in the future. Applying this idea to local 
authorities implies that if local authorities increase safety through mitigating measures (either 
by paying for safety measures in the urban area or by compensating Prorail for rail 
adaptations), they should be allowed to be more ambitious in their building programme for 
the adjacent urban area. Implementing such a principle will give an important incentive to 
local authorities to initiate tripartite negotiations with the rail transport related parties and 
building companies to actively explore the possibilities of risk reduction at local level, even 
when this results in creating budgets by the municipality or building companies for 
investments in local rail infrastructure.
To make the risk mitigating more efficient for the causer of the risk, the fourth 
institutional principle is that risks should be lowered ‘as low as reasonably practical’ 
(ALARP). This ALARPprinciple is not new in the field of risk management, as was shown in 
chapter 2. According to Ale (2005), in 1949 the ALARP context was already made explicit in 
the UK in the case of Edwards versus the National Coal Board18. In the Netherlands there has 
already been a strong emphasis in recent Dutch policy documents on the importance of 
measures to make risks as low as reasonably practical (see Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2004; 2006b), by which the reasonability of lowering risks also implies the 
acceptability of options. However, the observations in chapters 3 and 4 show that the principle 
is not well operationalised and applied in Dutch practice. There are, however, some limits to 
the implementation of these ideas in the Dutch situation. Ale (2005) argues that the difference 
between the Dutch Roman law legislative system and the British common law legislative 
system implies that it is very difficult to implement such a principle. Common law may be 
unwritten and, most importantly, what is not explicitly allowed is forbidden, unless it can be 
justified in court, whereas Napoleonic law is the other way around: if something is not 
forbidden, it is allowed. When compared to the fairly similar British situation, for example, 
the Netherlands has a different interpretation of what ‘reasonability’ implies and whether risks 
are acceptable. The Dutch practice is that complying with the formal norm also limits the 
discussion, whereas in the UK the norm has the aim of achieving a risk that is as low as 
reasonably achievable (ibid.). According to Ale (ibid.), this means that in the UK, the norms
18 According to Ale (2005) this case established that a computation must be made in which a quantum of risk is 
placed on one scale and the sacrifice (time, money, trouble) involved in the measures necessary to avert the risk 
is placed on the other scale. Should there then be a gross disproportion between them (and the risk is 
insignificant in relation to the sacrifice), then the person upon whom the duty is laid discharges the burden of 
proving that compliance was not reasonably practicable.
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are taken as a starting point rather than an end point.
Hereby, the responsible decision-makers have a better justification for their risk- 
reducing decision. According to Ale (2005), the ALARP approach should be included in 
Dutch legislation. In order to take such a step, it is important to operationalise it in such a way 
that it can be handled in the planning and decision making process. As argued in chapter 2, 
reasonability is generally seen as the ratio between the costs and the benefits of a risk- 
mitigating measure. A better cost-benefit ratio implies higher reasonability, which in turn 
might increase the acceptability of the outcome of the decision making process.
The four institutional principles constitute a partly changed but mainly newly 
interpreted institutional framework for external safety management. The challenge is to 
improve the way they are operationalised and applied in local planning and decision making 
processes. The flavour of the four principles structuring these processes is very different from 
the current approach in planning practice. In the remainder of this study, I will label the 
proposed set of principles as the ‘adapted institutional framework’ and focus on exploring the 
effects of working with this adapted framework in practice.
An important requirement for the application of the adapted institutional framework in 
practice is that, wherever necessary, it should be operationalised. The first principle (focus on 
relative change in risk level) refers to the use of a validated model that helps to indicate the 
change in risk level due to different urban development plans adjacent to the railway. The 
models currently used in practice can facilitate this principle. The second principle (stand-still 
principle) refers to the evaluation approach and can also be supported by using these models. 
The third (the mitigator should be rewarded) and the fourth principle (as low as reasonably 
practical) are basically facilitated by organising a multi stakeholder process of deliberation, 
supported by reliable cost-effect data of different risk mitigating measures. Today, supporting 
analytical tools insufficiently accommodate this approach. In particular, the important notion 
of reasonability has not yet been clearly elaborated, at least not for local circumstances. 
Therefore, in the next section, I will first focus on the elaboration and operationalisation of 
this critical notion.
5.4 Costs, benefits and reasonability
Some risk-mitigating measures cost more than others. It is therefore important to inform 
decision making authorities about which measures have more effect than others, and which 
have the highest cost-effectiveness. In this respect, cost-effectiveness and reasonability can go 
hand in hand. Before analysing ‘reasonability’, I will first summarise the principles of cost 
effectiveness. Then I will explore how these can be related to the concept of ALARP.
5.4.1 Comparing costs and benefits
In a cost-benefit analysis, all costs and benefits are expressed in a common currency, so that a 
comparison can be made between different options. This helps decision-makers select the 
option that is expected to have the highest benefits or the lowest costs. The generally applied 
criterion for a positive assessment is that the benefits of a choice option should be higher or 
equal to the costs. This criterion for a positive assessment of an option can be expressed by 
the following:
Benefits -  Costs > 0 (1)
To explore the benefits and the costs of different decision options, the cost-effectiveness (CE) 
of a specific option can be assessed using the following formula:
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CE (2 )
Benefits
If the ratio of formula (2) is nearly zero, the effectiveness of an option is very high. If the ratio 
nears a score of 1, it is less effective. If the ratio is higher than 1, the option is not cost- 
effective, as the option costs more than it delivers in benefits. In the following, a ratio score of 
between 0 and 1 is called cost-effective.
It is a fairly normal situation that the costs precede the benefits, but the benefits recur 
in the years following the investment. A discounting procedure is used to compare the costs 
made in the present with the benefits in the future. Firstly, an appraisal period of, for example, 
ten or twenty years is chosen (T). Secondly, the values of all costs and benefits related to the 
options are discounted to the first year of the appraisal period. The principle behind 
discounting is that people normally prefer to receive benefits sooner rather than later, and to 
incur costs later rather than sooner. Therefore, more weight is given to earlier costs and 
benefits than later ones by applying a discount rate. The future value of costs - made in the 
first year - after t years is then calculated by:
A  =  C  ■ (l + r  )  (3a)
In which:
fv t = the future value of costs in year t 
C = the cost of an option 
r = the discount rate
t = the index for the year of the appraisal period (t=1...T)
The future benefits can be calculated by the opposite of formula 3 a:
(l + r )
Bi,t=o (3b)
i = a risk-mitigating investment
Bj = benefit per time unit at time t
r = the discount rate
t = the index for the year of the appraisal period (t=1...T)
Formula 3b gives the adjusted benefit per single time unit. The present value pv  of the total 
future benefits of a particular choice option for an appraisal period of T years are therefore 
calculated by formula 3c:
T B
pv = J ——i—jd t  (3c)
(1 + r )
This finally leads to the following formula:
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pv = B  (  (1 + r) ) (3d)
! ln(1 + r ) V 7
With these basic rules in mind, I now take a closer look at how risk-mitigating measures can 
be modelled.
5.4.2 Expressing the benefits of risk-mitigating measures
In the case studied, a comparison needs to be made between the costs of mitigating measures 
to lower risks and the social benefits. The benefits of risk reduction are often measured in 
terms of the number of potentially saved human lives or in terms of a lowered probability of a 
disaster, while the costs are measured in terms of investment money. To calculate this benefit, 
the number of potentially saved lives should be multiplied by a monetary value.
Firstly, we need to look at social risk. Social risk is expressed by an fN curve on a double 
logarithmic scale. The curve displays the probability (P) of an accident as a function of the 
number of fatalities. Or (see Jonkman et al., 2003):
P = 1 -  Fn (x) -  f f K (x) (4)
x
where f N(x) is the probability density function and FN(x) is the probability distribution 
function of the number of fatalities per year, signifying the probability of less than x fatalities 
per year.
The number of potentially saved lives is equal to the surface below the fN curve. The 
statistical number of yearly lives saved is often expressed by the potential loss of life (PLL). 
The following formula is used to express this PLL in terms of the expected number of 
fatalities E(N) (ibid.):
PLL = E  (N ) = $ x fN (x)dx (5)
x
The previous means that the benefits of a measure are expressed by the lowering of the PLL 
(comparing the situations before and after the measure was taken), or:
$ E (N ) = ( ƒ  xfN (x)dx  f  -  ( f  x fN (x)dx )after (6)
x x
In formula 6 , AE(N) expresses the benefit of a risk-mitigating measure after the measure has 
been taken. This means that the benefits should also be expressed in monetary terms. The 
value of a single saved life should therefore be expressed in monetary terms. This, of course, 
might raise a discussion about the ethical aspects of the value of a human life, an issue that 
has frequently been discussed in the literature (for an in-depth discussion of the pros and cons, 
see Wolff, 2002, 2006; Sunstein, 2002; de Blaeij, 2003; or Adler & Posner, 2006). Here we 
take the position that monetary values of human life are primarily used for giving estimates in 
statistical and cost-effectiveness terms and are not used to give a moral judgement on the 
value of human life. Besides, there are very few other possibilities for systematising the 
quantitative appraisal of the social benefits of risk measures.
Chapter 5: Changing the institutional framework for risk management 117
To calculate the yearly benefit, the outcome of formula 6 is therefore multiplied by the value 
of a saved life:
Bi = #E (N) •« (7)
In which:
Bj = The yearly benefit of risk-mitigating investment i 
AE(N) = The lowered PLL 
a = The value of a life saved
Normally, measures are taken for a certain period of time before they are replaced. This is 
expressed by the number of years that a measure has an effect. This means that future values 
need to be discounted to present values. This can be done by combining formulae 3d and 7:
pv = #E (N) • a . (l -  (1 + r )-T ) 
ln(1 + r ) (8)
This leads to the following formula, which expresses the cost-effectiveness ratio Ri for a risk- 
mitigating investment i :
R  =
) E  ( N  ) -a
C
I (i + r y T )! (9)
%
ln(l + r )
5.4.3 Introducing the policy factor
The model described above lacks an important factor that has been discussed in the literature 
on risk management in the past decade. Vrijling et al. (1995) introduced a policy factor (5 to 
illustrate the differences in the acceptability of personal risks. The (  varies with the different 
degree of voluntariness with which an activity is undertaken and with the benefit perceived. It 
ranges from 10 in the case of complete freedom of choice (e.g. mountaineering) to 0.01 in 
case of an imposed risk that has no perceived benefit. The implication, according to Vrijling 
et al., is that the public tolerance for voluntary risks should be considered to be 1000 times 
greater than it is for involuntary risks (see also Starr, 1969; RIVM, 2003). Figure 39 gives an 
overview of different values for the (  in relation to the acceptance of risk.
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Figure 39: Personal risks in Western countries, derived from statistics of causes of death 
and the number of participants per activity (Vrijling et al., 1995)
Figure 39 shows that according to Vrijling et al. (1995), the public’s acceptance of risk 
depends on the voluntariness and benefit perceived. Therefore, the (  should be integrated into 
the cost-effectiveness model because the model would not be complete without a correction 
for the perceived risks of people living in areas adjacent to the rail transport of hazardous 
materials. As the involuntariness of the risk of the transport of hazardous materials is apparent 
and there is no direct benefit to those in the adjacent areas, a (  can be used that has the same 
value as Vrijling et al. (1995) have given to a production plant (0.01). Linking this idea to 
formula 9 produces the following formula to calculate the cost-effectiveness ratio for a 
measure that intends to lower the probability of a disaster:
R
C
+E ( N  ) ■.
(l -  (1 + r )-r )  
ln(1 + r )
■! (10)
In the next section, a calculation example of how this model works will be presented, using 
figures from practice.
5.5 Assessing reasonability: a hypothetical example
5.5.1 Preconditions for the calculation
Suppose the local authority of city X wants to carry out a small urban redevelopment project. 
And suppose that this project involves the development of office space and housing. What 
does this imply for the risks in that area and is it possible to mitigate these risks to lower 
levels? To answer these questions, I made a calculation by modelling the risk for a 
hypothetical Dutch city where the risks are too high according to a recent report by Aviv & 
Royal Haskoning (2005).
The calculation concerns an arbitrary kilometre of railway line through the city centre. 
The risk model I used -  URBIS EV -  was developed by TNO (Netherlands Institute for
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Applied Science) and makes it possible to calculate risks concerning, for example, the 
transport of hazardous materials by rail in urban areas. URBIS EV is one element of the 
URBIS III software package which models three local environmental issues, namely noise, air 
quality and external safety. Results of the models can be visualised on maps and in graphs and 
are easily included in reports. TNO therefore uses this software to advise local authorities on 
their urban development plans.19 I combined the outcome of the URBIS EV risk calculations 
with formula 10 to calculate the cost-effectiveness for risk reducing alternatives.
Suppose the local authorities want to compare four alternatives:
- Alternative A: the original situation.
- Alternative B: the original situation, but with an extra 100 people during the day and 
an extra 50 people at night.
- Alternative C: like alternative B, but risks are now lowered by removing two track-
20changes (cost: €2  million ).
- Alternative D: like alternative B, but the risks are now lowered by implementing an 
advanced security system on the railway signals called ATBvv (cost: 10 signals x 
€35,000 each = €350,000).
Both situation C and situation D have extra safety measures implemented into the rail 
infrastructure as a result of which the risks should be reduced. The question is then to what 
extent these risks are reduced. The URBIS EV model calculated the following four fN curves:
N
Figure 40: Four fN curves for four different alternatives calculated by URBIS EV
19 For more information, visit http://www.tno.nl/urbis.
20 I obtained the information on the costs of alternatives C and D by interviewing ProRail cost experts, Fred Hop 
and Lex Moscou.
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On a logarithmic scale, there does not seem to be a great difference. However, when we look 
at the PLL, the differences become clearer:
- Alternative A: PLL= 2.55*10-4
- Alternative B: PLL= 2.72*10-4
- Alternative C: PLL= 1.63*10-4
- Alternative D: PLL= 2.40*10-4
This implies that of the four alternatives, alternative C has the lowest PLL.
5.5.2 Calculating the reasonability of each alternative
Formula 9 can now be used to calculate the extent to which the above mentioned alternatives 
are cost-effective. Firstly, the discount rate should be implemented. In 2007, the Ministry of 
Finance lowered the discount rate from 4% to 2.5%. The r is therefore 0.025.
The ‘value’ per life saved is estimated differently by different authors. For example, 
the estimates given by Bowles (2003), HSE (2001) and Suddle (2004) range from €300,000 to 
€11,000,000. Knowing that, a higher value will increase the cost-effectiveness of a risk 
reduction measure, it could seem quite arbitrary to just pick a value. Moreover, it seems more 
ethical to pick a higher value, as this seems to give a higher value to a human life. However, I 
arbitrarily used €2,000,000 in the model, following Bowles (2003) and the HSE (2001), who 
give a similar value. With this in mind, the R, can now be calculated. Note that alternatives C 
and D have a different T, as Prorail informed me that these measures are discounted in 
different periods of time.21 Therefore, the costs for alternative C are multiplied by 1.25 
(15/12) in order to take into account the different lifespan of the measures.
Table 13: Alternative C and D modelled for their cost-effectiveness
Alternative C Alternative D
C = €2,000,000 
r = 0.025 
P = 0.01 
T = 12 years 
a = €2,000,000 
AE(N) = (2.72*10-4 - 1.63*10'4)
C = €350,000 
r = 0.025 
P = 0.01 
T = 15 years 
a = €2,000,000 
AE(N) = (2.72*10-4 -  2.4*10-4)
R 2500000  * 0  01 „ 350000 R * 0 01
R  " 0 26 % 0-01 1,09 * 10"4 * 2000000 *
# 0.025&
! 1 0 31 # ' 
0.32*10 ' 4 * 2000000* \ ' !
% 0.025 "
R= 11,03 R=4,41
When these two alternatives are compared, it is clear that alternative D is more cost-effective 
than alternative C. However, neither measure is cost-effective, since both generate a value 
above 1.0 .
5.5.3 Final remarks
Some final remarks need to be made with regard to the above calculations. Even if the R, is
21 I obtained the information on the costs and discounting of implementing these measures from personal 
correspondence with two people at Prorail, namely Fred Hop and Lex Moscou.
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larger than 1, and the measure is in principle not cost-effective, the value of R, is of major 
importance as it expresses where local authorities can get the best value for their money when 
they are comparing the different ratios for different mitigating measures. Related to the 
examples in table 13, given that the R, is lower for alternative D, this risk-mitigating measure 
can be deemed ‘more reasonable’ than alternative C. It therefore gives local authorities an 
opportunity to claim that they have made a well-informed decision on safety if they can show 
the value of a mitigating measure in terms of its reasonability. This does not necessarily mean 
that the measure with the highest benefit is also the most cost-effective: it is possible that a 
measure with a higher benefit costs much more than a measure with a lower benefit but higher 
cost-effectiveness. If a local authority prefers to take mitigating measures that have a higher 
benefit but involve higher costs, there is no reason why they should not as they can easily 
justify these measures.
5.6 Conclusions and discussion
The aim of this chapter was twofold: to reach an understanding of how institutions can be 
changed and to argue that an adapted philosophy for safety management and risks by means 
of using four institutional principles could be a way of overcoming the problems identified 
earlier in this thesis. In order to intervene in the institutional framework, following relevant 
literature, I have suggested that this may be done by means of institutional design. This 
approach assumes a pragmatic and normative perspective on institutional change in terms of 
how things could and should be done. I argued that an adapted philosophy for safety 
management could be a way to overcome the identified problems. There is a rather firm 
difference between safety management based on quantitative risk appraisals in relation to 
generic standards and safety management as the result of interactive decision making based 
on trade-offs related to local circumstances. An implemented norm is an arbitrary reference 
point in which all options are acceptable as long as they do not exceed the norm. 
Unfortunately, risk models show different outcomes when used. This, together with the fact 
that the statistics behind the risk models are debatable, implies that it is invalid to regard the 
outcomes of risk calculations as scientific truths.
Based on the aforementioned notion for decision making, I translated the three goals 
from the conclusion of part 1 into four institutional principles:
- Risks should be calculated in relative rather than absolute terms.
- A stand-still principle should be implemented for the increase of risks due to urban 
development/redevelopment.
- Increasing safety by risk mitigation should be rewarded by enabling urban 
development.
- Risks should be lowered as far as is reasonably practical (ALARP) supported by a 
model assessing the cost-effectiveness of risk mitigating measures.
These principles are not new, as they are found in for example environmental sciences or are 
new interpretations of existing concepts in external safety. They together result in a framing 
of the main institutions in the field of safety management that is expected to have a significant 
impact on the nature and result of decision making processes in that context, in the sense that 
the rules of the game are altered. Given these rules, local authorities are assumed to work as 
follows:
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- If a local authority wishes to develop/redevelop or intensify its territory near a rail 
transport axis, it should make an early judgement on how this will influence the risks 
from the start of the design process in a relative way.
- If the risks increase due to the planned activity, the local authority should lower the 
risk to the level before the activity was planned by implementing risk mitigating 
measures.
- To help the local authority decide how to lower these risks, the reasonability ratio of 
risk-mitigating measures can be used to ensure that the municipality spends its money 
well and has made a well-informed safety decision.
- Both effect and possibility lowering measures can be taken to mitigate risks. It should 
also be possible for a local authority to pay others to financially compensate for taking 
risk-mitigating measures.
- If it is impossible to mitigate risks, a project cannot be carried out or should be 
adapted.
A few simple assumptions on paper can make a huge difference, as they are expected to 
enable building in urban areas while upholding the idea of safety and good risk management. 
With these adjustments of the present institutional framework, it is expected that the in Part 1 
elaborated problems caused by the present institutional framework will be significantly 
reduced and that complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity issues in decision making with regard 
to external safety risks, will be better coped with. The question remains, however, whether 
this theory-based expectation also holds in practice. In the remaining part of this study, this is 
subject of further investigation. Chapter 6 presents the methodology for this investigation and 
chapter 7 the results.
Chapter 6: 
Set-up of the empirical analyses
6.1 Introduction
The institutional framework proposed in the previous chapter needs testing to investigate its 
practical value. The challenge is to find indications as to whether the expected theoretical 
improvements in decision making on urban projects adjacent to railways can also be observed 
in the real world. However, it is almost impossible to collect revealed strategic behaviour data 
by setting up a systematic measurement of the impacts of the proposed approach in the real 
world, due to the expected duration of the plan development, decision making processes and 
the related evaluation process. Moreover, various unique factors might have a significant 
influence on the nature of such a real world process, which would imply the need for a very 
careful selection of the cases. Alternatively, research challenges like the one we deal with in 
this study, might very well benefit from experimental approaches enabling the collection of 
intended strategic behaviour data, as will be argued in this chapter. The assumption is then 
that intended behaviour sufficiently matches actual behaviour with respect to strategic 
choices. The challenge is therefore to prepare an experimental evaluation approach based on 
the proposed intervention. Important in such an experimental approach is to create a setting 
where the social context sufficiently reflects reality. This e.g. implies that one requires a 
realistic representation of the decision making context, the involvement of real decision 
makers, and realistic decision making tasks.
This chapter argues that the concept of gaming simulation can help in valuing the 
proposed institutional framework and elaborates on the operational design of this approach. 
The main characteristics of the structure of such a gaming simulation will be described. 
Hence, this chapter provides the background information on the theory behind gaming 
simulation, its added value and how it will be applied in this research. The results of the
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application of the gaming simulation will be presented in chapter 7.
The remainder of this chapter consists of five sections. First, I will explain the concept 
of gaming simulation and its advantages for assessing the value of the proposed adapted 
institutional framework. In section 3, I formulate the goals established for the testing phase as 
well as the structure of the tests. Then in section 4, I deal with various methodological issues, 
such as whether the outcome can be generalised to other cases, the objectivity of the gaming 
simulation and, of course, the selected empirical context. Section 5 will explore the different 
risk-mitigating measures that can be taken to reduce risks. The final section, section 6 , will 
contain a summary of the most important findings of this chapter.
6.2 Measuring the effect of the intervention: gaming simulation
There are several methods for studying policy problems. In her thesis, Van der Lei (2009) 
investigated the suitability of actor analysis methods for complex policy problems. She 
distinguished two groups of actor analysis methods: multi-actor decision making methods and 
structural actor analysis methods. The difference between these multi and single actor 
methods is that single actor decision making can represent one person or one organisation 
acting as a solitary decision making unit. Here, an actor chooses between alternative courses 
of action after gathering information (step 1), applying a decision rule to this information 
(step 2), which results in a decision (step 3) (see also Fischhoff et al, 1981).
However, multi-actor decision making relates to situations in which decision making 
power is spread among multiple actors and the outcome of the decision is determined by the 
interaction between these actors. Multi-actor decision making methods therefore focus on the 
actors involved in a decision problem. To study these problems, different methods, are 
available to analyse or resolve conflicts between opposing actors, negotiation on possible 
resolutions or deadlock problems in which actors are stuck in a situation in which no progress 
is made (Van der Lei, 2009). Such methods are for example drama theory (a method to solve 
conflicts), agent-based modelling (a method to assess the influence of an actor on a system as 
a whole) and simulation games (a method to learn about human interaction within a system). 
In the following, I will focus on simulation games and why these are particularly interesting 
for this research.
For a number of decades, games have been used to study behaviour. Games were first 
applied in the military sphere, but spilled over to business and management applications in the 
1950s and 1960s (Mayer & Veeneman, 2002). Game theory and gaming simulation are two 
frequently used terms for a specific concept of research. Game theorists attempt to capture the 
behaviour of individuals or organisations in strategic situations in which they presume 
interactions between choices underlying this behaviour and the choices made by other 
individuals or organisations. Game theory, originating from mathematics, in this respect 
offers a framework for studying strategic (rational) actor behaviour. However, the classical 
assumption that the ‘homo economicus’ determines the nature of rationality in this context 
has gradually been replaced by the assumption that choices are made under uncertainty and 
with limited knowledge. As such, today the notion of bounded rationality is broadly accepted 
in these games.
Gaming simulation usually refers to ‘a dynamic model of essential characteristics or 
elements of a real or hypothetical system, process or environment’ (Geurts et al., 2000). In 
this perspective, the term ‘gaming simulation’ is applied to those simulations that work 
wholly or partially on the basis of players’ decisions. The players, normally real-life actors, 
have to act out roles and attempt to meet certain objectives in interactions with other players 
within a given set of rules. Moreover, the term gaming simulation comes from the fact that a 
model simulating the main structure of the real system is used to study the behaviour of the
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decision making systems. They can be considered as an inductive approach for understanding 
multi-actor decision making and learning about the interactions of humans in a system. For 
the validity of a simulation game, it is important that the participating actors perceive the 
environment as a good representation of the real environment in which decision making 
normally takes place (see Salen and Zimmerman, 2003; Rouwette, 2003; Van der Lei, 2009).
Mayer and Veeneman (2002) investigated simulation games in relation to decision 
making on infrastructure. According to these authors, gaming simulations have three 
functions. Games can be used to train or teach participants about the management and design 
of specific cases, whereby participants can learn about the problem at hand. Gaming 
simulation can also be used for research purposes. As such, simulations exhibit characteristics 
of experimental research such as control, repeatability and, if possible, also on statistical 
analysis. Finally, gaming simulations can be used for intervention purposes. As the games are 
experimental environments in which both researchers and participants may learn from the 
experiences for real-life decision making and policy-making, gaming simulation can be used 
as an ex-ante analysis of the impact of alternative strategies (see also Geurts et al., 2000). The 
literature suggests that simulation games can also be used to investigate complex institutional 
problems in a controlled environment (e.g. Veeneman, 2002). These arguments mean that 
gaming simulation can be a fruitful approach to investigate the effects of the proposed 
institutional framing of external safety and urban planning. A similar type of approach was 
applied by Rosmuller (2001) in a study on the safety impact of bundling of infrastructure.
In the following, I will focus on these simulation games in order to analyse whether 
the proposed adapted institutional framework can be used to cope with the complexity of 
decision making related to urban planning adjacent to railways. In the next section, the goals, 
structure and limitations of this scientific method will be discussed.
6.3 Goals, expectations and structure of the testing phase
6.3.1 Goals of the simulation
The overall goal of the testing phase is to gain insight into whether the proposed institutional 
framework will, as expected, improve the quality of the decision making process related to 
urban development plans and risk management. I want to measure whether there is a 
difference between the outcomes of decision making given the present institutional 
framework versus the proposed framework. More specifically, the expectation is that by 
applying the principles of the adapted institutional framework, the real-world actors will 
encounter fewer problems with respect to planning urban development projects compared 
with the dominant way of working, and that both the decision making process itself and the 
participants’ understanding of risks will improve. By this, I mean that it is necessary to 
investigate whether the problems mentioned in part 1 of this research are prevented or notably 
reduced by the proposed approach. If this is the case, then complexity is better coped with and 
uncertainty is reduced. As such it can be considered as an improvement of the present 
situation.
This primary goal is translated into three secondary or subgoals, each of which will be 
operationalised in indicators for measurement. The first subgoal of the test is to investigate 
whether it is possible to build more real estate without increasing the risks or possibly even 
reducing the risks. This subgoal reflects the potential benefits of the stand-still principle and 
the idea of rewarding risk mitigators.
The second subgoal is to investigate whether the decision making process itself 
improves with regard to reaching a decision. This is interpreted in terms of whether decision­
makers use more and better-targeted information to base their decisions on. This effect is
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expected to be the result of the decision supportive use of the risk calculation model and the 
cost-effectiveness model. Further, I want to investigate whether this improved information 
base helps stakeholders to reach consensus on the details of the plan for the development area. 
This subgoal reflects the potential benefits of the relative use of risk calculations and the 
application of the cost-effectiveness model as a specification of the ALARP principle.
The third subgoal is to investigate the extent to which the participants have an 
improved understanding of the impact of their plans or projects on risks. Also, it is necessary 
to investigate whether they are aware of the impact of possible risk mitigating measures. It is 
therefore important to find out whether local authorities will be more able to explain to 
residents how they plan to achieve acceptable levels of risk. Furthermore, the question is 
whether they are more willing to accept responsibility for the initial risk increase caused by 
the rise in population resulting from new urban development plans and whether they take 
responsibility for reducing those risks. This third subgoal relates to the idea that the involved 
actor takes responsibility for the extra risk caused. Moreover, this reflects the polluter pays 
principle/ risk mitigation rewarding principle.
The above goals are presented in figure 41:
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Figure 41: Schematic overview of the (secondary) goals of the gaming simulation
6.3.2 Preparatory preconditions
To perform the testing phase, the simulation game had to simulate as closely as possible a 
real-world decision making process with respect to an urban development project. In that 
context, the fact that a decision making process in reality usually takes several years is a 
complicating factor.
To nevertheless enable a close resemblance to practice, a number of requirements had 
to be fulfilled. Firstly, the simulation needed to be performed by modelling an urban
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development project that could not be implemented in the recent past because the risks 
exceeded the norms. A deadlock in the discussion (see Van der Lei, 2009) provides a good 
starting point for investigating assumed improvements in decision making as elaborated in the 
previous subsection. The potential breakthrough in the deadlock provides an interesting 
perspective for the municipality. It gives the municipality an added value when participating 
in this research, as it could gain additional insight in its urban development projects and the 
risks caused by these projects. The second requirement is that the practitioners involved in the 
simulation should also have been involved in the original project, as this would ensure that 
they were already familiar with the project and had proven expertise in either external safety 
or urban planning issues. Thirdly, as it was not possible to construct a real-world decision 
making process that lasts from weeks to possibly many years, a time limit needed to be 
incorporated into the simulation. Given that the practitioners were participating on a voluntary 
basis, the simulation could not take more than half a day (including the reading of 
documentation and travelling, this implies a whole day’s input by the players). Finally, more 
than one gaming simulation needed to be conducted in order to be able to make some 
comparison of the consequences of the intervention.
In this study, two gaming simulations were performed representing two different 
cases. According to Swanborn (1994), conducting case studies is legitimate in three 
situations, namely: a) when the researcher does not yet have a problem statement, but is 
interested in specific situations, groups or processes; b) when the researcher has a problem 
statement or hypothesis that is exclusive to specific situations, groups or processes; or c) 
when the problem statement is theoretical or generic by nature, but the data are collected and 
analysed for one specific group, situation or organisation. In this research, the hypothesis that 
an adapted institutional framework will improve the decision making and the decisions 
compared with the present framework is an exclusive and specific situation that needs to be 
elaborated for its added value. It therefore corresponds to Swanborn’s second situation.
The first case is the city of Roosendaal in the southern part of the Netherlands. The 
second is the city of Dordrecht. Figure 42 shows both cities on a map of the Netherlands. 
Further details about the two cases are presented in Chapter 7.
Figure 42: Dordrecht and Roosendaal on a map of the Netherlands
I chose these cities as they represent cities facing serious risk problems. Dordrecht faces a 
large exceedance of the GR norm as a result of the large transport flows of hazardous
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materials on the Brabant line and the route to Belgium. Roosendaal shares this problem in 
part, as a large transport flow to Belgium passes through the city. Moreover, as I will argue in 
the following sections, both cities had serious problems in the past with high risks related to 
rail transport, significantly limiting their potential with respect to urban development. As 
such, I have chosen two rather extreme cases for investigating whether the alternative 
institutions will create a different outcome. Choosing extreme cases is in line with the 
suggestions by Eisenhardt (1989), Pettigrew (1990) and Yin (1994) on case study research, 
who state that it is neither necessary, nor preferable to choose random cases. Case study 
research according to these authors is not about statistical pattern analysis or statistical 
generalisation. Instead, these authors argue that the choice of cases should aim at replicating 
or extending the emergent theory. According to Yin (1994), it can therefore be justifiable to 
conduct selective case study research when researchers have not yet had the opportunity to 
gain insight into all unique situations. Or, as Eisenhardt (1989) states, case study research can 
be particularly appropriate because case studies do not rigidly rely on previous literature or 
prior empirical evidence and as such is very appropriate to generate freshness in the 
perspective on a topic.
While there is no ideal number of cases, the more cases performed, the more robust 
the conclusions can be (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, a trade-off must be made with the efforts 
to prepare and execute each simulation (including policy reconstruction of the past, collecting 
the necessary quantitative data, modelling the specific situation, organising the gaming 
simulation, executing the gaming and analysing the observations). In this case, a limitation to 
two simulations was made given the amount of required prepatory work versus the limitations 
in time, funding and available research capacity.
To gain insight into the decision making processes regarding urban planning and risk 
management, it was of enormous added value to review these two selected cases and 
experience the possible impacts of the application of an adapted institutional framework. 
However, it cannot be ruled out that other cases might give different results from those found 
in this study. Conclusions are therefore drawn under the assumption of a likely repetition of 
the findings in other cases.
6.3.3 Collaboration with TNO
According to Bekebrede (2010), a disadvantage of simulation-games is that they often only 
use blocks or papers to represent the physical environment. Instead, the use of computer 
simulations has considerable advantages. According to this author, when used, these computer 
simulations enable a more realistic outcome of the game.
These tests were therefore performed in collaboration with TNO. More specifically, 
experts from the department of Industrial and External Safety of the Environment, Health and 
Safety business unit modelled the cities of Roosendaal and Dordrecht and calculated the GR. 
To do this, we used the TNO risk model, URBIS EV22. Special features of the model include 
the calculation of the potential loss of life, the possibility to calculate the effect of a number of 
potential risk-reducing measures (e.g. the removal of switches or reducing train speeds), the 
possibility to change population densities and the possibility to show the local influence on 
GR (the ‘area-specific GR’; gebiedsgericht groepsrisico). The information provided by this 
model can be used as input for the calculation of, among others, the cost-effectiveness ratio R 
as described in chapter 5.
22 For more information on the URBIS EV model, visit http://www.tno.nl/urbis
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6.3.4 Design of the gaming simulation and planning for the day
The set-up of the game was based on the participation of practitioners from three relevant 
parties. The first party comprised civil servants from the city spatial planning department who 
are involved in designing plans, dealing with safety or implementing policy in their city. The 
second party comprised real estate agents who sell or let houses and office spaces in that area. 
The third party was ProRail in its role as the rail network manager. Of these parties, the civil 
servants are the most important group, as they are the ones who should prepare for political 
decisions concerning the urban development plan. The other two parties were invited for their 
knowledge on house prices, profitability and costs of rail adaptations and the corresponding 
expert role they play in the planning debate with civil servants. It should be noted, however, 
that these parties are not primarily responsible for preparing political decision making. Their 
behaviour largely depends on such decision making and will consequently seek opportunities 
to influence the decision preparation process. Between six and ten people involved in the 
projects were invited to take part in the simulation game for each project. The invited 
practitioners were informed by email and telephone about the nature of the meeting. The 
schedule for the simulation days is given in table 14.
Time
13.00 - 13.15 
13.15 - 13.45 
13.45 - 14.00
14.00 - 14.10 
14.10 - 14.25 
14.25 - 14.35
14.35 - 15.05 
15.05 - 15.20
15.20 - 15.30 
15.30 - 15.50 
15.50 - 16.20
16.20 - 17.00
Table 14: Schedule for the simulation days
Activity______________________________________
First part of the simulation
Introduction and questions
Thinking of a lternative urban plans
C ritica lly  revising the plans of the other group
Valuing the different options and choosing the best one
Calculating the effects of the urban plan on risk
Discussing the resu lts with the participants and introducing the second part of the day
Second part o f the simulation 
Thinking of risk-m itigating measures
Critically revising the risk-m itigating m easures of the other group 
Valuing the different options and choosing the best one 
Calculating the effects of the risk-m itigating m easures on risk 
Discussing the resu lts with the participants 
Evaluation and discussion
Each of the two gaming simulations was divided into two parts. The aim of the first part was 
to encourage the participants to produce alternative plans for the urban area concerned, while 
the second part should focus on generating risk-mitigating measures.
The plan was to divide the participants at the beginning of the gaming simulations into 
two random groups, each of which then should discuss the potential for a new urban project in 
the relevant area. The aim was to have the participants produce as many ideas as possible and 
to write them down on large sheets of paper along with the rough figures related to the 
project, such as the number of houses that should be added to the area where the project was 
planned. After about 30 minutes, the two groups were expected to exchange their sheets of 
paper and take a critical look at the proposals and then make critical comments with the aim 
to improve the proposals.
The participants would then be invited to evaluate the ideas by adding stickers to their 
preferred option. Each participant would then be given two stickers, and could thus ‘vote’ 
twice for their preferred option(s). The two ideas with the most votes would then be translated 
into input data for the URBIS EV risk model. This model had to be filled on forehand with 
the basic and essential information on the characteristics of the urban situation concerned, 
including the rail tracks. The extended model could then be used to calculate the Potential 
Loss of Life as the criterion for group risk. During this modelling, the participants might take
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a short break.
During the modelling of these ideas on different planning projects, the plan was to ask 
the participants to start thinking about any mitigating measures that might be necessary to 
lower risks. They would also be told that it might not be possible to model all the measures 
proposed. However, to facilitate the creative process, they would not be told in advance which 
measures could not be modelled.
The measures used in the first part of the simulation should also be used in the second 
part. Hence, the participants should again be divided into two groups to discuss possible risk- 
mitigating measures. During this part of the session, the results of the simulation would be 
given to the participants to show them the impact of their ideas on the risks. After this, the 
participants would be asked to choose the combination of ideas (i.e. which urban plan in 
combination with which risk-mitigating measure) they consider to be the best. The 
participants were also expected to use the cost-effectiveness model to interactively support 
their decision making.
The advantage of this process is that a number of different options might be 
thoroughly explored and discussed in a short space of time. Moreover, a variety of planning 
options might be modelled to demonstrate how they influence the calculated risk, thus giving 
the participants immediate insight into what their ambitions and ideas mean for the calculated 
risk. The structuring of the process might also force the participants to think about ways to 
control risks and learn about how their ambitions might influence risks.
6.3.5 Objectivity of the collected data
Executing the gaming simulation as described above, each of the two sessions was moderated 
by one of the TNO researchers and myself. The gaming literature emphasises the need for 
careful registration of the process. This is generally done by chronological registration and 
observations of actions, the behaviour of actors, the type of discussions, the outcome of 
deliberations and the like. The moderators were not in a position to systematically take notes 
during the discussions. To nevertheless ensure objective and clear reporting of each session, 
two independent scientific researchers were added to the team as observers. Their only role 
was to make observations and take minutes of each session. In addition, they specifically 
looked for indications as to whether the suggested principles in the adapted institutional 
framework influenced the process. They therefore received a checklist of indicators, which 
served as a guideline for the minute makers. This list contained eleven questions related to the 
indicators formulated in section 6.3.1 (see table 15, Appendix II includes this checklist in both 
Dutch and English)
Table 15: The indicators on the checklist for the observers
- Do the partic ipants understand  the re la tive  use of the risk  ca lcu la tion s?
- Do the partic ipants feel responsib le  for risks and can th ey  ju s t ify  th ese  r isk s?
- A re the resu lts of risk  ca lcu la tion s con tested , and if so , w hat cau se s th is?
- A re the input and output va riab le s  of risk  ca lcu la tion s con tested ?
- How do the partic ipants react to the resu lts of risk  ca lcu la tion s?
- Do the partic ipants gain insight into w hat th e ir building am bitions m ean for the level of risk?
- How do the partic ipants use the co st-e ffectiveness m odel, and if so how do they  va lu e  it?
- Do the partic ipants take  responsib ility  for the cho ices m ade?
- Do the partic ipants va lu e  the new set-up  as useful or better?
- Do the partic ipants have the idea th ey  a re  the ju s t  problem  ow ner of r isk s?
- Do the partic ipants th ink  that an urban deve lopm en t p ro ject can be p lanned better/m ore  
eas ily  than before?
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Whenever the participants discussed issues addressed in table 15, the minute takers paid extra 
attention to their comments. Based on their notes, the two observers produced detailed 
minutes of the process as a basis for the analysis afterwards. In chapter 7, the information 
resulting from these observations and notes will be processed in the report of the simulations, 
partly illustrated by quotes made by the participants. In order to evaluate the simulation game 
(process and the resulting outcomes), an evaluation form was handed out at the end of the 
day. The form focussed not only on evaluating the participants’ appreciation of the adapted 
institutional framework, but also intended to enable a different angle in the assessment of the 
outcome, as the information provided by the participants in the evaluation form in 
combination with the minutes should provide a thorough view of the gaming simulation. The 
open evaluation questions are shown in table 16.
Table 16: The questions on the provided evaluation form
- W hat do you th ink  of the re la tive  use of group risk?
- How did you expe rien ce  the use of risk  ca lcu la tion s as a decision supportive tool?
- W hat do you th ink  of the idea that urban deve lopm en t p ro jects m ay no longer in c rease  risk  as 
a rep lacem en t for the orientation va lu e ?  (stand -still p rinc ip le)
- W hat do you th ink of the idea that tran spo rt is no longer an im portant va riab le  for the  
ca lcu la tion s?
- Do you th ink  that the co st-e ffectiveness model has an added va lu e ?  If  so , w hy? If  not, why  
not?
- Do you th ink  you can use the co st-e ffe ctiveness model to ju s t ify  the cho ices you m ake  
concern ing  risk s? I f  so , w hy? If  not, w hy not?
- Did you expe rien ce  less dependence on o ther parties as fa r as inform ation is conce rned? If  so , 
w hat inform ation do you no longer need? If  not, w hy not?
- How did you expe rien ce  today's decision m aking p ro cess?
- A re there  resu lts o ther than in the 'rea l' p ro cess? If  so , w hat are  the d ifferences and w hat do 
you th ink  cau se s these  d iffe rences?
- Do you th ink  that there  are  advan tages to th ese  'new ' ru le s?  If  so , w hat are these  
ad van tag es?  If  not, w hy not?
- I f  you have any rem ark s or tips or w ish to m ention som eth ing that has not ye t been  
add re ssed , p lease feel free to w rite them  down here
The forms used to evaluate the experiences of the participants of these gaming simulations are 
presented in Appendix III in both Dutch and in English. Similar to the checklist for the 
independent observers, these questions relate to the indicators formulated in section 6.3.1.
6.4 Limitations of the gaming approach
There are three limitations to the approach described for investigating the impact of the 
proposed adapted institutional framework on the urban planning process. The first limitation 
concerns the assumption that every relevant actor is willing to cooperate. Non-cooperation of 
certain actors might weaken the validity of the approach. Unfortunately, that is what 
happened: we experienced a non-cooperative attitude on the part of ProRail that appeared 
during the operational organisation of the gaming. ProRail is a large organisation with over 
3000 people working on a wide range of projects. Members from this organisation were very 
willing to assist in earlier stages of this research in different ways, such as providing the 
transported volumes of hazardous materials by rail and calculating the cost of a variety of 
risk-mitigating measures related to the rail infrastructure. Unfortunately, the project managers 
did not respond to several invitations to participate in the gaming sessions. The role of the 
project managers in this part of the research would be to contribute their expert knowledge on
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rail transport and infrastructure during the simulations, in order to review whether 
infrastructural measures were possible to be taken at the locations addressed in the 
simulations. Also, their role was to review whether the safety systems were feasible and, for 
example, had not already been installed.
After various attempts, it seemed impossible to have representatives from ProRail 
participate in the gaming simulations in the indicated role. The fact that there was no one 
present to act on behalf of this actor makes it more difficult to compare the observations on 
the process and the resulting outcome with real-world decision making, although in chapter 3 
we described that ProRail often adopts a rather isolated position in local projects in reality 
too. Fortunately, as described, essential information on the specific cases relating to the 
railways had been collected beforehand from the ProRail organisation, based on collaboration 
with various staff members from different departments, who could not join the simulations 
themselves, because they were not in a position of decision maker. This information was 
subsequently used during the sessions.
The second limitation concerns the costs of the different risk-mitigating measures. 
While preparing the simulation, it became clear that not all the costs of risk-mitigating 
measures could be assessed. Basically, there are three types of measures that can reduce risks: 
effect-reducing measures, logistic measures and infrastructural measures.
The first type o f measures includes measures such as blast-resistant glass, fortified 
walls, the installation of sprinkler installations, and the like. The downside of these measures 
in the context of the safety assessment is that many of these effect-reducing measures are 
hardly transferable in changes in the levels of the variables included in the risk calculation 
models. These measures are supposed to reduce risks, but none of the risk models appears to 
take them into account. TNO, for example, has performed a great deal of research aimed at 
quantifying the risk-reducing potential of people’s preparedness, but this had not yet been 
implemented in URBIS EV. In essence, this has to do with the complexity in causal analysis: 
it appears to be extremely difficult to formalise the causal effect of these types pf measures.
The second type o f measures -  mainly logistics measures, such as driving at lower 
speeds or on other routes -  are known for their risk-reducing potential. In personal 
correspondence with logistics experts, a figure that is generally applied to calculate 
operational costs was indicated, namely that a kilometre driven by a freight train costs on 
average €18.50. Therefore, if a train is redirected the costs can be calculated by multiplying 
the extra kilometres by €18.50. However, redirecting international transport is very difficult, 
as the transport companies are free to choose the route and mode they wish, making it difficult 
to predict the extra operational cost.
What can be taken into account is that transports are given certain time slots during 
which they can pass through city centres or that they can have a ‘smart load’, in other words, 
flammable liquids are separated from LPGs, which drastically reduces the risk of a warm 
BLEVE scenario. Both measures have risk-reducing potential. The time slot option can be 
used to direct transport through city centres during periods when fewer people are around; for 
example, if a city centre has a high concentration of offices, trains can be directed to go 
through that city during the night. However, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to calculate 
the extra costs for the transport companies. Also, if the adoption of time slots has a positive 
effect on one city, they may have a negative effect on other cities with high-density housing 
areas adjacent to railways. Unfortunately, in this case too, it is very difficult to calculate the 
costs of these logistic measures, as they are dependent on the number of extra hours that are 
consequently charged, uncertainties about how trainloads can be organised and any 
inefficiency in the use of equipment and rail capacity. It is unclear what consequence these 
potential inefficiencies have for transport operating companies.
The gaming simulations were planned for January and February 2009. During preparation, it
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appeared that a national study commissioned by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management to model the costs of logistic measures was to be published in April 
200923. I therefore attempted to gain access to the preliminary results of this study, but failed. 
Due to the complex nature of their costs assessment, it was therefore decided not to take these 
logistic measures into account in the gaming.
The third type o f measures (infrastructural measures) does not pose limitations to the 
gaming. These measures -  removing switches, removing level crossings, installing hot-box 
detection and the improved ATB system (see the following section for a description of these 
measures) -  have a risk-reducing effect that can be modelled in URBIS EV. Moreover, these 
measures have a large benefit over measures that are taken for new buildings (such as the 
blast resistant walls mentioned earlier in this section), as these measures also reduce risks for 
the existing city and the local residents.
The third limitation is that there were few possibilities for modelling risk-mitigating 
measures, as few measures have actually been quantified in risk management practice. This, 
of course, might be considered as an important downside of this gaming simulation. The 
question therefore is whether, being aware of this potential downside, it is still defendable to 
apply the gaming simulation approach? This question has been answered with a ‘yes’ in this 
study, because it actually represents the reality very well and as such, although being a 
downside increases the realistic nature of the excercise. The consequence is that the number 
of measures taken into account in the gaming simulations was necessarily limited, but at the 
same time quite realistic. Moreover, in theory the included set of potential measures still 
allowed for a considerable flexibility and space in the debate among the participants.
Figure 43 summarises the pros and cons of the different measures.
Disadvantages: Disadvantage: Disadvantage:
- Very difficult to get - Not possible to - Not all measures
accurate costs model most can be modelled
- Hard to implement measures in terms of
in practice cause and effect Advantages:
- Measures only - Easy to model other
Advantages: affect new buildings measures
- Easy to model the and not existing ones - Measures to reduce
effects on risks the possibility (origin
- Considerable effect Advantages: measures)
on reducing risks - Easy to take into - Possible high effect
account in design on lowering risks
process - Measures also
- Possible low costs reduce risks for the
- Possible large gains existing city
by smart planning
and design
Figure 43: Three categories of risk-mitigating measures and their advantages and 
disadvantages
23 It was eventually finished in late 2009, but not published openly.
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In the next section, the main set of measures remaining after the previous necessary reduction 
and which were included in the gaming simulation will be elaborated in more detail.
6.5 Specifying risk-mitigating measures in the gaming simulation
As specified in the previous section, the number of measures that can be modelled is limited. 
For the gaming simulation, I have specified two categories of measures that, theoretically, can 
be implemented and hence are considered to be the main focus of the discussion. The first 
category is the category of infrastructural measures. In this category, four different risk 
mitigating measures can be distinguished. The first measure is implementing hot-box 
detection on the railway. Hot-box detection is a system that enables an early detection of 
jammed shaft bearings or overheated brakes. Hot-box detection is installed between the tracks 
and has infrared sensors that register heat. When a train with heated brakes passes, for 
example, a signalling system warns the train dispatcher by means of an optical indicator and 
an acoustic alarm. Train dispatchers are located at one of ProRail’s thirteen centralised train 
control centres. As such, hot-box detection is not a safety system (i.e. it is not a fail-safe 
system) as it does not intervene in train operation but only warns the train dispatcher that 
something is potentially wrong (Railpedia, 2008a). It costs about €450,00024 to incorporate a 
full hot-box detection system into a rail system.25 As indicated, this measure can be modelled 
in URBIS EV.
The second measure is removing level crossings. Such crossings increase the risk of 
disasters because of the likelihood of collisions taking place between cars and trains. This 
feature can also be taken into account when using URBIS EV to support decision making. In 
practice, the number of level crossings is gradually declining in the Netherlands, due a 
national policy that was launched about a decade ago. In Roosendaal, there is one in the area I 
addressed, while there are none in the planned area in Dordrecht. In Roosendaal, it would cost 
as much as €51 million to build a tunnel for traffic to pass underneath the railway26.
The third measure is the enhanced version of the automatic train protection system 
(Automatische Trein Beïnvloeding Verbeterde Versie; ATBvv), which is an improved version 
of the ATB system -  a fail-safe signalling system that continuously controls the speed of 
trains above 40km/h. The system intervenes automatically when a train driver exceeds the 
maximum permitted speed or fails to brake after passing a signal that indicates a lower speed. 
The ATB first warns the train driver by means of an acoustic signal; if the train driver does 
not respond within seconds, the system applies an emergency brake which brings the train to a 
complete stop. However, this ATB does not control speeds under 40 km/h or the passing of 
signals that indicate danger if the maximum speed is restricted to 40 km/h. In principle, this 
means that train collisions between two trains can occur. The worst-case scenario is a head-on 
collision between two trains, each running at 40 km/h. Since 1992, a series of accidents were 
caused by trains passing danger signals (Railpedia, 2008b), the most recent of which occurred 
in Barendrecht on the 24 September 2009.
This passing of signals indicating danger at less than 40km/h can be prevented by 
implementing the enhanced version of ATB -  the ATBvv -  which can monitor trains passing 
a signal indicating danger and intervene by automatically stopping them. Based on risk 
evaluations and addressing public demand to reduce risks in the case of a collision (if passing 
a signal indicating danger) by at least 75%, ProRail and IVW (the inspection service of the
24 I obtained the information on the costs and discounting of implementing these measures by interviewing 
ProRail cost experts, Fred Hop and Lex Moscou.
25 In this case, I used a hot-box detection system for two railway tracks going in two different directions, 
combined with a signalling system to the train control centre.
26 Idem footnote number 23
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Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management) drew up a list of 1000 signals 
to be fitted with ATBvv. This figure might eventually be increased to 1700. Each signal fitted 
with ATBvv reduces the risk of train collisions and costs €35,00027 per signal. Implementing 
ATBvv measures is only possible in Roosendaal, as Dordrecht has already been provided with 
this new system. Roosendaal can be provided with ten signals at a total cost of €350,000.28 
The URBIS EV model uses a correction factor for calculating risks, assuming that the normal 
ATB is included in the modelled system. When modelling ATBvv, we used the same risk- 
reducing correction factor as for the regular ATB in order to be able to compare situations 
with and without ATBvv.29 Hence, when ATB and ATBvv were modelled in the same 
situation, we doubled the correction factor for ATB.
The fourth measure that can be taken is removing switches. Switches significantly increase 
the possibility of a derailment. However, when modelling an area the risk models do not need 
to take into account how many switches there are. This means that a section of track with ten 
sets of switches has the same weight in the model as a section with only one set. In other 
words: the model uses a dichotomy of yes/ no switches present. As this research applies a 
relative view on risk models, this dichotomy forces us to use a risk-lowering correction factor 
equal to the removal of all switches in case it is proposed to reduce the number of switches 
even when in the end more than one set of switches remains. Switches are always removed 
two at a time, because to change from one track to another generally means that a set of 
switches on both tracks needs to be passed. Removing two sets of switches costs €2 million.
The second category encompasses measures that can be taken to mitigate the possible 
effect of a disaster. This basically boils down to the smart redesign of the area adjacent to the 
railway that is subject of development. In principle, this category allows more creativity in 
arriving at risk-lowering solutions, depending on the structure and character of the area that 
will be modelled. Risk models take into account the fact that the dominant scenario for the 
GR criterion is the BLEVE scenario. This scenario influences an area of up to 200 metres on 
both sides of the tracks. Therefore, if the highest concentration of people resides in the area 
beyond a 200-metre boundary, the risks will be much lower. A great advantage of such a 
measure is that changes to the urban design makes measures to the physical infrastructure 
unnecessary. This means that local authorities need not invest in physical measures. 
Therefore, it may be less costly to alter an urban design than to pay for infrastructural 
measures. However, this might imply that the development area is more than 200 metres from 
the railway.
It can also be attractive to build other low-density functions adjacent to railways such 
as public parks, parking areas or roads. Depending on the other parameters -  such as the 
percentage of transport at night, which is often higher than during the day -  it may be 
practical to build offices rather than houses directly adjacent to railways, thus significantly 
reducing the population densities adjacent to the railway during the hours when the transport 
of hazardous materials is scheduled. However, it is up to the participants of the gaming 
simulations to suggest how to deal with these types of measures.
27 After I had obtained cost information and used it in the gaming simulations, new information was provided 
showing that these measures in fact cost €55,000, based on project close-out costs. In the following, I continue to 
use €35,000 as a reference, as I provided the participants in the gaming simulation with this figure.
28 In line with the previous footnote, this should then be €550,000.
29 While planning and executing this research, plans were made for a national research project to scientifically 
quantify the ATBvv measure.
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6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that in theory the methodology of gaming simulation has a clear 
added value for performing the tests on the impacts of an adapted institutional framework on 
decision making. I also elaborated the gaming simulations in terms of content, process and 
organisation. It was explained why I choose to carry them out in the cities of Roosendaal and 
Dordrecht: in both cases the GR standard is exceeded, whereas a significant redesign of the 
urban environment adjacent to the railway is planned and the debate bears characteristics of a 
deadlock situation. Moreover, experts from both municipalities appeared willing to participate 
in the preparation and the execution of the gaming simulation.
I also elaborated the framework for observation, to measure and evaluate the effects of 
the proposed intervention aimed at preventing or mitigating the problems as observed in part 
1 of this study. Besides the methodological requirements concerning the objectivity of the 
analyses such as the specification of a set of indicators to describe the process, some 
limitations of the analyses were described. Most important in this respect is the fact that not 
all potentially interesting measures to influence the risk level in the area under study can be 
treated by the models used to support the debate between the participants. Clearly, this is not 
an ideal situation to work with, but at the same time very well represents the problems that 
real life actors need to cope with. This resulted in a number of assumptions for modelling risk 
lowering measures in the URBIS EV model for this research.
A second important limitation is that we experienced a non-cooperative attitude on the 
part of ProRail that appeared during the operational organisation of the gaming. 
Unfortunately, the project managers did not respond to several invitations to participate in the 
gaming sessions. Their role was to contribute their expert knowledge on rail transport and 
infrastructure during the simulation and to review whether the safety systems were feasible 
and, for example, had not already been installed. This led to a situation in which not all the 
actors that participate in such decision making processes in real world, were involved in the 
gaming simulation in the preferred way. Consequently, a back-up strategy had to be followed. 
Fortunately, essential information on the specific cases relating to technical and operational 
aspects of the railways was collected beforehand from the ProRail organisation, based on 
collaboration with various staff members from different departments, who could not join the 
simulations themselves, because they were not in a position of decision maker or project 
manager. Their information was subsequently used during the sessions.
In the next chapter, the findings of the gaming simulations will be described.
Chapter 7: 
Investigating the effects of the adapted institutional 
framework: a simulation of two cases
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present the results of the two gaming simulations aimed at investigating the 
effect of the adapted institutional framework on the outcome of the decision making process. I 
first describe the analyses with regard to the city of Roosendaal, based on the following 
structure. In section two I firstly outline the characteristics of the case, including the features 
of the area that were included in the supporting models. Then the process of the gaming 
simulation is reported and analysed, based on the minutes taken during the simulation and the 
evaluations. In the third section, the same structure is followed for the city of Dordrecht. This 
is followed by a detailed conclusion on each studied case.
7.2 Roosendaal
7.2.1 Introduction
Roosendaal is a border city with over 77,000 inhabitants in the southern part of the 
Netherlands. The city is divided into two urban areas by a railway that accommodates a 
substantial flow of hazardous materials. Products transported by rail from Rotterdam to 
Antwerp (Belgium) have to pass through Roosendaal. In addition, the ‘Sloe’ area is located to 
the west of Roosendaal. This is the industrial area of the city of Flushing (or ‘Vlissingen’ in 
Dutch). From here, a transport flow mainly consisting of category A materials is generated to 
Belgium and Germany (5,450 wagons in 2007; ProRail, 2008). There are also plans to locate 
a large sea container terminal in the area, which is expected to generate more hinterland
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freight traffic through Roosendaal in the future. In conclusion, Roosendaal has a considerable 
problem with respect to the transport of hazardous materials. This, and the fact that a large 
railway yard is located near the city centre, creates a number of problems for the local 
authorities, including risk problems. Other problems involve the noise produced by trains and 
the industry located alongside the railway.
7.2.2 SpoorHaven project
Illustrative of the problems in Roosendaal is the difficulty of implementing the SpoorHaven 
project. In November 2003, the city of Roosendaal presented the SpoorHaven Roosendaal 
Masterplan. This plan had the status of a ‘flexible’ plan for the period until ‘somewhere 
around 2020’ (Roosendaal, 2003). The plan consisted of a functional and a spatial plan for the 
development of an area covering more than 100 ha. The aim of the plan was to combine three 
central policies (Roosendaal, 2003, p.4):
- Removing the barrier created by the present railways.
- Intensifying, combining and transforming different functions to increase spatial 
quality.
- Applying an integral approach for both the short and the long term.
To arrive at the preferred area development, a number of key elements were included in the 
plan (Roosendaal, 2003):
- A new council office.
- Leisure activities, such as a cinema and a discotheque.
- A new ROC school (regional training centre).
- Further development of the RBC Roosendaal soccer stadium.
- A minimum of 1000 houses (in all market segments).
- A new railway station.
- A new bus station to replace the two present stations.
- Between 500 and 1000 new jobs.
- Relocating the present railway yard to the north of the city.
The master plan mentioned two alternative versions, one of which included a tunnel for the 
railways, the other a raised rail infrastructure. Even though the plan is quite ambitious in 
terms of the quantified targets, its introduction referred to problems with risks related to the 
rail transport of hazardous materials:
‘Less visible, but still very much felt, is the lack o f safety as a result o f operations with 
the transport o f hazardous materials. This hinders not only developments within the 
area, but also developments in the city centre.’ (Roosendaal, 2003, p.3, translated 
from Dutch)
In 2007, a pilot project was conducted to review the plans and their potential impact on safety 
and risks. In this project, the SpoorHaven plan was slimmed down to one that influenced the 
western part of Roosendaal, as shown in figures 44 and 45.
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Figure 44: Roosendaal from the air, with the SpoorHaven area located in the square
Figure 45: An impression from the local land use plan of the SpoorHaven project
Risk calculations based on the market prognoses provided by ProRail (Save, 2007) showed 
that the risks increased significantly as a result of the urban plans. Two types of calculations 
were made. The model first calculated risks according to a ‘non-complex’ situation in which 
there was no correction for the railway yard situated in the city. The model was then corrected 
for extra risks due to the city’s ‘highly complex situation’ as an experiment to stress different
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situations of complexity on rail tracks where the tracks have interaction with a railway yard. 
This correction factor consisted of a higher incident ratio per kilometre per wagon. 
Roosendaal was designated in the category of the highest complexity. The results of the risk 
calculations are presented in table 17. The table shows risks in the present situation and in 
future situations in which several development plans have been carried out for different 
kilometres of rail track (Km 1 to Km 3). The table shows a large difference in the outcomes of 
the calculations. However, both calculations show that in the future situation, the risk norms 
will be exceeded for two kilometres of rail track.
Table 17: Results of calculations related to the transport of hazardous materials in 
Roosendaal (Save, 2007)
GR (maximum exceedance a t N  fa ta lities) 
Present situation Future situation
Prognosis not com plex
KM 1 No exceedance No exceedance
KM 2 Factor 1.4 with 750 casualties Factor 5.5 with 1050 casualties
KM 3 No exceeding Factor 4.5 with 750 casualties
Prognosis com plex
KM 1 No exceedance 1.3 with 300 casualties
KM 2 Factor 13.3 with 750 casualties Factor 59.0 with 1050 casualties
KM 3 Factor 2.3 with 550 casualties Factor 48.0 with 1050 casualties
As the risks were too high, the plans needed to be reviewed. In a follow-up study, it was 
stated that:
‘Since then it has become clear that a number o f variables have changed. The spatial 
interpretation o f the SpoorHaven area has been elaborated further and is now 
classified in phases 1A and 1B. Phase 1A will be developed in the short term. Phase 
1B will be realized in the long term.’ (Save, 2008)
More specifically, the development plan involved the following programme:
Phase 1A
- 900 houses/apartments
- New stadium for RBC football club (5000 -  10,000 seats)
- 16,000m2 office space
- 950m2 catering industry
- 1400m2 companies
- VMBO school (1500 students aged 12-16)
- ROC school (570 students aged 16+).
Phase 1B
- 200 houses/apartments
- Cinema (200 -  300 people).
The areas for phases 1A and 1B are indicated in figure 46.
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Figure 46: The planned areas for phases 1A and 1B in Roosendaal
Due to the safety problems, several reports have been made on the effects of the building 
plans on risks. The most recent report at the time of this research dates from April 2008. Two 
scenarios are reviewed in this report: one is based on the transport figures derived from the 
number of transported wagons in 2006; the other is based on transport figures for the basic 
network. Moreover, three options were used for the urban plans. These were the present 
situation, the phase 1A plan and the phase 1A + 1B plan after implementation. These 
scenarios generated different results with respect to the GR criterion (Save, 2008). Table 17 
shows these three options and specifies these for three different kilometre sections of the rail 
track in the city.
Table 17: Results of the calculations related to the transport of hazardous materials in 
Roosendaal (Save, 2008)
GR (maximum exceeding a t N  fata lities)
Present situation Phase 1A Phase 1A + 1B
Basic Network
KM 1 No exceedance No exceedance No exceedance
KM 2 Factor 13 with 750 Factor 15 with 750 Factor 20 with 650
casualties casualties casualties
KM 3 Factor 1.5 with 540 Factor 2.2 with 540 Factor 5.6 with 750
Realisation numbers 
2006
casualties casualties casualties
KM 1 No exceedance No exceedance No exceedance
KM 2 Factor 7.8 with 750 Factor 8.4 with 750 Factor 10 with 750
casualties casualties casualties
KM 3 No exceeding No exceeding Factor 2.9 with 540 
casualties
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The reason for using two sets of transport figures is that the basic network assumes larger 
transport volumes than were realised in 2006. Differences are also due to the planned increase 
in the population. It should also be noted that these figures are influenced by the assumption 
that the ATBvv system will be implemented in the near future. Consequently, the calculated 
risks are expected to be lower for the future situation. To achieve the aims of this project, the 
plans have been modified and slimmed down. In October 2008, the city council decided on 
how to reduce the project to an acceptable size. In the Major Tasks Strategy (Strategie 
Majeure Opgaven) the mayor and the alderman involved in the project wrote a memo to the 
city council stating the preferred variants of the SpoorHaven project. This memo included a 
‘major tasks fact-sheet’ in which the preferences, goals and means for the project were 
reformulated. The physical result of the project should be (Roosendaal, 2008):
- Improvement of safety of the SpoorHaven area to an acceptable level (a healthy, high 
quality living environment, stimulation of safe havens within the safety zones).
- Restructuring the obsolete company grounds.
- Neutralising the barrier of the railway yard.
- Increase housing and employment in the city.
- Efficient use of space.
To achieve these goals, the authorities described three variants. In the 0 variant, there is no 
development whatsoever of phases 1B, 2A and 2B, and the confinement of risks is minimal. 
In variant 1, there is a reduction of risks as a result of which the areas involved in phases 1B, 
2A and 2B can be further developed for rail-related activities. In variant 2, there is the 
intention to further reduce risks30 making the development of phases 1B, 2A and 2B possible, 
which means that the southern part of phase 2B can be filled with urban functions. This 
makes it necessary to construct a tunnel transecting the rail area. Phases 2A and 2B are related 
to the northern part of the Roosendaal rail area and the railway yard. As the phases are due to 
be discussed in 2009 after a decision has been taken on phase 1A (on which the local 
authorities are dependent in terms of safety and risk increase), these different phases were not 
taken into account in the gaming simulation session as no full review of their risks is available 
(Roosendaal, 2008).
Finally, phase 1A is included in Roosendaal’s new land-use plan. However, phase 1B 
is not yet included as it would probably lead to unacceptable situations with regard to risks. 
Moreover, exceeding the orientation value of GR could not be accounted for in line with the 
justification duty for the GR.
The conclusion is that Roosendaal faces severe limitations with regard to urban 
development due to the rail transport through the city. In the past, it appeared to be extremely 
difficult to create a breakthrough. According to the classification used by Van der Lei (2009), 
this resembles a deadlock situation. To address this situation and in an attempt to find a 
breakthrough, the approach suggested in this dissertation was adopted to explore the problem 
from another perspective and to investigate whether this helps to unlock the debate and to 
create new dynamics in decision making.
7.2.3 Gaming simulation in Roosendaal: round 1
The gaming simulation in Roosendaal was held on 27 January 2009. Before the simulations 
were performed, the major characteristics of the area were modelled in URBIS EV. As the 
city of Roosendaal had not yet been investigated previously by TNO, this required some
30 The document does not mention how these variants might reduce risks.
Chapter 7: Investigating the effects of the adapted institutional framework 143
preparatory work. The modelling was based on population files from an earlier national risk 
evaluation from 2005 called the Anker Project. These population files proved to be less 
accurate than they should be. In fact, the population files assumed fewer people living in the 
modelled situation than in the real-world situation. This influenced the outcome of the 
research, as will be discussed towards the end of this section.
Seven people participated in the gaming simulation in Roosendaal, five of whom were 
employees of the municipality of Roosendaal and two were employed by real estate 
development companies (see Appendix IV for the names of the participants and the 
companies). The participants were divided into two groups and went to opposite sides of the 
room to discuss possible urban plans for the SpoorHaven 1B area. The first group mainly 
discussed the fact that the area had deliberately been kept out of the local land-use plan due to 
the vagueness of the safety, noise and air quality standards. Moreover, they discussed all the 
problems that created this vagueness. Therefore, the group members stated that ‘the margins 
[to build in that area] are small’ and ‘there are only a few alternative programme 
interpretations’. Also, the existing school was referred to as ‘loose change’, as the situation 
should become safer when the school was relocated, due to the school’s temporary character. 
Other comments concerned the building of office space beside the railway in order to act as a 
buffer in the case of an explosion. Apart from these comments, the group mainly debated the 
problematic aspects of the present situation.
The second group was more involved in creatively thinking of alternatives for urban 
development. The group members mentioned a number of possible developments in the area. 
Apart from offices and houses, they also felt that different types of leisure functions could be 
accommodated in the area, such as a multi-screen cinema, a regional museum, an indoor 
swimming pool and a large gym. They also said that a combination of offices and indoor 
parking facilities directly next to the railway could act as a buffer in the case of an explosion. 
In the end, they reduced the number of options to a specific combination of housing, office 
space and a large leisure facility. The possible developments mentioned by the second group 
were:
- A multi-screen cinema (10 screens with a seating capacity of 400).
- A museum (10,000 visitors per year).
- Indoor swimming pool (no specifications mentioned).
- 20,000 square metres of office space (about 1400 people).
- Housing (apartments and homes, a total of 300 or 720 people).
- Parking spaces.
- Restaurants and a few bars.
- A combination of these functions, but in smaller proportions than the initial ideas.
After half an hour, each group started to comment on the proposals of the other group. 
Because a number of participants had thought up quite detailed technical solutions, while the 
first group had not developed a variety of workable ideas, the discussion was held in a plenary 
session. It was interesting to observe that the participants were quite aware of the risks and of 
methods to protect the adjacent areas. They mentioned urban designs (again) that could be 
used as a safety buffer for houses, the effect of the urban plans on GR and the deepening of 
the railway for more safety. After inviting the participants to focus on ideas for urban 
development, they started expressing their preferences regarding the urban environment. After 
a while, the participants reached consensus on a plan (hereafter called scenario 1):
- 200 houses (480 people)
- 25,000m2 of office space (2000 people).
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After a brief discussion, the participants also proposed modelling another plan (called 
scenario 2). This plan -  which they intended to implement as a project in the real-life situation
-  consisted of 350 houses in combination with a large cinema with six screens each with a 
seating capacity of 200. The participants were eager to learn about the impact of these ideas 
on risks.
The risks were calculated, showing the following potential loss of life (PLL):
- 1.76*10-4 for the original situation
- 3.51*10-4 for scenario 1
- 4.02*10-4 for scenario 2.
In other words, both scenarios created a significant increase in risks. The risks were even 
higher than anticipated by the participants, which caused substantial annoyance and debate 
confirming the deadlock nature of the situation.
7.2.4 Gaming simulation in Roosendaal: round 2
In this round, the participants were asked to think of risk-mitigating measures to arrive at a 
level of risk that was not higher than the PLL for the original situation of 1.76*10-4 (in 
accordance to the stand-still principle). The first discussions, however, focussed on building 
offices and an indoor car park right beside the railway to increase safety by using these 
buildings as a buffer against the blast of a possible BLEVE and thus protect the houses behind 
them. We needed to explain that it is not possible to model such an alternative use of 
buildings in either URBIS EV or one of the other available models, which evoked such 
reactions as ‘What’s the point of this exercise, then?’ and ‘That’s a pity’.
When the participants were asked if they could come up with other measures, they 
summed up a number of measures that had been investigated by a major Dutch consultancy 
firm (Arcadis), which had investigated which risk-mitigating measures were possible.31 
Removing switches and implementing ATBvv on a number of signals were mentioned 
together with a number of large-scale projects, such as deepened rail tracks, removing the 
entire railway yard or creating a dedicated freight railway. After these ideas had been 
specified, we confronted the participants with other risk-mitigating measures and asked32 
them if they were familiar with the following information:
- Measure 1: Removing the level crossing has a risk lowering potential, and would cost 
€51,000,000.
- Measure 2: Removing two switches on the route to Belgium has a risk lowering 
potential, and would cost €2 ,000 ,000 .
- Measure 3: Equipping ten signals with ATBvv would cost €35,000 each, and has a 
risk lowering potential.
- Measure 4: Implementing hot-box detection would cost €450,000, and has a risk 
lowering potential.
31 Arcadis created a list of all possible ideas, most of which could not be quantitatively modelled. For an 
overview of this research, see Arcadis (2008).
32 We had a shorter open discussion than anticipated, because the participants were not really familiar with rail 
infrastructure measures that were also reasonably executable. We therefore considered it necessary to 
systematically introduce these measures to the participants.
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Figure 47: Aerial photo of Roosendaal showing the location of measures 1, 2 and 3. 
Measure 4 is located to the south of this area. (Source: Google maps)
During the discussion on these measures, we also performed four new risk calculations to 
establish what effect these measures would have on the total risk. We also performed a fifth 
risk analysis to find out the risk-reducing potential of the three cheapest measures. 
Unfortunately, there are no possibilities in this case to build beyond 200 metres of the 
railway, as the SpoorHaven 1B area is not wide enough. It is therefore not possible to build 
with low population densities near the railway and higher population densities further from 
the railway. The results are summarised in table 19.
Table 19: Overview of the PLL related to the various scenarios and measures
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Original situation
Measure 1 3.11*10'4 3.55*10-4
Measure 2 2.04*10'4 2.31*10'4
Measure 3 3.16*10'4 3.61*10'4 1 . 7 6 * 1 0 -4
Measure 4 2.81*10'4 3.22*10-4
Measures 2, 3 and 4 1.47*10'4 1.76*10'4
Risk without 
mitigating measures 3.51*10'4 4.02*10-4
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As shown in table 19, scenarios 1 and 2 cannot have the related risks reduced by measure 1, 2, 
3 or 4 separately up to the level of the reference situation. In fact, measures 2, 3 and 4 would 
have to be implemented simultaneously in order to reduce the risks in accordance with the 
stand-still principle. Thus, for €2.8 million, both scenarios 1 and 2 could be carried out. They 
would reduce the risk to the level in the original situation, or (coincidentally) lead to exactly 
the same level of risk. Confronted with these results, the participants were instantly 
enthusiastic, stating for example:
- ‘The deadlock can be resolved.’
- ‘I really like these results.’
- ‘The novelty is that this creates insight into the fact that you can make investments to 
keep risks controllable.’
- ‘Very refreshing.’
- ‘[It’s now become a] common sense appraisal [instead of one] done by a bunch of 
technicians.’
There were some questions about how this way of looking at risks differs from the one that 
dominates present practice. After explaining these differences, we discussed and evaluated the 
results and the new framework with the participants.
The participants were enthusiastic about three features of this framework. Firstly, they 
said that the local authorities themselves would again be responsible for risks:
- ‘Both safety and investments are arrogated to the local authorities.’
- ‘Increased quality of the whole city, including the already existing city.’
- ‘The local authorities need to keep control of the city.’
Secondly, they said that the local authorities would find it easier to give account for the 
existing risks:
- ‘This is explainable.’
- ‘This shows the consequences of the urban plan and risk-mitigating options in the area 
to be developed.’
- ‘You can show the citizens that you have much better control of the risks.’
- ‘The infrastructure is more controllable. That is a good political argumentation.’
Thirdly, they said that the urban development programme is more manageable in an early 
phase of planning:
- ‘[This way of looking at risk] has a great benefit due to its practical use.’
- ‘It’s great to have these insights at an early stage [of planning].’
- ‘At the same time we can develop [our urban territory] and control risks.’
In contrast, there were two types of criticisms. The first was that it was expected that there 
would no longer be an incentive to increase transport safety, as is illustared by the quotes:
- ‘This removes the incentive for the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management and ProRail to improve safety.’
- ‘But what incentive remains for the central government if we solve the problems for 
them?’
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The other complaint was directed at the long-term effects of this new approach in relation to 
transport volume. The participants were sceptical about the impact the long-term effects 
would have on risks, stating:
- ‘What happens when the transport volume increases?’
- ‘If we need to change the local land use plan in ten years’ time and the transport has 
tripled: what happens then?’
These criticisms seem to indicate that the participants are worried about certain consequences 
of the principles constituting the adapted institutional framework. It might, however, also 
indicate that they are not yet fully aware of what the relative use of risk and the stand-still 
principle imply. Also, the adapted institutional framework does not imply that other actors 
(such as the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Prorail and 
transport operating companies) are freed from their duty to control risks in accordance with, 
for example, international rules and are thus released from their legal obligations to manage 
risks.
7.2.5 Evaluation of Roosendaal
As described in the set up, the participants were asked to fill in an evaluation form (the 
questions asked in the form are included in Appendix III). Unfortunately, the response to the 
evaluation form was low. The participants wanted to fill in the forms at home or on their 
computers, and asked if we could provide a digital copy. Of the seven participants, only three 
returned the evaluation forms. One of the two real estate developers provided an additional 
(fourth) response by email, stating that he did not feel he had enough knowledge of external 
safety to answer the questions as he worked at a company that only takes measures if required 
or requested. From an educational point of view, he had learned a great deal about the 
processes related to external safety and decision making. The questions asked in the form are 
presented in Appendix III.
Concerning the relative use of the GR calculations (question 1 of the evaluation), the 
respondents thought it was ‘smart’ and ‘good for the short term’. However, they also 
mentioned the two problems identified above, stating: ‘You take away the incentive for the 
Ministry and ProRail to create solutions’ and ‘What happens after 10 years (...) when you find 
that the risks have increased?’
Furthermore, the respondents commented on the decision-support approach in which 
the calculations were used, stating that it was ‘refreshing to see the effects of design options’ 
and ‘good for creating alternative plans and gaining quick insight into risks’ (evaluation 
question 2). The idea that urban development should not increase the risks in an area did not 
receive negative comments as such, although the long-term tenability was questioned 
(evaluation question 3): ‘Good for the short term’ and ‘Provides a neutral basis for a good 
discussion that actually improves the adjacent areas.’
The respondents were relieved as well as sceptical about using the transport of 
hazardous materials as a constant factor in calculations (evaluation questions 4 and 7). 
Especially for the short term, it was ‘realistic’, ‘comforting’ and ‘very pleasant’; however, it 
was ‘not based on the reality’ and ‘ignored the problem source’. On the other hand, it was also 
said that ‘you can avoid using unreliable transport data (...) that currently leads to endless and 
difficult discussions’.
Because three risk-lowering measures were needed simultaneously to reduce the risks 
to the initial level, it was not possible to compare the measures separately on their cost- 
effectiveness to assess the extent to which the measures were ALARP. Consequently, it was
148 Rail Transport Risks and Urban Planning
difficult to use the model directly as a decision-support tool. Nevertheless, the respondents 
were very optimistic about the potential use of such a model (evaluation questions 5 and 6). 
They stated, for example:
- ‘Safety and functionality can be geared to each other.’
- ‘A useful addition to the design phase that will ensure it remains realistic.’
- The same approach could be useful (...) in negotiations about the costs related to the 
basic network.’
- ‘(It will give) quick insight into the proportions of the investments, the effect and the 
options.’
With regard to the simulation of the decision making process (evaluation questions 8 and 9), 
the respondents said that it was ‘refreshing (...) compared with the safety discussions of the 
last ten years’, ‘quick, easy and useful’ and ‘the session has (...) made clear that risks should 
be taken into account right from the start of the design phase’. However, they also repeated 
their earlier statements about the need to give incentive to others to implement safety 
measures and their concerns about the long-term effects of the approach. The final two 
evaluation questions (10 and 11) evoked similar reactions. The respondents felt there were 
short-term advantages of applying the approach, but in the longer term the approach might 
have disadvantages too.
7.2.6 Concluding the Roosendaal gaming simulation
The respondents’ comments and evaluations made clear that the elaborated approach offers 
advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantages are that the local authorities gain more 
control over their own situation, the situations can be better explained to residents and risks 
become more clear in an early phase of planning, thus making them more manageable. 
Moreover, it became clear that with a combination of risk-mitigating measures, the risk 
increase caused by the urban plans could be reduced to the original level of risk, potentially 
causing a breakthrough in the deadlock situation.
As for the two concerns that were addressed, the first was that the adapted institutional 
framework seems to imply that there would no longer be an incentive for transport operating 
companies, ProRail or the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management to 
make the transport of hazardous materials by rail safer. This expectation is difficult to prove 
or disprove. Packaging requirements for transport operating companies are made at European 
level and as such are not influenced by national policies, let alone external safety policy. In 
addition, it is difficult to assess the plausibility of the suggestion that there is no incentive for 
the Ministry and ProRail to invest in good and safe infrastructure. For example, in the 
previous chapter it was mentioned that the Dutch authorities are working on the 
implementation of the ATBvv system.
The other concern regarded the growth of future transport, seems true from the present 
point of view in which transport is an important factor for risk calculations. It is important to 
realise that in the present situation there is no serious incentive whatsoever to limit the growth 
or even reduce the level of international oriented transports.33 Here we refer to the discussion 
in section 1.6.1 on the structuring of the transport system in three different markets with 
different types of problems, stakeholders and means of intervention. From that structure we
33 There have been successful attempts to ban ammonia and chlorine transports, but these are only national 
transports and came at very high costs namely nearly €48 million and €65 million, respectively (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008; Ministerie van VROM, 2002).
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learn that it is currently unavoidable to accept international transport and the influence of a 
free market economy on the growth of transport as given. Moreover, we need to realise that 
we cannot burden local authorities with the problems associated with the growth in transport. 
Therefore, the issue of transport volumes should be tackled at a national or international level 
by building new railways or stimulating the use of other transport modes (e.g. inland 
shipping; see e.g. Platz, 2009), for example. If this problem cannot be solved, we will have to 
accept (at the level of the traffic market) the uncontrollability of transport volumes as a given.
Unfortunately, it appeared not possible to fully and directly use the cost-effectiveness 
model in this gaming simulation as a decision-support model because a combination of three 
measures came into discussion instead of separate measures. A comparison of these measures 
therefore made no sense. The respondents were nevertheless positive about the potential use 
of such a model. Most importantly, it seems to be possible to implement a more ambitious 
building programme with less risk.
Based on the analysis in the case of Roosendaal, the conclusion can be drawn that in 
this gaming simulation the applied approach based on the adapted institutional framework for 
external safety management, had a positive impact on the decision making process. Not only 
can the local authority of Roosendaal build with a higher level of ambition without violating 
the stand-still principle, the actors involved also feel able to better understand and explain the 
nature of the risks and risk management approach and as such experience a better informed 
decision making process.
7.2.7 Epilogue
After the simulation was performed, the input parameters were rechecked to see whether 
everything was correct. The recalculation of the risks showed that the PLL in the original 
situation should be higher. The earlier mentioned school apreared not to be included in the 
population file. Consequently, the original situation should have a risk level of 2.55*10-4. This 
is higher than the 1.76*10-4 used during the simulation. This naturally implies that when the 
city of Roosendaal proceeds with its plans to build in the SpoorHaven 1B area, it will need to 
take fewer measures to reduce risks to the original level unless the aim to apply the ALARP 
principle is taken seriously. There is no reason to assume that the experiment as such suffered 
from this difference in calculations.
7.3 Dordrecht
7.3.1 Introduction
The city of Dordrecht is a part of the Randstad -  the conurbation in the western part of the 
Netherlands. Dordrecht is one of the oldest cities in the Netherlands: it received its city 
charter in 1220. Nowadays, the city has about 118,000 inhabitants. It is located 20 kilometres 
to the south-east of Rotterdam and is just a couple of kilometres east of the largest Dutch 
railway yard, called Kijfhoek.
As Rotterdam has the biggest port in the EU and a large industrial area, a huge 
transport flow of hazardous materials is generated. Following the opening of the Betuwe line, 
Dordrecht no longer has to deal with all the transport of hazardous materials. However, in 
2007 there was still a significant transport flow from Rotterdam through Dordrecht to 
Belgium and Germany. The flow in that year comprised: 13,150 wagons of category A 
materials, 2050 wagons of category B2 materials, 18,550 wagons of category C3 materials, 
3550 wagons of category D3 materials and 1300 wagons of category D4 materials (ProRail, 
2008). These transports created risks that exceeded the orientation value for GR by more than
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a factor of ten and, as such, generated a serious problem for urban development.
7.3.2 Risk problems in Dordrecht
In 2004, extensive research was performed by TNO to monitor the risks in the Dordrecht- 
Zwijndrecht34 rail area. The study showed that risks for this area are too high (see table 20).
Table 20: Exceedance factor of the GR orientation value for a number of kilometres of 
rail track (Adopted from TNO, 2004)
Factor exceeding the 
orientation value
Present Future
situation situation
_____________________________ (2004)_________ (2010)
Zwijndrecht
Kilometre 1 19 15
Kilometre 2 2 3
Kilometre 3 0.7 2
Kilometre 4 0 3
Kilometre 5 0 5
Dordrecht
Kilometre 9 19 17
Kilometre 10 6 3
The differences between the present and the future situations result from the different urban 
development scenarios and the different transport scenarios. The present situation is based on 
transport figures from 1998, and the future situation on estimates for 2010. Table 20 shows 
that the risks in Dordrecht will be lower in 2010 compared to 2004. Unfortunately, the 
transport figures for 2004 were in reality already significantly higher than those used in 2004 
by TNO for the year 2010 (compare TNO (2004) with ProRail (2006)).
In Dordrecht, the Draft Structure Vision Dordrecht 2020 (Ontwerp Structuurvisie 
Dordrecht 2020) and the accompanying strategic environmental assessment (SEA) provide 
the urban development framework for the period up to the year 2020  -  the year in which 
Dordrecht celebrates its 800th anniversary. The Structure Vision acts as an ‘inspiration’ 
document to show the ambitions of Dordrecht and, as such, does not have a legal status.
In this document, Dordrecht acknowledges the existence of a risk problem in its rail 
area. Problems are referred to as ‘bottlenecks’. The city mentions a number of possible 
improvements, namely a shift from rail to water transport, a ban on the transport of LPGs in 
combination with flammable liquids, lower maximum speed of rail transport passing the city, 
the improvement of rail signals and a better urban design (Dordrecht, 2008a, p. 36). The city 
aims to reduce risks to a maximum of four times the orientation value (Dordrecht, 2008a, p. 
68).
Apart from the risk problems (safety), the SEA shows that air quality and noise are 
other environmental challenges for the urban development of Dordrecht. Therefore, ‘careful 
considerations’ should be made if locations in the city are to be developed/redeveloped 
(Dordrecht, 2008b). Moreover, the SEA concluded that intensifying the urban areas could
34 Zwijndrecht is a smaller city that lies to the west of Dordrecht directly across the Oude Maas river.
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lead to a higher environmental strain. In this respect, external safety is an important aspect of 
almost every development due to many different risk sources.35
7.3.3 Projects in Dordrecht: the Maasterras/Weeskinderdijk project
The greater Dordrecht region (Drechtsteden) has over 300,000 inhabitants and forms the 
gateway to Rotterdam when it comes to transporting goods from the port of Rotterdam to the 
hinterland of Europe. As such, Drechtsteden and the Rotterdam city region would both benefit 
from ‘sustainable and safe access to the main port [Port of Rotterdam] by rail’ (Stuurgroep 
Deltapoort, 2008). The area between Rotterdam and Dordrecht is also called the Delta 
Gateway (Deltapoort). This area ‘scores below average’ compared to the rest of the Randstad 
on socio-economic indicators and has a less attractive living environment (Ministerie van 
VROM, 2008).
To create a more attractive living environment, the authorities of Dordrecht and 
Zwijndrecht formulated the Maasterras Master Plan at the beginning of 2004. The project is a 
joint initiative of Dordrecht and its smaller neighbour Zwijndrecht to redevelop their rail 
zones. The Maasterras project can be used to illustrate the problems with respect to external 
safety and urban development that play a role in Dordrecht.The master plan initially stated (in 
2004) that about 200,000 m2 of office space, 75,000 m2 of business space, 28,000 m2 of retail 
space and about 1400 houses should be created over a period of 25 to 30 years. The total area 
is over 200 hectares (nearly 500 acres). Later, in 2007, these numbers were reduced to 
160,000 m2 of office space, 32,000 m2 of business space, 10,000 m2 of office space and 1800 
houses (Dordrecht et al., 2007). In the gaming simulation, we took a closer look at the 
Dordrecht part of the Maasterras project -  more specifically, the Weeskinderdijk project. This 
is the circled area in figure 48.
Figure 48: Artist’s impression of the Maasterras area for Zwijndrecht (left) and 
Dordrecht (right). The Weeskinderdijk area is circled.
35 Dordrecht also faces risks arising from road and waterway transport and industrial plants.
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In 2006, a building programme was formulated including plans to implement the project in 
the coming years. In early 2007, the city councils of Zwijndrecht and Dordrecht approved the 
building programme for the Maasterras project on condition that additional environmental 
investigations were carried out into air quality, noise and safety (Dordrecht et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, an ‘indicative programme’ has been formulated for this area. The programme 
states that room for 608 houses, 38,700 m2 of office space and 5,110 m2 of shopping space 
has been reserved (Khandekar, 2006). In it, a plan was presented for the design of the area, 
which is shown in figures 49 and 50. Note that the dark buildings in figure 49 are housing 
projects and that the lighter buildings are intended for office space. The striped buildings will 
have mixed functions.
Figures 49 and 50: Two artist’s impressions of the Weeskinderdijk area
The total area is about 9 ha. Due to its shape (approx. 300 m x 300 m), an area of 3 ha (the 
area that is beyond 200 metres from the railway) is less susceptible to the BLEVE scenario.
Due to the high exceedance of the orientation value as presented in table 20, the city of 
Dordrecht has major problems where urban redevelopment is concerned. In other words, there 
is a deadlock in the planning process. Therefore, the representatives of the city were eager to 
participate in the simulation to investigate whether the adapted institutional framework 
produces a solution to their deadlock.
7.3.4 Preparing the Dordrecht gaming simulation
The gaming simulation of decision making on this project was held in Dordrecht on 17 March 
2009. The preparation for this simulation differed from that for the simulation in Roosendaal. 
Firstly, the participating researchers from TNO were familiar with Dordrecht, as they had 
thoroughly investigated this city in 2004. Therefore, less preparatory work was required with 
respect to modelling the risks. Secondly, the contact persons in Dordrecht indicated that they 
did not have much contact with external parties such as rail operators or real estate 
developers, and that they therefore wanted civil servants from Dordrecht and from the city of 
Zwijndrecht to participate in the simulation. Ultimately, only officials from the local 
authorities attended, as this was apparently the usual way of preparing major urban 
development projects in Dordrecht. In this respect, the city of Dordrecht applies a more 
classic planning approach in which the city is the key planner and developer, whereas the city
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of Roosendaal uses a more public-private interactive approach in which private partners are 
the key developer. As close resemblance to the normal urban planning practice was desired 
for the research purposes, the request from Dordrecht was not considered as a problem, 
although it was not in accordance to the initial research plan. Also, the contact persons in 
Dordrecht offered to invite the additional participants themselves. Unfortunately, of the eight 
people who had been invited and who had confirmed their participation, three dropped out 
shortly before the gaming simulation session. Consequently, the simulation was postponed for 
three weeks. In the end, however, there were still four cancellations. The practical 
consequence of this was that instead of dividing the four participants into two groups in the 
first round of the gaming simulation, we kept them together as one group, creating a plenary 
session during this simulation.
There were also some other changes in the set-up of the gaming simulation session 
compared to the one for Roosendaal. Apart from the plenary nature, the main difference was 
that we used the information provided in the documents to prepare three alternative urban 
plans as a back-up in case the smaller group generated less discussion. In that case we would 
be able to demonstrate how different urban plans might affect the risks in that area. One plan 
was based on the provided information and artist’s impressions; another plan was based on 
the indicative programme but with a high density of housing in the area beyond the 200  metre 
border; the final plan was a plan in which the office space and housing are equally 
concentrated in the area.
The original idea was to have the participants discuss the features, limitations and 
possibilities of the area in the same way as in Roosendaal. In deviation of that intention we 
decided, using the elaborated model of the risks, to present the participants also the outcome 
of calculations of what we considered to be different variants of the three main plans. These 
variants were elaborated and modelled in advance (see for more details section 7.3.6). The 
reason for giving this input was on the one hand to keep the participants’ attention while one 
of the TNO researchers modelled the ideas resulting from the debate. On the other hand, it 
intended to generate more information and to enrich the process of decision making, since we 
had learned from the Roosendaal simulation that the participants were eager to learn more 
with respect to their original plans.
7.3.5 Gaming simulation in Dordrecht: round 1
The plenary discussion mainly concerned a new version of the 2004 plan. During the 
discussion, the participants made clear that the plan was in an advanced stage of planning. It 
was mentioned that the area should be used very intensively due to the high costs of land 
procurement and soil decontamination. Therefore, the building programme should be more 
intensive than the initial plan from 2004. To do so, the planned office space was expanded to 
a maximum of 100,000 m2, including 40,000 m2 for an ‘administrative cluster’ (i.e. new 
council offices). The area should become the business heart of the city. The number of 
planned dwellings increased to 850, around 750 of which would be apartments. Other options 
were mentioned (e.g. a school for technical and vocational training, and a multi-screen 
cinema), but were not taken very seriously due to their relatively high costs and lower 
financial benefits. The plan also included parking spaces and some smaller shops. Other 
differences between these proposals and the 2004 plan are that a central overpass road from 
Zwijndrecht to Dordrecht in the present situation would be maintained and that the buildings 
would be raised from street level to the level of this road in order to generate more efficient 
land use.
Due to these high demands, several blocks of houses and offices were necessary for 
higher investment returns. In addition, the height of the original blocks from the 2004 plan
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was increased. Other features involved a large tower from the 2004 plan and two other 
buildings beside the railway tracks.
The participants eventually concluded that the basic lay-out provided in the 2004 plan should 
be implemented. The Weeskinderdijk area was divided into four areas, each with its own 
specific value for office space or housing. We assessed the average number of people present 
in these areas in discussion with the participants and in accordance with the rules for the 
URBIS EV model. They are summarised in table 21.
Table 21: Agreed area specification after round 1
Specification Number of people
Area 1 50,000m2 of office space 2000
Area 2 750 apartments 1275
Area 3 35,000m2 of office space 1400
Area 4 100 houses 240
We then presented the situation as it is today and four scenarios for the 2004 plan. Scenario 1 
involved the 2004 plan as presented above. In scenario 2, we focused on the risks in case all 
offices were built in the area up to 200 metres from the rail tracks and the houses were built in 
the 100 metres beyond this area (these specifications were used in the 2004 plan). Scenario 3 
was the same as scenario 2 , but instead of using the blocks from the original plan, we used an 
average density for the first 200 metres. Scenario 4 was the same as scenario 1, but without 
the tower directly beside the railway and instead located this tower beyond 200 metres from 
the tracks. The PLL for the original situation and the four scenarios was:
- Original situation: 3.2*10-4
- Scenario 1: 3.89*10-4
- Scenario 2: 3.45*10-4
- Scenario 3: 3.52*10-4
- Scenario 4: 3.67*10-4
In other words, all four scenarios showed an increase in risks and as such violate the stand­
still principle. The figures also indicate that building in lower densities near the railway or 
further away from the railway can lower risks. The fN curves are presented in figure 51.
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Figure 51: Five fN curves corresponding to different situations in Dordrecht
7.3.6 Gaming simulation in Dordrecht: round 2
After the fN curves were presented, the risks concerning the plan just discussed by the 
participants (the ‘new plan’) were presented. The intensified building near the railway did 
show an increased risk compared to the 2004 plan: instead of a PLL as found in scenario 1 of 
3.89*10-4, the new plan showed a risk of 4.1*10-4.
After these figures were presented, we asked the participants to discuss risk-mitigating 
measures that could be implemented to reduce risks. They proposed a number of possible 
measures:
- Enhanced version of ATB.
- Other train arrangements (i.e. remove other flammable liquids from trains carrying 
LPGs).
- Create gutters for rapid drainage of flammable liquids.
- Alternative building scenarios (comparable to the earlier mentioned scenarios 1, 2 and 
4).
- Switch removal.
- Hot-box detection.
- Reduce the maximum speed on the railway in the city centre.
- Improve people’s preparedness by constructing escape routes.
It was mentioned that some of these measures could not be modelled in the present models. 
Apart from this disadvantage, we explained that it is also difficult to gain insight into the costs
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of a number of these measures. Moreover, on investigating measures to increase 
infrastructural safety, we found that ProRail had already installed or was planning to install 
the enhanced version of ATB at all important switches, something which the participants were 
unaware of. Hence, we explained to the participants that there were three possible risk- 
mitigating measures:
- Hot-box detection (€450,000)
- Removing switches (€2,000,000)
- Different area planning or building densities.
The calculations then showed that the implementation of hot-box detection or the removal of 
the switches would reduce the risks in the original plan (scenario 1) from 3.89*10"4 to 
3.11*10-4 or 2.33*10-4, respectively. Thus, if the representatives were willing to invest in 
reducing risks and apply these measures, they are expected to compensate for the increase in 
risks to a level lower than provided for by the stand-still principle for the original situation 
(3.2*10-4).
One of the participants stated that he is used to working this way ‘secretly’. 
Moreover, he stated that ‘we already think in the way that you do’. However, the participants 
claimed that they do not have ‘a foundation in figures’. One participant argued that this is not 
common thinking in the field of external safety and that the other participant was ‘the only 
one who thinks like that’. The fact that these measures reduce the risk to lower levels than in 
the original situation is nevertheless ‘a new result’. Moreover, €450,000 is ‘a lot cheaper than 
leaving hectares unused’. A great advantage according to the participants was that numerical 
insight is created into how to reduce risks. The participants called this insight and the relative 
use of GR calculations ‘attractive’.
After generating these results, we presented the participants with information 
regarding the cost-effectiveness of hot-box detection and switch removal for the original plan. 
The results of the calculation are given in table 22.
Table 22: Hot-box and switch removal modelled for their cost-effectiveness
Hot-box detection Switch removal
C = €450,000 
r = 0.025 
P = 0.01 
t = 15 years 
a = €2,000,000 
AE(N) = (3.89*10'4 - 3.11*10'4)
C = €2,000,000 
r = 0.025 
P = 0.01 
t = 12 years 
a = €2,000,000 
AE(N) = (3.89*10-4 -  2.33*10-4)
„ 450000 
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R= 2.3 R= 7.7
When confronted with these figures and knowing that a lower R, implies higher cost- 
effectiveness, the participants responded enthusiastically. They were particularly interested in 
the effect of mitigating measures and how the results were presented: ‘This is interesting’ and 
‘The presentation of the result really adds to the discussion’.
At their request, we provided results for the new situation. We showed the participants 
the effect that implementing hot-box detection and removing switches would have on the
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calculated risks. As shown in table 23 and figures 52 and 53, the risks are reduced to nearly 
the original situation with hot-box detection only. Switch removal would drastically reduce 
the risks. We also asked the participants if they wanted to move the tower beyond the 200 
metre area. They all answered affirmatively, but stated that this should not increase the costs 
of the project (this cost aspect is not taken into further account). The result of this is shown in 
table 23.
Table 23: Influence of mitigating measures on the new plan
PLL New situation Original situation
Hot-box 3.28*10
Switch removal 2.43*10
Moving tower 3.85*10
Hot-box + moving 3.08*10
tower
4.1*10'4 3.2*10“
-4
-4
-4
-4
Figures 52 and 53: fN Curves for the new plan with hot-box detection and removal of 
the tower
The discussion then focused on the presentation of the information. It was noted that at 
present most analyses and decision making is based on ‘gut feelings’, and that the presented 
results are ‘brand new’ and have ‘an added value to the policy choice and effort’. Moreover, 
the participants agreed that these appraisals should be made at the start of the process rather 
than at the end, stating that urban developers should take these types of input as a parameter 
for designing plans. Also, ‘the speed and simplicity of this calculation method could make an 
important contribution’. Finally, it was stated that ‘this numerical approach could help give 
feedback to the mayor and aldermen’.
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TNO’s area-specific GR feature in URBIS EV was also mentioned as an interesting asset for 
decision making, as the participants felt it was easier for urban planners to use than the fN 
curve and the PLL, due to the colours this feature uses to accentuate areas in the city with a 
higher cumulative contribution to the GR.36
One of the participants asked to what extent our adapted institutional framework is 
different from the present situation, as this ‘story is a completely logical one’. An interesting 
discussion started, in which the other participants reacted to the participant who had made this 
comment. Moreover, it was explained that in cases where the risks are too high, a local 
authority normally cannot build and that the quantification of effects and costs of mitigating 
measures was new. The same person replied that ‘this means that the Maasterras project can 
be built without the adaptations from the basic network’. This was followed by: ‘In that case, 
the flag can be raised today.’
7.3.7 Evaluation of Dordrecht
To ensure a full response to the evaluation, we handed out the evaluation forms directly after 
the simulation. The evaluations showed that the relative use of GR was found to be very 
useful (evaluation question 1): ‘This emphasises the use of risk-mitigating measures’, ‘makes 
it easier to compare options’, ‘insightful and adds up to (...) good practice’.
According to the respondents, risk calculations as a decision-support tool ‘create 
insight into the effects of different measures. It creates more support for [reducing] risks as a 
design task’. And (evaluation question 2): ‘The usefulness is that this creates insight into the 
effects of different measures. This is useful in the planning process.’
Using the stand-still principle instead of the orientation value for GR (question 3) was 
supported by all respondents: ‘The only way to decide on spatial plans’, ‘that’s the right 
choice to make’, ‘very practical’ and ‘much better’.
The idea that transport is less dominant in the appraisal of the plans was found very 
useful (evaluation question 4). ‘It [transport] does not really make a difference’ and ‘makes 
the influence of the urban plan more clear’, although ‘transport will always be important, only 
much less so in the proposed way’.
Evaluation questions 5 and 6 (about the use of cost-effectiveness model) were both 
answered very positively by all respondents. The respondents stated that ‘the effects and the 
costs were made clear and insightful and that both are important for decision making’. 
Moreover, it ‘enables insight into the choice of an option’.
Of the participants, three gave different answers (and one did not respond) to the 
question whether they were less dependent on information provided by other actors 
(evaluation question 7). One respondent replied affirmatively, one stated that a number of 
quantified measures still depend on the rail infrastructure manager and the third said that he 
had not yet experienced such a dependency. Therefore, a good conclusion cannot be drawn 
from the answers to this question.
Evaluation question 8 (referring to what the participants thought about the process), 
however, created a much clearer picture. The respondents stated that this process ‘helped to 
get clarity fast’, ‘it was good that we could discuss the results of the calculations, their 
explanation and the presentation together. Also for non-experts, this makes clear what the 
effects are’ and ‘this helps to make the narrative explainable’.
36 Nevertheless, one participant said that the norm ratio of the fN curve and the orientation value were also 
important as this ratio shows in which situation the norm exceedance is the highest. However, I did not want to 
take this into account due to the nature of this research, in which the orientation value is no longer taken into 
account as the risks are calculated in relative rather than absolute terms. The area-specific GR can also be of use 
here as it shows which areas have a greater influence on the GR.
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According to the respondents (evaluation question 9), the difference between this way of 
approaching risks and the current approach is that ‘some of the decisions are now taken on gut 
feeling’. This process ‘helps (...) and most of the time the basic assumptions for the plans are 
imposed. This always leads to discussions and little support. In this case, there is more 
insight, [which leads to] more support [which in turn leads to] more enthusiasm to launch 
alternative plans.’
All the respondents mentioned advantages of the adapted rules of the game (evaluation 
question 10). ‘Things are now possible that previously were not’, ‘plans become easier to 
carry out’, ‘the focus is now on measures instead of on exceeding [the norm]’ and ‘the 
Maasterras project appears to be feasible: the costs have been made more transparent and can 
be balanced’.
When asked whether the participants had any final remarks (evaluation question 11), 
two comments were made. The suggestions were to include other pictures instead of only the 
fN curve and -  as had been mentioned during the discussion -  that not only the PLL should be 
presented but also the factor by which it exceeds the GR norm should be shown.
7.3.8 Concluding the Dordrecht gaming simulation
Some concluding remarks can be made concerning the Dordrecht simulation. First, it showed 
that in this case too, the approach based on the adapted institutional framework seem to have a 
positive effect on the dynamics within and outcome of the debate. With this in mind, it can be 
argued that also in this case the three secondary goals mentioned in Chapter 7 are met.
Some critical comments about this simulation should be made too. As stated earlier, 
the gaming was postponed due to three cancellations, but when it was eventually performed, 
there were four cancellations. This made the group smaller than in Roosendaal, which forced 
to change the initial format of having two groups that discussed each other’s plans into 
holding a plenary discussion. Clearly, this generated less input into the discussion and the 
plans than it did in Roosendaal. Moreover, the group of participants was clearly biased by a 
municipal civil servants perspective. No direct interaction/debate with Prorail or developers 
was realised. Only indirectly, data from these organizations were used.
7.4 Conclusion and reflection
Based on these two gaming simulations, it is now possible to identify the differences and 
similarities between the findings in the two simulations and the extent to which the findings 
are in accordance with the indicators formulated in chapter 7. The indicators are addressed 
and discussed separately below.
I f  risks increase, they can be reduced to the original situation
It was found in both deadlock situations that by theoretically taking certain measures, the 
risks could be reduced to lower levels than in the original situation. The city of Roosendaal 
needed to implement three risk-mitigating measures to reduce risks to the original situation. 
The situation in Roosendaal appeared to be more complex than that in Dordrecht. Still, even 
in this difficult situation, it was possible to reduce risks without taking the most costly risk- 
reduction measure, namely the removal of the level crossing. In Dordrecht it proved easier to 
reduce risks. Basically, here the approach based on a smart redesign of the area was followed, 
combined with one risk-mitigating measure concerning the rail infrastructure: the 
implementation of hot-box detection. It shows that the approach followed in the gaming was 
contributing to a sense of solution for the deadlock.
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Redevelopment o f an urban area will not increase risks
In the case of both Roosendaal and Dordrecht, a significant increase in risks was proven to be 
very likely as a result of the initial plans for urban development. Both cities are nevertheless 
eager to redevelop their urban territory. However, based on a combination of measures, risks 
were reduced compared to the initial plans, and it appeared possible to adhere to the stand-still 
principle. Therefore, our findings suggest that when a smart and pro-active approach is 
chosen, the redevelopment of the urban areas does not necessarily increase risks if 
suggestions to mitigate those risks are taken serious.
Local authorities have a possibility to redevelop their territory
The results for the two cases differ: it will be more difficult for Roosendaal than for Dordrecht 
to mitigate risks. This difference can be explained by the fact that the two areas are different 
in size. It appeared easier to reduce risks in Dordrecht, because the development area is much 
larger and a significant number of the buildings can be built further away from the railway. 
This difference is also partly due to the aspirations of the city of Roosendaal, which wants to 
significantly increase the built environment while the area under consideration is small and 
located directly adjacent to the railway. In the end, however, both cities appear to be able to 
redevelop a part of their urban area.
Modelling risk at the site gives the participants insight into their aspirations 
The participants were very interested in the way we organised and presented the discussion. 
They stated that the gaming simulation and the application of the described principles and 
support tools created a simple and clear setting in which the effects of urban plans could be 
assessed at an early stage of decision making, and thus be taken into account before the plans 
were finalised. Moreover, the participants in Dordrecht stated that they usually base their risk- 
related ideas on gut feelings. The presentation of the results provided them with extra insight 
into their actions and information to share with responsible politicians. This contributes to the 
need for a better informed decision making.
Participants use the cost-effectiveness model as extra input in reaching a decision, and value 
this as useful
In the Roosendaal gaming simulation, it was not possible to compare the measures separately 
on their reasonability. Nevertheless, the respondents stated that they were optimistic about the 
potential use of the cost-effectiveness model. In the Dordrecht case, the cost-effectiveness 
model helped to gain insight into the consequences of various measures and to reach 
consensus more easily. Also the participants stated that it helped to gain insight into which 
option was most cost-effective and as such seems more reasonable to take.
Participants reach a decision on what they want to create
In both cases, the participants agreed on the urban plans they preferred to be developed and on 
the related risk-reduction measures that should be taken in that context. The fact that the 
urban plans in Dordrecht were strongly inspired by previous plans contributed to the 
agreement on the results. The participants in Roosendaal were more open to other plans.
The participants understand what their aspirations mean for the level o f risk 
The participants stated that the way in which we presented the effects of their plans was a 
useful way of gaining insight into and understanding of their aspirations. In the case of 
Roosendaal, the increased insights into the consequences of the local authorities’ plans 
created confusion among the participants; nevertheless, they learned more about the effects of 
their plans on risk.
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The participants are able to explain their plans to the residents o f their city 
Especially the participants in Roosendaal clearly noted that the plans could more easily be 
accounted for vis-à-vis the city’s residents. In Dordrecht, the participants mentioned that the 
approach made it easier to explain the plans and the associated risks to residents and other 
parties, including the mayor and alderman.
The participants take responsibility for the urban development and risk-reduction plans 
In both cases, the participants stated that they were willing to take risk-reduction measures in 
order to be able to implement their projects. This -  and the fact that they were able to account 
for the risks they cause and mitigate -  implies that they are willing to take responsibility for 
the urban development project.
There are of course also critical notes to be made concerning the execution of the gaming 
simulation. In particular two are mentioned. Firstly, the number of participants was limited 
due to the difficulty of getting various people from various organisations in the same room. 
Especially in the Dordrecht simulation, it appeared to be difficult to get everyone in the same 
room at the same time. Secondly, the diversity of backgrounds was limited. ProRail did not 
participate directly in either of the two simulations and in the Dordrecht simulation there were 
no real-estate developers present.
Ideally, representatives of all organisations should be present. In this research, the 
problems caused by this lack of cooperation were reduced by the information provided on the 
technical-infrastructural aspects, especially the costs of safety measures in that field by 
interviewing ProRail employees. Moreover, local authorities are considered the very key 
players in this planning process, given their responsibility for the urban building programmes.
Given these findings, it can be concluded that the two gamings suggest that in these 
cases the adapted institutional framework, respectively the elaboration of it into an approach 
for organising and supporting a (decision orientated) debate among stakeholders, indeed 
contributes to an improved decision making process on risks. In both cases, all three 
secondary goals were achieved: it appears to be possible to have a larger building capacity, 
combined with better informed decision-makers who have a better understanding of the risks 
caused by their ambitions and plans.
Although the ALARP principle was not systematically addressed due to the fact that 
the cost-effectiveness model was only applied in the Dordrecht simulation, it can be said that 
all four principles did seem to play an important role. The application of these principles as 
rules of the game contributed to safer plans with more consensus than in the original situation, 
characterised as a deadlock.
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Chapter 8: 
Conclusion and discussion
8.1 Conclusions
8.1.1 Back to the aim of this study
The aim of this study was to evaluate the present practice of urban development in relation to 
the risks resulting from the rail transport of hazardous materials and to suggest possible 
improvements to the institutional framework that guides the related planning and decision 
making processes. I formulated the following research question:
What is the nature o f problems concerning the transport o f hazardous materials by 
rail in relation to urban planning in the Netherlands, what causes these problems and 
can adapting the present institutional framework solve these problems?
This central question was broken down into five sub-questions:
1) Which institutions influence transport related risks, risk management and urban 
planning in the Netherlands?
2) What problems can be identified in the present situation?
3) What are the challenges we face in order to achieve better risk management?
4) Is it a potential solution to modify the institutional framework and, if so, according to 
which principles?
5) What is the potential influence of this adapted framework in practice?
The conclusions with regard to these sub-questions will be summarised subsequently.
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8.1.2 Answering the sub-questions
Question 1: Which institutions influence transport related risks, risk management and urban 
planning?
Within the research domain of this study, different interests and responsibilities appear to be a 
source of conflict. Local authorities are expected to redevelop urban areas in order to improve 
the urban living and economic environment. Rail transport operating companies provide 
services for the (inter)national transportation of hazardous materials. The rail infrastructure 
management organisation maintains rail tracks and allocates rail capacity slots. These tasks 
are all institutionalised in separate organisations and regulatory systems that have been 
developed and tend to operate separately from each other.
From a financial perspective, the possibilities for (re)developing the local urban area is 
of importance for the municipalities. In developing these areas, the municipalties have to 
follow the planning procedures as prescribed in spatial planning and environmental law. Both 
the municipal interests and the planning procedures imply a very strong focus on the local 
details. In contrast, the infrastructure manager is typically focused on the quality of the 
national railway network, following technical and safety regulations. Transport companies 
operate in the context of a free market economy which, in the case of freight transport, is 
represented by the European Union principle of free movement of goods. Due to this 
principle, limiting the volume of transport flows on a specific rail track somewhere in the 
international network is generally rather difficult, since the principle of the free movement of 
goods is one of the key institutions for a free market. Moreover, a free market economy 
creates a supply and demand interaction, which can differ considerably over time.
The linking pin between all these institutionally embedded interests and 
responsibilities is the requirement according to the present external safety policy to comply 
with basically two environmental quality standards: the individual risk (IR) norm and the 
group risk (GR) norm. The IR norm has a limiting value of 10-6 per year. This means that a 
person residing in a certain area may have a maximum risk of dying as a result of an accident 
involving hazardous materials of once every million years. The GR norm indicates the 
maximum permitted risk of a group of people dying due to a disaster. The GR norm is less 
stringent, as it has an orientation value that needs to be taken into account.
Question 2: What problems can be identified in the present situation?
The cases discussed in this dissertation (both in chapter 3 and 7) deal with (severe) limitations 
with urban development resulting from high risks exceeding the norms, either due to transport 
and future growth of this transport or due to an increased population near the railway as a 
result of the building plans. Risk calculation models therefore play a significant role. The 
impression received from the case analysis in this study is that uncertainty in transport 
scenarios triggers selectivity in the use of such scenarios, biased in favour of the local 
interests. Here we observe a mismatch between the analytical assessment approach that 
assume the availability of reliable data on flows, probability of incidents and the effects of 
incidents, whereas in practice these are subject of debate on cause and effect relations, of 
uncertainty and of diverging interpretations.
Six categories of problems in the present situation were identified:
1) Problems related to the use of risk norms 
Safety standards constitute a major focus point and decision criterion in decision making on 
urban development in urban areas adjacent to railroads. The present consequence of 
exceeding norms is that the possibilities for urban development are severely limited. The 
norms for risks are difficult to interpret and to control in practice. The GR norm is particularly
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debatable: it is often exceeded in practice, and the only way to prevent this is by making 
arrangements between the stakeholders, focusing on taking measures regarding the 
infrastructure and/or the urban development plan.
2) Problems related to the modelling o f risks
There is a strong relationship between the first problem and this one. It is difficult in practice 
to understand how risks are calculated and how these figures should be interpreted. This 
problem results from what several experts called the ‘black box’ nature of the modelling of 
risks, the use of the calculated risks and the use of the model in the policy practice. There is 
debate in practice about which parameters should be used to calculate risks and how various 
parameters influence the calculated risk. Moreover, there is uncertainty on the probability and 
the effect of disasters and how these statistical figures are realised and evaluated.
3) Problems related to unclear transport flows and transport volumes
This is a big problem in combination with how risks are modelled. Risk calculations depend 
largely on data about how much material is transported. Forecasts, however, are experienced 
as being unreliable and actual data are often not available or are not up to date. These 
transport figures differ significantly from year to year which has a direct consequence for the 
calculated risk at a certain spot. Due to these big differences, in practice it appears impossible 
for local authorities to rely on these forecasts to plan their urban territory either due to the 
unreliability of the forecasts or due to the high increase of forecasted transports.
4) Problems related to governance issues
Local authorities seem to be unwilling to take responsibility for any risk increase resulting 
from their decisions. They also seem to have insufficient understanding of the risks they cause 
when they want to develop near railways. Hence, decisions are too often taken on gut feelings 
rather than a thorough understanding of the risks. On the other hand, the national authorities 
put too little effort into harmonising the institutions (rules of the game) to bridge the gap 
between the described interests and responsibilities in a broader, more workable, way than the 
mere disputable risk standards. In the past decade, the management of risk at the national 
level has been dominanted by infrastructural solutions such as the introduction of the basic 
network concept or the construction of a new railway, the Betuwe line.
5) Problems related to conflicting interests
This category has a strong link with problem category four. Different actors have different 
interests; local authorities wish to (re)develop urban areas because they benefit from the 
revenues, rail operator Prorail and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management wish to have a healthy transport system and transport operating companies wish 
to maximize transport and profit. Both aspect influence risks; more urban development 
increases the potential effect of a disaster, whereas more transport increases the possibility on 
a disaster. The conflicts tend to be strengthened by the way in which the different policy 
fields are institutionalised and due to intensifying transport flows and the more generally felt 
desire of cities to intensify building programmes in the heart of the urban area. This again is 
strengthened by the lack of a transparent and firm attempt at the national level to harmonise 
the different institutional frameworks the stakeholders primarily have to deal with.
6) Problems related to risk perception
A negative perception is easily created. Near misses, for example, receive a great deal of
media attention and experts seem to find it difficult communicating about risks to politicians
and to the public. No good strategy exists to create positive attention to how risks are reduced.
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Therefore, good risk communication to the public and to politicians and decision-makers is 
crucial. A clear understanding of risks is therefore necessary.
In today’s practice, understanding the real ins and outs of external safety in local 
situations suffers from the problems described above. Consequently, risk understanding 
suffers from many uncertainties and misinterpretations. This leads to a situation in which 
nobody tends to take full responsibility, thus creating a decision-making vacuum in which the 
cases are eventually ‘resolved’ by focusing heavily on the risk calculations37. Even when the 
outcome of the calculations does not reflect the intentions or view of the decision makers and 
contrast with the assumptions underlying the developed plans, decisions are still in favour of 
plan implementation. In that context, the local authorities tend to make maximum use of the 
degrees of freedom with respect to the interpretation of the GR data in interaction with the 
orientation value of the GR criterion.
These results lead to believe that external safety issues are much more complex and 
uncertain (and in certain respects also ambiguous) than that they are presented and conceived 
in the policy making debate. This is attributable to the interaction between the top-down 
prescribed risk calculation approach, the ‘simple’ norm setting and the focus on norm 
compliance, the lack of a structured elaboration of a precautionary risk management approach 
and the ambiguity in position and responsibility of the local (municipal) level in interaction 
with the authorities at the national level. In sum: various institutional rules or principles seem 
to contribute to increasing uncertainty and complexity.
Question 3: What are the challenges we are faced with to come to a better risk management? 
Fuzziness in itself is not something that can be solved, but it can be coped with by adjusting 
the institutional framework for decision making, risk management and risk analysis. The 
identified problems resulted in three related challenges. The challenges were interpreted and 
formulated as goals for further research. The first goal was to elaborate a new perspective for 
risk management, which is based on a perspective of local circumstantial decision-making 
instead of the archetypical basis of risk management, based on standard setting. The 
background is that there are two archetypical ways to manage external or manufactured risks: 
setting standards and decision-making based on circumstantial trade-offs. The basic difference 
concerning these two approaches is how these approaches refer to acceptable risks. The 
second goal was to solve the existing imbalance between policies in the field of freight 
transport, external safety and urban planning. Due to this imbalance, the outcome of risk 
models and the different transport forecasts are contested as invalid or incorrect, while at the 
same time the GR norm is exceeded in many cases. The third goal is to support the local 
authorities concerned to take better responsibility for the risk they cause through urban 
development near railways.
Question 4: Is it a potential solution to modify the existing institutional framework and, i f  so, 
according to which principles?
In the context of the first abovementioned goal, the elaboration of a new perspective for risk 
management, this study argued that institutional redesign offers an attractive perspective 
Based on theoretical considerations and the results of the extensive problem exploration, an 
adapted institutional framework to deal with external safety was therefore proposed. This 
adapted institutional framework consists of four institutional principles that are partly derived 
from environmental policies and are partly derived from already existing, but re-interpreted 
notions on external safety:
37 In an interview with newspaper NRC ( ‘Er is iets grondig mis me het denken over veriligheid\ 27th of January 
2011), the chairman and secretary of the Hazardous Substance Council of the Netherlands confirmed this notion 
in relation to a large fire at a hazardous material storage facillity in Moerdijk, the Netherlands.
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- Risks should be calculated in relative rather than absolute terms.
- A stand-still principle should be implemented for the increase of risks due to urban 
development/redevelopment.
- Increasing safety by risk mitigation should be rewarded by enabling urban 
development.
- Risks should be lowered as far as is reasonably practical (ALARP) supported by a 
model assessing the cost-effectiveness of risk mitigating measures.
These institutional principles are assumed to have a positive impact on the present decision­
making process and as such significantly contribute to the second and third goal. According to 
this framework, local authorities need to work according to the following process:
- If a local authority wishes to develop/redevelop or intensify its territory near a rail 
transport axis, it should make an early judgement on how this will influence the risks 
from the start of the design process in relative terms.
- If the risks increase due to the planned activity, the local authority should reduce the 
risk to the level before the activity was planned and, if necessary, change its 
ambitions.
- To help the local authority assess how to lower these risks, the reasonability ratio of 
risk-mitigating measures can be used to ensure that available budgets are spent well 
and that well-informed safety decisions are taken.
- Both effect and risk-reducing measures can be taken to mitigate risks. It should also be 
possible for a local authority to compensate others for taking risk-mitigating measures.
- If it is impossible to mitigate risks, a project cannot be carried out or should be 
adapted.
Question 5: What is the potential influence o f this adapted framework in practice?
The overall goal of the testing phase was to gain insight into whether the proposed 
institutional framework will, as expected, improve the quality of the decision-making process 
related to urban development plans and risk management. This overall testing goal was 
elaborated in terms of three subgoals. The first subgoal of the test was to investigate whether 
it is possible to build more real estate without increasing the risks or possibly even reducing 
the risks. The second subgoal was to investigate whether the decision-making process itself 
improves with regard to reaching a decision. The third subgoal was to investigate to what 
extent the participants have an improved understanding of the impact of their plans or projects 
on risks. Following relevant policy analysis literature, the test was based on the method of 
gaming simulation applied to two cases (in the cities of Roosendaal and Dordrecht) that at 
that moment could be characterised as deadlock situations.
The results of the simulations in the two cases differ: it will be more difficult for 
Roosendaal than for Dordrecht to mitigate risks. This difference can be explained by the fact 
that the two areas are different in size. It appeared easier to reduce risks in Dordrecht because 
the development area is much larger and a significant number of the buildings can be built 
further away from the railway. This difference is also partly due to the aspirations of the city 
of Roosendaal, which wants to significantly increase the built environment while the area 
under consideration is small and located directly adjacent to the railway. In the end, however, 
both cities at least theoretically appeared to be able to redevelop part of their urban area.
In the Roosendaal gaming simulation, it was not possible to compare the measures 
separately on their reasonability. Nevertheless, the respondents stated that they were 
optimistic about the potential use of the cost-effectiveness model. In the Dordrecht case, the 
model helped to gain insight into the consequences of various measures and to reach
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consensus more easily. The participants stated that it helped them to gain insight into which 
option was most cost-effective and as such more reasonable (and defendable) to take. 
Moreover, the plans could more easily be accounted for and the participants in both cases 
have stated that they felt comfortable to take risk-reduction measures in order to be able to 
carry out their projects.
Based on the notable progress in decision-making in the context of the tests as 
compared to the present situation, it can be concluded that in these cases an approach based 
on the application of the adapted institutional framework seems to lead to an improved 
decision-making process on risks and to a better handling of complexity of decision making. 
The main indicator for this is that all three subgoals were achieved: it appeared possible to 
come up with a more ambitious building programme, combined with compliance to the stand­
still principle and better informed decision makers who have a better understanding of the 
risks caused by their ambitions and plans.
8.2 Discussion and reflection on the methods and the results
In this section, I will reflect on the findings of this study by elaborating on some issues that 
might generate criticism on the elaborated approach: the concept of reasonability, the lack of 
control on the growth of transport, the neglect of risk perception and the interpretation of the 
reaction of the participants of the workshops in the two cases on the approach.
8.2.1 Discussion of the methods used
The problem analysis in the first part of this research is based on literature-oriented research, 
multiple case studies and the consultation of experts based on two GDR brainstorm sessions. 
As such, the results are based on a variety of analyses and consequently can be considered 
relatively robust. The analysis of the impacts of the suggested intervention in the second part 
of this research is based on the application of simulation gaming. There are limitations to the 
robustness of the conclusions from the gaming simulations. As Mayer and Veeneman (2002) 
state, validation of the results of gaming simulations is hard when the results are used 
separately from other methods or approaches. Although I underline the legitimacy of this 
statement, I employed the method because of its great potential to gain an in-depth insight 
into the possible influence of the adapted institutional framework on decision-making 
regarding local urban planning projects. To improve the validity of the results, I performed 
two case studies to see whether the impacts were as anticipated. I do not contest the fact that 
the validity of the conclusions would be higher if more simulations had been performed. Due 
to restrictions in terms of time and financial means, I limited the simulations to two similar 
cases. Important is that these cases showed similar results.
The critical notes concerning the execution of the gaming simulation refer to two 
aspects. Firstly, the number of participants was limited due to the difficulty in a very late 
stage of preparation of having various people participate. Especially in the Dordrecht 
simulation, it appeared to be difficult to get everyone in the same room at the same time. 
Secondly, the diversity of backgrounds was limited. ProRail did not directly participate in 
either of the two simulations and in the Dordrecht simulation there were no real-estate 
developers present. The problems caused by this lack of cooperation were reduced by 
systematic use of the information on the costs and effects of safety measures provided by 
ProRail employees in various interviews. These employees were also asked whether the 
proposed safety measures were possible in the first place. On the other hand, it needs to be 
stressed that local authorities are considered to be the very key players in this planning 
process, given their responsibility for the urban building programmes. This stakeholder
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actively participated in both games. Therefore, although the circumstances of the simulation 
were not ideal, they were considered sufficiently adequate for the goals of this research.
A possible enrichment of the impact study would be to perform several simulations for 
other types of cases. At the moment, for example, we have no insight into what the adapted 
institutional framework would mean for those local authorities, which in the present situation 
have no problems with exceeding the GR norm. According to the proposed institutional 
framework, these local authorities should comply with the same rules so as to reduce risks 
according to the stand-still principle. Compared to the present situation, this might lead to a 
more negative outcome for local authorities, as the stand-still principle is more stringent than 
the justification duty for GR is for situations in which the orientation value is not exceeded.
One of the more important limitations of the performed impact study is that only a 
limited number of risk-reduction measures could be modelled. Therefore, only limited insight 
has so far been created into how such measures can be taken cost-effectively. In order to gain 
more insight into these processes, more effort should be put into making all measures 
quantifiable. Moreover, it is unclear what will happen in cases where there are no potential 
measures left of which the impacts can be quantified in a reliable way.
8.2.2 Participants’ response
The conclusions regarding the impacts of the proposed adapted institutional approach are 
partly (next to the observations by the independent observers) based on the positive feedback 
from the participants in the workshops in both cases. It might be argued that the participants’ 
dominantly positive response to the gaming simulation is more attributable to the use of the 
gaming simulations as such than to the application of the adapted institutional framework. 
The participants may have experienced the gaming simulations as pleasant to participate in 
and as a relaxed (non-political) setting for interactively generating new ideas for area 
development. Another explanation might be that the experts in this field of risk management 
are generally not so much used to the simulation gaming as a tool for analysis. Gaming is 
often applied in the field of social sciences, whereas risk management (as argued) is much 
stronger characterized by the application of classical analytical tools, an approach that is more 
typical for engineering. However, even though there may be several other explanations for the 
positive reflection of the participants on the gaming simulations, this does not necessarily 
undermine the observations made nor the suggested explanation based on the influence of the 
adapted institutional approach. It is simply difficult to distinguish the contributions of these 
different explanations to the overall effect of the applied approach. The close monitoring of 
the process during the gaming simulation does not show a bias towards the idea that, for 
example, the mere fact that the participant got a new perspective on reaching the local 
building ambitions was decisive for their positive reflection on the gaming. Such a conclusion 
would not match the fact that also the rules of the game were intensively debated. However, 
for more strongly separating potential effects from the introduction of gaming techniques 
from the effects of the changes in the rules of the game, more research in the future should be 
performed.
8.2.3 Growth of transport
One criticism of the adapted institutional framework expressed by the participants in the 
gaming simulation in Roosendaal is that it does not set limits to the growth of transport. Also, 
the actors involved in external safety in local practices put a great deal of emphasis on the fact 
that more transport creates more risks. In this debate, they take insufficient account of the fact 
that the transport companies are required to comply with many rules and regulations in order
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to be able to transport hazardous goods. Consequently, the fact that rail transport itself is a 
safe modality receives perhaps insufficient attention in the social debate.
It is important to realise that the total volume of transported materials is subject to 
significant fluctuations, as the free market economy is the driving force behind transport. 
Hence, if the economy grows, transport in general and that of hazardous materials also grows. 
As has been described, it was estimated in late 2003 that the total volume of transported 
hazardous materials will increase annually by between 0.9% and 2.4%, leading to an overall 
increase of between 25% and 80% in 2020 (ProRail, 2003). However, these estimates were 
already revised in 2007 by formulating an expected increase in 2020 of 135% (ProRail, 2007). 
Theoretically speaking, risks may even double from one year to the next, as shown by the 
transport figures for 2003 and 2004 for the Brabant line. The lesson from this source of 
uncertainty is that the free market mechanism might have a much greater influence on the risk 
level than interventions by the Dutch central government. Nevertheless, policy makers seem 
convinced that the volume of transported hazardous materials can be limited or steered to a 
maximum amount, which is illustrated by the present debate on the introduction of the basic 
network approach that is considered to be the final solution to the identified problems. 
However, as argued earlier, international rules on the free transport of goods makes the 
assumption on the maintainability of the basic network approach difficult to guarantee (also 
see section 8.4).38
The burden for solving these macro problems presently lies at local level. However, 
local authorities cannot solve the problems caused by the (inter)national principle of the free 
transport of goods: their only instrument is that of pressure in the media to persuade national 
authorities to pay for more risk-reduction measures. Such macro problems should therefore 
primarily be addressed and preferably also solved at the (inter)national level, and any increase 
in risks that local authorities cause should be solved at their own level (i.e. the local level).
The proposed adapted institutional framework uses the assumption that every actor has 
its own responsibility to control and manage risks. Therefore, increased transport is not 
something that local authorities should feel responsible for, as that is the responsibility of 
other actors. Nevertheless, if they still feel the need to contribute to the debate on this issue, 
there are at least three ways in which the transport problem can be put on the agenda of higher 
authorities. The first is to take the problem to the European Union and claim that the transport 
of goods principle creates significant safety problems in various Dutch cities (and probably 
also in cities in other European countries). However, it is not expected that the EU is very 
receptive for this safety claim, as the free transport of goods principle is one of the core 
principles of the internal European market.
The second way is to use a financial instrument to steer, like pricing or subsidising 
measures to encourage transporters to switch to different modalities. Here, however, there are 
complicating factors. For example, if transport shifts from rail to road, not only will this lead 
to more road traffic and thus to more traffic jams, it is also unclear what the effect of such a 
shift would be on risks elsewhere, as hazardous materials would have to be transported 
through other urban areas in order to reach their destinations. Moreover, road traffic is 
generally less safe than rail traffic. Furthermore, the authorities can only influence 
domestically transported materials; for international transport, transporters are free to choose 
the modality that best fits their purpose. However, if the incentives are large enough, 
transporters might be willing to switch to other modalities, as shown by the examples of the 
chloride and ammonia transport in the Netherlands. Facilitating this for international transport
38 Even the Committee on the Transport of Hazardous Materials (Commissie Vervoer Gevaarlijke Stoffen; 
CTGG) -  a committee consisting of representatives of several transport operating companies and companies that 
produce hazardous materials -  recently expressed their concerns about the feasibility of the assumption of a 
maximum volume of transported hazardous materials (CTGG, 2009).
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would be very difficult, if not impossible. Finally, according to Railcargo (2009), rail 
transport is becoming more popular while other modalities are becoming less popular39.
The final option concerns influencing the agenda on transport infrastructure 
development in favour of the construction of new railway lines in the periphery of urban 
areas. For example, studies have been carried out to explore the potential impact of a 
dedicated freight railway from Rotterdam to Antwerp (Belgium). Unfortunately for the cities 
located on the present route, this railway -  the Robel line, which is comparable to the Dutch 
Betuwe line -  is not regarded as a highly valuable asset to the rail network. This seems rather 
strange from a logistic point of view, as it can be expected that transport will continue to 
increase. Such extra investments in the rail network could help to create more capacity for 
passenger transport on the existing rail network, whilst preventing the need for hazardous 
materials to be transported through city centres, as a new railway could be diverted around 
them and thus reduce the risks to zero.
In the medium term, the view on transport by rail is expected to differ from the present 
view. While in the early 1990s transport by rail was seen as outdated, it has experienced a 
strong growth in the last 15 years (Railcargo, 2007). In fact, ProRail could not meet the 
demand of the Dutch passenger transport company (NS) to give the NS all the required 
passenger train slots (NRC, 2007). Moreover, the construction of the second Maasvlakte (an 
industrial area being built in the North Sea as an extension of the Port of Rotterdam) should 
be finished in 2013. As the Port of Rotterdam is already one of the largest harbours in the 
world and by far the largest in Europe, this will attract even larger ships and even more freight 
(Jacobs, 2007), part of which will be transported on the present rail network40. In particular 
the idea is to use the Betuwe line to its full potential for the Rotterdam-Germany connection. 
It is not unthinkable that the rest of the rail network will not be able to meet the capacity 
needs for both freight or passenger transport if both continue to increase. If this becomes the 
case, constructing the Robel line will have a positive side effect for Dordrecht and Roosendaal 
with respect to safety issues.
Clearly, not every Dutch city has this ‘advantage’, although in principle every railway 
line used for the transport of hazardous materials could be diverted away from cities by 
constructing tracks around them. For all these cities, the added value of new railways would 
be the reduction of risks and noise levels; for a few of them, the new possibilities for urban 
redevelopment would be a bonus. It therefore remains a matter of further analysis whether the 
construction of new tracks would be a cost-effective investment only for the sake of risk 
reduction. Based on the arguments and principles elaborated in this study, I do not think that it 
is necessary to separate transport from urban areas so drastically.
8.2.4 Reasonability
As noted in chapter 6 , one mitigating measure can be more reasonable than another. This is 
basically interpreted in terms of cost-effectiveness, an idea that is embraced by various 
experts (e.g Vrijling et al., 1995; Adler & Posner, 2006). However, I did not find evidence 
that the preferred measures in this research were also cost-effective. It must be mentioned that 
in this study, there were only two real-life examples that could be properly calculated. The (  
factor was used to correct the model’s outcome, because of the involuntariness and because 
there is no direct benefit for people who live or work close to the railway. This correction
39 Road and waterway transport declined by 5.7% and 4.4% respectively, while rail transport for all goods 
increased by 11.6% (Railcargo, 2009).
40 Also, ambitions to become the gas distributor of North-West Europe and the possibility of a hydrogen oriented 
future mean that there are uncertainties with respect to the transport of flammable gases, although it is more 
plausible that the gross quantities will be transported through pipes.
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factor makes the Ri nearly cost-effective. The model also shows that even with a correction 
factor (  with a value of 0 .01 , the cost-effectiveness of measures to reduce risks is difficult to 
achieve.
According to Jongejan (2008), from a utilitarian point of view risk reduction beyond 
the stand-still principle is reasonable only as long as the marginal benefits exceed the 
marginal costs. In contrast, it can be argued that a society or a decision-making process is 
never based on utilitarian ideas alone. Other important factors are, for example, other 
institutions, other perceptions and other financial aspects. In this study I used cost- 
effectiveness as an indicator of ‘reasonability’. The calculations in the example given in 
Chapter 6 and for Dordrecht showed that the preferred measure was not cost-effective. 
Nevertheless, this did not bother the people who attended the simulation in Dordrecht, 
because they felt the costs were quite low and could be used to significantly reduce risks and 
to make the situation in Dordrecht safer. The participants in Roosendaal could not get an 
indicator of the reasonability of each individual measure. Still, even with higher costs than in 
Dordrecht, they were very enthusiastic about being able to build in their urban area again. 
Therefore, in a political arena it is, to a certain degree, not a very large problem when certain 
non cost-effective measures are taken, as long as people value the investment as important. 
This is surely the case in the debates on external safety, e.g. to create a feeling of trust and 
certainty. It can also be argued that in practice risks are already so low that it seems illogical 
to make extra investments in order to reduce these risks. From a political or psychological 
perspective, however, these investments might be very worthwhile. One could perhaps even 
see this as a form of ALARA.
8.2.5 Risk perception
I deliberately omitted one issue when exploring the problems of risk in the conclusion of part 
one of this study: the perception of the risks associated with the transport of hazardous 
materials -  an issue that was mentioned in literature as well as by the participants in the GDR 
sessions. This choice was made because it is very difficult to prevent biased perceptions from 
influencing the debate, not in the least due to the role of the media that is often interested in 
selected, mostly negative, information about (potential) events. Early studies of risk 
perception showed that public concerns cannot be blamed on ignorance or irrationality. 
Research has also shown that many of the public’s reactions to risk can be attributed to their 
sensitivity to technical, social and psychological qualities of hazards that are not well 
modelled in technical risk assessments (Slovic, 1993). In the field of risk assessment, winning 
the public’s trust is a tough battle, as it is easier to create distrust among the public. Slovic 
(ibid., pp. 677-679) mentions four reasons for this. Firstly, negative events are more visible or 
noticeable than positive events: negative events often take the form of specific and well- 
defined events, while positive events are more often fuzzy or indistinct. Secondly, there is a 
psychological tendency for negative events to carry much greater weight than positive events. 
Thirdly, sources of bad (i.e. ‘trust destroying’) news are perceived by the public to be more 
credible than sources of good news. Fourthly, distrust, once initiated, tends to reinforce and 
perpetuate itself: distrust is apt to inhibit the kinds of personal contacts and experiences that 
are necessary to overcome distrust, and initial distrust (or trust) colours our interpretation of 
events, thus reinforcing our beliefs. In this respect, Sunstein (2007) argues that we tend to 
overreact to risks and especially to worst-case scenarios.
Several studies have shown how difficult it is to prevent negative perceptions (see 
Slovic, 1986; 1987; 1993). One important denominator in these studies is the underlining of 
the need for being transparent and communicative to the public. This implies that a debate 
with the public based on shared insights, feeling for the uniqueness of the situation and a
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healty distance to formal rules and institutions can be very productive (see e.g. Van Poortvliet, 
1999). Although I did not specifically investigate these perception issues, based on the 
findings in the cases, I believe that the institutional setting I proposed enables the key players 
to develop a better line of argumentation underlying the qualification of situations in terms of 
level of safety and the choices in favour of certain measures. The attention for the 
reasonability of risk-reduction investments makes it possible for local authorities to better 
communicate what measures they take to reduce risks. At least, this was what the participants 
in the gaming simulations, who were generally familiar with or involved in public 
communication on risks, mentioned in relation to the applied approach. A better 
understanding and an apparently easier way of decision-making using decision-supportive 
information seems, at least theoretically, to be helpful in this respect.
8.2.6 Complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity
In the first part of this study we concluded that various institutional rules or principles appear 
to contribute to uncertainty and complexity. In terms of the framework of Klinke and Renn 
(2002), we concluded that there is a mismatch between the analytical assessment approach 
that assumes the availability of reliable data on transport flows, probability and the effects of 
incidents, and the transparency in the interpretation of criteria for decision making in the 
context of risk management, and real world practice which, in fact, is too often dominated by 
a debate on the size and nature of uncertainties, diverging interpretations of rules and 
fuzziness about who is responsible for what. It was therefore that we concluded that the 
complexity and uncertainty regarding the management of external safety issues is high and 
that sometimes even ambiguity can be observed. This was demonstrated by observations by 
experts and in cases regarding the different outcomes of risk models, the reluctance to take 
full responsibility for risk reducing decisions and the existence of different interpretations by 
different actors of the outcomes of the risk assessments.
In their article, Klinke and Renn give examples of complex, uncertain and ambiguous 
risks in terms of climate change, the effects of CFCs on the ozone layer, risks concerning BSE 
and electro magnetic fields. One could argue that these particular risks fundamentally differ 
from the risks induced by rail transport of hazardous materials and that the qualifications 
expressed in the article and the approach for risk management suggested by Klinke and Renn 
are therefore unsuitable for the use in this research. Such criticism doesn’t make much sense 
for two reasons. First, the framework offers a not-theoretically biased classification of 
different risk situations and as such offers an open eye for the real world variety. Other 
scholars offer more theoretically biased perspectives, e.g. with a more technical (e.g. Beroggi 
and Wallace, 1995) cultural (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) or organisational (e.g. 
Poortvliet, 1999) view on risk management. Second, the challenges and the strategies 
mentioned in the article are spot-on. The main message put forward by the framework is that 
risk management regarding subsystems that have a clear institutional, economic and social 
relationship with other subsystems of society, inevitably develop non-technical, social 
influences on strategic managerial approaches. Influences that, when we attempt to 
understand them, require non-routine types of approaches for analysis. The strategies for 
reducing complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity mentioned in Klinke and Renn’s article 
include, for example, reducing the damage potential by limiting the over-all risk level by 
reaching an agreement on effective measures (complexity), balancing costs of under­
protection versus the costs of over-protection and limiting the range of effects (uncertainty) 
and seeking consensus by a socially acceptable plan (ambiguity). The overall lessons, 
overview of challenges and suggestions for strategies to follow concerning risk management 
have been very inspiring for this study.
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the article was very useful in studying the matter in 
question, even though rail transport of hazardous materials by rail sounds far less complex 
and ambiguous than, for example, climate change or electro magnetic fields. This study 
confirmed that some problems are more difficult to understand and grasp than they look at 
first sight. For this, it may be useful to conduct further empirical research to explore the wider 
applicability of the framework and to see whether there are more examples of these seemingly 
normal day-to-day activities that at second glance have a deeper rooted complexity, 
uncertainty or ambiguity. This may possibly enrich the framework by Klinke and Renn, with 
new examples of - seemingly - simple risks.
8.2.7 Institutional design
There are three comments that need to be made concerning the concept of institutional design 
as it is used in this study. First, Alexander (2006) relates the concept to practitioners and sees 
it as a ‘craft’ in which the best knowledge, intuition and experience should be brought in. By 
using the concept, we did not intend to take the role of the practitioner. Instead we used the 
idea of institutional design as a means to suggest that, instead of looking at explanatory ex­
post analyses of institutional transformation, it might be useful to take a look at institutional 
transformation from an ex-ante perspective. As such, institutional design was a welcome 
approach for creating an adapted institutional framework.
Second, the concept is related to a normative stance of creating an institutional 
framework that is deemed ‘better’ than the existing one. It might be argued by some that 
normativity is unscientific and should therefore not be part of a scientific research. This is true 
up to some point, but neglects the fact that sometimes a more action based scientific approach 
should be followed. Moreover, the adapted institutional framework is not seen as the answer 
for all problems, but as an answer (though considered to be very relevant) that was also tested 
on its potential impact on decision behaviour of real-life actors. We felt in this context that it 
is more important to realise that when performing an empirical research that is rooted deep in 
practice, it is desirable to create an alternative perspective for problems found and to give 
recommendations that may actually be used, instead of merely describing these problems 
from the perspective of an observer at a distance. Moreover, the adapted framework is deeply 
justified for and embedded in theory and the empirical exploration in the first part of the study 
to avoid a situation in which personal judgement or preferences from the researcher would 
prevail to objectivity.
Third, there is little empirical experience in practice of the use of institutional design. 
Therefore it was necessary to provide for a sound methodological approach to test the 
institutional design. In this case, the gaming simulation method was used, which proved to be 
a helpful tool. However, more empirical research is useful as to also develop and apply other 
methodologies that fit the concept.
8.3 Recommendations for risk management practice
This study was triggered to develop new ideas in a policy field that faces severe challenges. In 
this context, as in chapter 1, I refer to the trigger of this study as formulated in the report on 
external safety management by the Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat & Vromraad (2003). 
This report recommended five starting points for future decisions on external safety risks:
1) One should accept living in a risk society, but one still has to continuously improve the 
conditions for achieving external safety goals: space in the Netherlands is an intensively used 
commodity and public and political attention to safety is characterised by a ‘swing
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movement’, i.e. the longer the period without disasters involving many casualties, the lower 
the public and political attention to safety issues. In order to prevent such a swing, actors 
should strive for continuous improvement of external safety by reducing risks and taking 
measures.
2) Create a sound basic level of safety while doing justice to the diversity of opinions. It 
is not realistic to give all opinions equal weight. However, the deliberation of several aspects 
must be transparent and well balanced, because the system of quantitative risk analysis and 
singular norm standards is not sufficient to achieve the goals set.
3) Responsibilities and competences with regard to risk and external safety policy should 
be clearly allocated: continuous improvement is the main goal. Only then should the standard 
be an important instrument. The explicit allocation of responsibilities leads to a situation 
where it becomes clear who is responsible for what, which means that those who cause risks 
are triggered to search for solutions.
4) The responsibility of the causers of risks should come first: too often it seems as 
though the liability is divided among the authorities, because one assumes that the authorities 
should compensate damage or losses. The responsibility, however, lies with the causer of the 
risk; in judicial terms, therefore, this party is responsible.
5) Decision making and communication should be transparent. Victims often blame 
decision makers for accidents. Risks must therefore be well explained to civilians. Underlying 
arguments must be clear, for which transparency is needed. This is hard to accomplish as long 
as the government has several responsibilities as risk regulator (legislator), risk causer and 
supervisor.
The report triggered me to investigate more in-depth what is happening in practice (the 
extended problem analysis), confirming the observations underlying the report. Next, I 
consider the proposed adapted institutional framework as an argued answer to the report’s 
recommendations. The outcomes of the simulation games suggest that the adapted framework 
makes it easier to identify who is responsible for what. There is also more incentive to 
continuously improve safety, due to the principle that actors who take risk-mitigating 
measures should be rewarded for their actions by supporting their decisions with a model for 
the reasonability of risk-reduction measures. As a result, the transparency of decisions 
improves. Therefore, my first recommendation is to implement this adapted institutional 
framework into the practice of decision making concerning urban planning and external safety 
with regard to rail transport of hazardous materials.
My second recommendation is that an effort should be made to further quantify the 
effects of safety measures in order to improve the appraisal of risks. At the moment, there are 
only a limited number of measures that can be easily quantified. At the same time, there are 
numerous measures that could be taken and that would have a qualitative risk-reducing effect 
(see TNO, 2004). Such measures include blast-resistant outer walls, special drainage gutters 
for flammable liquids, improving people’s preparedness and installing better extinguishing 
facilities. Although this is a difficult task, it is necessary for a good decision-support.
The third recommendation is to implement gaming simulations into normal consultancy 
practice, which presently seems to be rather limited in its ability to produce innovative ways 
of advising clients beyond standardised reporting or the posting of consultants at clients’ 
premises. The participants in our test cases highly valued the way in which they could 
interactively devise new ideas on urban planning and at the same time mitigate risks. The 
graphs and figures presented to them were highly effective in creating a better understanding 
of the problems at hand, while the plans also received strong support. Although this naturally 
needs to be combined with writing reports about such simulations, it would highly improve 
the advice that consultants give to their customers.
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Finally, the Dordrecht case proved that building in different densities (i.e. moving the large 
tower from directly alongside the railway to a location beyond the 200 metre zone) can lower 
risks significantly. This can be related to Suddle’s (2008) concept of safety-integrated design, 
which implies that safety can be improved significantly by taking into account safety 
measures on different levels of scale, namely the building level, the district level and the city 
level. As a basis for discussion, however, this concept lacks an empirical foundation and is 
not grounded on the quantification of the ideas.
Compared to Suddle’s concept, this study shows that not every urban area that is to be 
redesigned will have characteristics that allow for these smart designs. This was partly the 
case in Roosendaal, where the shape of the area was such that it did not allow for an analysis 
based on higher densities further from the railway. I therefore believe that safety-integrated 
urban design is very valuable in many but not all circumstances. I do, however, recommend 
combining the specifics of safety-integrated design with the first two recommendations in 
order to improve urban design on a quantified basis.
8.4 Epilogue
Rail transport of hazardous materials needs to be regarded as a normal risk that is accepted in 
a society as a part of daily life and as a necessary condition for the functioning of a society. 
The necessity lies in the fact that the materials transported are used as home products as well 
as in the chemical industry. Ammonia for example can be used for fertilisers in agriculture but 
also for simple household products. In other words, we all benefit from their production and 
processing into daily used products. Consequently, we inevitably have to accept the fact that 
these materials have to be transported, partly by rail.
No one seems to challenge the statement that rail transport is safe but can never be 
100% risk-free. Despite everything we do to minimise the risk of disasters, accidents can and 
will occur. Fortunately, such incidents are infrequent. Many risk factors can be controlled, but 
we cannot deny one aspect of risk management and risk analysis: the fact that risks are never 
nil. The recent disaster in Viareggio is a clear example of this, as well as a collision between 
two trains in the Netherlands near Barendrecht in September 2009. In this respect, distrust and 
a negative perception of risks can frame the debate such that risks that are nearly nil are 
overvalued and felt as more negative than they perhaps are. Nevertheless, as long as we do 
not seriously reduce the use of fuels, chemical products or other daily used chemically based 
products, we need to accept risks as they are: a part of everyday life. The main challenge, 
therefore, is to manage risks to a level that is considered acceptable by the responsible 
authorities. From then on, it is important to just accept that we have done everything in our 
power to reduce risks and that there are some things in life that we just cannot control.
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Appendix I:
Overview of the participants in the GDR sessions
Participants in the first GDR session
• Adriaan Pels: senior policy adviser on the transport of hazardous materials, EVO 
(shipping organization)
• Joris Jennen: senior adviser on external safety, Oranjewoud consultancy
• Roeland Lourijsen: manager of environmental capacity cluster, ProRail.
• Harry Snel: consultant, Movares consultancy
• Art van der Giessen: safety adviser, Arcadis consultants
• Joost van der Ree: environmental project manager, West Brabant Regional 
Environmental Bureau
• René Holdert: spokesman, Railion (transport organization)
• Nils Rosmuller: senior researcher, Netherlands Institute for Physical Safety
Participants in the second GDR session:
• Remco Ariaens, adviser on pro-action, South-east Brabant safety region
• Jan Zondervan: policy adviser on external safety, South South-Holland regional fire 
brigade
• Hans Verhoeven: environmental policy adviser, Department of City Development, 
Eindhoven
• Bas Dikmans: policy adviser on the economy and mobility, province of North 
Brabant
• Karen van Tol: adviser on spatial development and external safety, DHV consultancy
• Sjoerd Post: policy adviser on external safety, Rijnmond Environmental Bureau
• Edwin van der Werf: project manager, city of Roosendaal
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Appendix II
Gaming simulation checklist
Begrijpen de deelnemers het relatieve gebruik van de risicoberekeningen?
Do the participants understand the relative use of the risk calculations?
Ervaren de deelnemers een duidelijke verantwoordelijkheid voor risico’s en kunnen zij deze 
verantwoorden?
Do the participants feel responsible for risks and can they justify these risks?
Vindt er discussie plaats over de uitkomsten en zo ja, waar wordt dit door veroorzaakt? 
Are the results of risk calculations contested, and if so, what causes this?
Bestaat er discussie over de in- en de output van de risicoberekeningen? 
Are the input and output variables of risk calculations contested?
Hoe reageren de deelnemers op de uitkomsten van berekeningen? 
How do the participants react to the results of risk calculations?
Krijgen de deelnemers inzicht in wat hun ambities betekenen voor het risiconiveau?
Do the participants gain insight into what their building ambitions mean for the level 
of risk?
Hoe hanteren zij het kosteneffectiviteitmodel en zien zij hierin een meerwaarde?
How do the participants use the cost-effectiveness model, and if som how do they value 
it?
Nemen zij verantwoordelijkheid voor gemaakte keuzes?
Do the participants take responsibility for the choices made?
Wordt de nieuwe opzet als nuttig/ beter ervaren?
Do the participants value the new set-up as useful or better?
Hebben de deelnemers het idee dat zij de terechte probleemeigenaar zijn van risico’s? 
Do the participants have the idea they are the just problem owner of risks?
Vinden de deelnemers dat het project beter/ makkelijker te plannen is dan voorheen?
Do the participants think that an urban development project can be planned 
better/more easily than before?
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Appendix III
Evaluation forms for the two gaming-simulations
Evaluatie sim ulatie externe veiligheid en stedelijke ontwikkeling  
Evaluation gam ing-sim ulation external safety and urban developm ent
Vraag 1 : Wat vindt u van h e t relatieve gebruik van h e t groepsrisico?
Question 1 : What do you think o f the relative use o f group risk?
Vraag 2 : Hoe h eeft u h e t ervaren om risicoberekeningen als beslissingsondersteuning te 
gebruiken?
Question 2 : How did you experience the use o f risk calculations as a decision supportive tool?
Vraag 3 : Wat vindt u ervan als RO p ro jecten  h e t risico n iet m ogen vergroten als vervanging van 
h e t voldoen aan de oriënterende w aarde? (stand still beginsel)
Question 3 : What do you think o f the idea that urban developm ent p ro jects  m ay no longer 
increase risk as a rep lacem ent for the orientation value? (stand-still principle)
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Vraag 4 : Hoe ervaart u h e t dat transport n iet m e e r  belangrijk is voor de bereken ingen?
Question 4 : What do you think o f the idea that transport is no longer an im portant variable for 
the calculations?
Vraag 5 : Z ie t u een m eerw aarde in h e t kosteneffectiviteitm odel? Zo ja , welke, zo nee, waarom  
niet?
Question 5 : Do you think that the cost-effectiveness m odel has an added value? I f  so , w hy? if 
not, why not?
Vraag 6 : K unt u h e t kosteneffectiveitm odel gebruiken als verantwoording voor gem aakte  
k eu zes?  Zo ja , waarom, zo n ee , waarom niet?
Question 6 : Do you think you can use the cost-effectiven ess m odel to ju s tify  the choices you  
m ake concerning risk s?  I f  so , w hy? I f  not, why not?
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Vraag 7 : H eeft u ervaren dat u m inder afhankelijk b en t gew orden van andere partijen als h et  
gaat om inform atie? Zo ja , welke informatie h eeft u n iet m eer nodig, zo nee , waarom niet?
Question 7 : Did you experience less d ependence on oth er parties as far as information is 
co n cerned? I f  so , what information do you no longer n eed ? I f  not, w hy not?
Vraag 8 : Hoe h eeft u h e t p ro ces vandaag ervaren om tot besluiten te kom en?  
Question 8 : How did you experience today's decision-m aking p ro cess?
Vraag 9 : Z ijn  e r  andere uitkom sten dan in h e t 'e ch te 'p ro ce s?  Zo ja ,  welke zijn  dit en waardoor 
zijn  deze veroorzaakt denkt u?
Question 9 : A re  there resu lts oth er than in the 'real' p ro ce ss?  I f  so , what are the differences and  
what do you think ca uses th ese  differences?
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Appendix IV
Participants in the gaming simulation in Roosendaal:
Wiel Verhaegh 
Casper Sprong 
Wouter Willen 
Ewoud van den Heuvel 
Theo de Munnik 
Pauline de Jong 
Jeroen van Otterloo
(Municipality of Roosendaal) 
(Municipality of Roosendaal) 
(Municipality of Roosendaal) 
(Municipality of Roosendaal) 
(Municipality of Roosendaal) 
(Bouwfonds)
(Proper-Stok)
Participants in the gaming simulation in Dordrecht:
- Gerdien Muilman (Municipality of Dordrecht)
- Mark Numan (Municipality of Dordrecht)
- Ronald Kooman (Municipality of Dordrecht)
- Gert Slager (Municipality of Dordrecht)
Samenvatting
Het debat in Nederland rond onvrijwillig ervaren risico’s is de laatste decennia verhevigd. In 
het kielzog van onder andere de vliegramp in de Bijlmer in 1992 en de vuurwerkramp in 
Enschede in 2000, is de maatschappij zich meer bewust geworden van de problematiek van 
externe veiligheid, in het bijzonder de risico’s rond het vervoer, de productie en de opslag van 
gevaarlijke stoffen. Dit bewustzijn heeft geleid tot een hernieuwde aandacht van de 
Nederlandse overheid met betrekking tot het institutionaliseren van risicomanagement om 
grote rampen te voorkomen en de veiligheid van burgers in de nabijheid van risicovolle 
activiteiten te vergroten door middel van herijking van het externe veiligheidsbeleid. Externe 
veiligheid is gericht op het beheersen van risico’s ten aanzien van de opslag, het gebruik en de 
productie van gevaarlijke stoffen en vuurwerk en het transport ervan over weg, water, spoor 
en door buisleidingen. Ook het gebruik van vliegvelden valt er onder. In het bijzonder het 
risico van het transport van gevaarlijke stoffen per spoor heeft de laatste jaren de nodige 
aandacht gekregen door enkele grote incidenten in steden als Delfzijl (2000), Amersfoort 
(2002), Tilburg (2007), Barendrecht (2009 en 2011).
Om een basisniveau van veiligheid te garanderen heeft de Nederlandse overheid 
normen voor externe veiligheid ingesteld. Deze normen zijn het plaatsgebonden risico (PR) 
en het groepsrisico (GR). Het PR is de statistische mogelijkheid dat een onbeschermd persoon 
komt te overlijden in een periode van een jaar door een ongeluk met gevaarlijke stoffen op 
een bepaalde plek. Het PR wordt door contouren op een kaart gevisualiseerd. Het GR is een 
maat voor de cumulatieve jaarlijkse kans dat een groep personen in één keer komt te 
overlijden door het verblijven in het invloedsgebied van een inrichting of transportroute als 
daar gevaarlijke stoffen aanwezig zijn of over vervoerd worden. Dit risico wordt 
gevisualiseerd door middel van een logaritmische schaal en de hierin weergegeven fN curve. 
De normen die verbonden zijn aan het PR en GR vormen de kern van het externe 
veiligheidsbeleid en zijn van belang bij het bestuderen van de interactie tussen enerzijds het 
transport van gevaarlijke stoffen per spoor en anderzijds stedelijke ontwikkeling in de 
nabijheid van dat spoor.
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Het onderzoek komt voort uit de observatie dat, in tegenstelling tot andere grote steden in 
Europa, het vervoer van gevaarlijke stoffen per spoor in Nederland relatief vaak dwars door 
stedelijke gebieden gaat, waardoor het sterk van invloed is op stedelijke (her)ontwikkeling en 
ontwikkeling van vastgoed nabij het spoor. De reden hiervoor zit in het feit dat het risico 
wordt berekend door middel van modellen, die het risico berekenen door middel van een 
formule die, grofweg, uitgaat van de kans op een ongeval met dodelijke slachtoffers, 
vermenigvuldigd met het effect. In geval van het GR geldt dat de kans wordt beïnvloed door 
onder andere de hoeveelheid transporten, de spoor lay-out en de snelheid van het vervoer. 
Voor het GR geldt ook dat een toename van het effect door de ontwikkeling van meer 
vastgoed in de nabijheid van het spoor -  waardoor er doorgaans dus sprake is van meer 
potentiële slachtoffers -  van invloed is op het risico.
Op dit moment wordt de oriëntatiewaarde van het GR -  geen harde norm, maar een 
richtwaarde -  op veel plaatsen ruim overschreden. In de periode tot 2020 zijn de ramingen dat 
het transport van gevaarlijke stoffen over het Nederlandse spoor zal groeien met 135 tot 154 
procent, terwijl veel lokale overheden hun binnenstedelijk gebied intensiever willen 
ontwikkelen. Hierdoor is de kans groot dat er spanningen ontstaan tussen transport van 
gevaarlijke stoffen en stedelijke ontwikkeling en dat de risico’s zullen toenemen.
Het doel van dit onderzoek was om te onderzoeken hoe het Nederlandse externe 
veiligheidsbeleid enerzijds van invloed is op stedelijke ontwikkeling in de nabijheid van spoor 
waar gevaarlijke stoffen over vervoerd worden en anderzijds op het transport zelf en om 
verbeteringen te formuleren, wanneer dit nodig mocht zijn. Om dit doel te verwezenlijk was 
de volgende centrale vraag opgesteld:
‘Wat is de aard van de problemen die samenhangen met het transport van gevaarlijke 
stoffen per rail in interactie met de stedelijke ontwikkeling in Nederland? Wat is de 
oorzaak van die problemen en biedt de verandering van het institutionele raamwerk 
perspectief op oplossing van die problemen?’
Dit onderzoek is in twee delen uitgevoerd. Het eerste deel had als centrale focus te 
onderzoeken of, en in hoeverre, er problemen zijn in de praktijk tussen het vervoer van 
gevaarlijke stoffen en stedelijke ontwikkeling. Dit deel bestond allereerst uit het formuleren 
van een toetsingskader gebaseerd op de inzichten van een artikel van Klinke en Renn (2002), 
waarin verschillende typen risico’s geconceptualiseerd worden. Daarnaast zijn de 
belangrijkste instituties in dit veld beschreven. Vervolgens zijn vijf casestudies uitgevoerd in 
Rotterdam, Breda, Arnhem, Eindhoven en Heerlen. De uitkomsten van deze casestudies 
werden gecombineerd met de uitkomsten van twee Group Decision Room (GDR) sessies met 
experts op het gebied van externe veiligheid, stedelijke ontwikkeling en transport. Op basis 
van deze probleemverkenning is in het tweede deel de focus gelegd op het onderzoeken of het 
mogelijk was een ander institutioneel perspectief op transport van gevaarlijke stoffen per 
spoor en stedelijke ontwikkeling te creëren en om te testen of dit aangepaste perspectief tot 
andere uitkomsten leidt in een gesimuleerde praktijk.
Probleemanalyse: vijf casestudies
Uit de vijf cases kan afgeleid worden dat er drie relevante beleidsvelden zijn, te weten: 
externe veiligheid, stedelijke ontwikkeling en het vrij vervoeren van goederen over het spoor, 
die elkaar bovendien beïnvloeden, doordat zij sterk interacteren. Wat in het ene gebied 
gebeurt is van directe invloed op het andere. Meer vervoer bijvoorbeeld leidt tot minder 
veiligheid en minder mogelijkheden voor stedelijke ontwikkeling. Er zijn een aantal zaken die 
de vijf cases gemeen hebben. Alle onderzochte gemeenten worden gehinderd in hun
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bouwambities door te hoge risico’s, enerzijds door hoge vervoersaantallen en toekomstige 
vervoersprognoses, anderzijds door de verhoogde bevolkingspopulaties als gevolg van de 
bouwambities zelf. Uit de cases komt het beeld naar voren dat lokale overheden de neiging 
hebben om onzekerheden in en een gebrek aan transparantie van de risicoberekeningsmethode 
in hun eigen voordeel te interpreteren. Veel onzekerheid voor de bouwplannen komt ook 
voort uit de verschillende toekomstscenario’s die in omloop zijn en die als input dienen voor 
de risicoberekeningen. Hierdoor ligt het gevaar van creatief rekenen met de input parameters 
op de loer. In alle bestudeerde cases bleek dat de gemeenten plannen konden bedenken en die 
wilden gaan uitvoeren, maar blijft het beeld hangen dat de risico’s lager ingeschat worden dan 
dat deze in werkelijkheid wellicht zijn.
Ook lieten de cases zien dat de betrokken belanghebbenden verschillende meningen 
hadden over onderhandelingen met betrekking tot de vraag hoe de risico’s verlaagd moeten 
worden. Het belangrijkste discussiepunt lijkt hierin te zijn wie voor de kosten opdraait van het 
verlagen van risico’s en zelfs ook wie verantwoordelijk is voor te hoge risico’s. Er is in de 
praktijk daarom een schemergebied over wie verantwoordelijkheid draagt voor risico’s die 
verhoogd zijn. Hierdoor ontstaat een vacuüm waarin iedereen naar elkaar begint te kijken, 
maar niemand echt iets onderneemt.
De inzichten uit de eerste drie hoofdstukken impliceren dat, globaal gesproken, 
risicomanagement in Nederland gebaseerd is op de classificatie van 'simple risk problems’ 
(zie Klinke en Renn, 2002): normen worden bepaald en vastgelegd in beleid en het belang van 
risicomanagement is te verzekeren dat het beleid nageleefd wordt. Vanuit een Nederlands 
beleidsperspectief is dat logisch, omdat vanuit een milieubeleid optiek het in Nederland een 
normale manier van werken is om handhaafbare normen in te stellen voor milieuproblemen. 
Desalniettemin lijken deze cases te impliceren dat de problemen die geconstateerd zijn veel 
meer complexiteit, onzekerheid en zelfs ambiguïteit bevatten dan vanuit het beleid wellicht 
ooit verwacht werd.
Probleem analyse: twee group decision room sessies
De experts die geraadpleegd zijn in deze twee group decision room (GDR) sessies hebben het 
voornoemde beeld bevestigd. Uit de sessies bleek een overwegend kritische opvatting over 
het huidige externe veiligheid beleid en de praktijk van risicomanagement. Een divers palet 
van problemen werd genoemd met betrekking tot hoe zij de huidige praktijk ervaren. Deze 
problemen zijn gecategoriseerd tot de volgende zes thema’s:
1) Het gebruik van de normen
2) Het risicomodel en hoe dit gehanteerd wordt
3) De verschillen in risicoperceptie
4) Onduidelijkheid over transport stromen, met name de hoeveelheden en soort 
gevaarlijke stoffen
5) Onduidelijkheid ten aanzien van de bestuurlijke verantwoordelijkheid
6) Het optreden van conflicterende belangen
Uit deze analyse kan afgeleid worden dat verschillende aspecten van het institutioneel 
raamwerk met betrekking tot externe veiligheid bij lijken te dragen aan de toename van de 
complexiteit en de onzekerheid met betrekking tot het beheersen van risico’s. De GDR sessies 
bevestigen ook het beeld dat de analytische middelen die voorgeschreven en toegepast 
worden geen stevige hulpmiddelen zijn, omdat deze middelen vooral zijn toegesneden op een 
context waarin risico’s worden gezien als 'simple risk problems’, die een lage complexiteit en 
geen serieuze onzekerheid met zich meedragen.
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De uitkomsten van de twee probleemanalyses schetsen een beeld dat de problemen van 
institutionele en praktische aard zijn. De doelstelling voor het vervolg van dit onderzoek was 
daarom om een wetenschappelijk gefundeerd antwoord te vinden op de gevonden problemen. 
Dit antwoord moest uitgewerkt worden aan de hand van het vervullen van drie doelen die min 
of meer direct verbonden zijn met de sleutelproblemen. Het eerste doel was om een ander 
perspectief op besluitvorming te creëren met betrekking tot risicomanagement rond stedelijke 
ontwikkeling in gebieden die te maken hebben met het vervoer van gevaarlijke stoffen. Bij dit 
nieuwe perspectief hoort een verandering van de focus op een hypothetisch optimale 
oplossing die onder de normwaarde ligt naar een focus die veel sterker inspeelt op de 
specifieke omstandigheden van een casus. Hierdoor verandert het karakter van 
besluitvormingsprocessen van een technische optimaliseringsslag naar een proces benadering, 
waarin het debat tussen belanghebbenden met verschillende voorkeuren belangrijker wordt en 
waar sociale acceptatie van de uitkomst belangrijker is dan het technisch optimum.
Andere problemen lijken hun oorsprong te hebben in de manier waarop instituties zijn 
vormgegeven. Het voornaamste probleem is hier de dominante positie die de Europese 
richtlijn inzake vrij verkeer van goederen heeft en de invloed die deze indirect heeft op de 
berekende risico’s. De onbalans tussen internationale belangen van transportbedrijven, 
nationale belangen van de spoornetwerkbeheerder en lokale belangen van gemeenten en 
ontwikkelaars, frustreren het debat tussen belanghebbenden. Dit creëert een situatie waarin 
actoren hun belangen verdedigen in plaats van constructief mee te denken over hoe stedelijk 
gebied minder hinder kan ondervinden van risico’s veroorzaakt door transport van gevaarlijke 
stoffen. Hierop heeft dan ook het tweede doel betrekking, namelijk het verminderen van deze 
onbalans tussen de institutionele invloed van beleid rond stedelijke ontwikkeling, transport 
van gevaarlijke stoffen per spoor en externe veiligheid op de ontwikkelingen van de risico’s 
in lokale situaties.
Economische motieven zijn doorgaans dominanter qua invloed op besluitvorming 
voor lokale overheden dan veiligheid, waardoor in de huidige situatie het debat vooral lijkt te 
gaan om wie voor de kosten van het verminderen van risico’s opdraait of wie überhaupt 
verantwoordelijk is voor de risico’s. Het derde doel is daarom gerelateerd aan het tweede 
doel: het aangepaste perspectief op risicomanagement en de verbeterde balans tussen 
verschillende institutionele velden moeten het mogelijk maken voor alle belanghebbenden om 
meer verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor de uitkomst van besluitvorming dan dat op dit 
moment het geval is. Om dit te veranderen in een positieve zin impliceert dat 
belanghebbenden (met name lokale overheden) de middelen en informatie moeten krijgen om 
aantrekkelijke oplossingen met brede steun voor de lokale situaties te krijgen.
Naar een aangepast perspectief op risicomanagement
Het belang van de geformuleerde doelen ligt (a) in de wens dat risicomanagement niet alleen 
gaat over het toetsen van plannen en situaties aan een norm, (b) het streven om lokale 
overheden te leren omgaan met transport van gevaarlijke stoffen over hun grondgebied, en (c) 
het realiseren van een institutioneel kader dat een eerlijk en afgewogen besluitvormingsproces 
faciliteert voor alle actoren. Dit leidt tot het inzicht dat een andere manier van 
risicomanagement nodig is om een aangepast institutioneel kader te scheppen. Aanpassingen 
moeten daarom gemaakt worden die gericht zijn op een andere toepassing van methoden voor 
het verzamelen van informatie over risico’s en tegelijkertijd mogelijkheden scheppen voor 
betrokken belanghebbenden om op een goede manier risico’s te inventariseren. Om dit 
perspectief te creëren is een interventie nodig. In dit onderzoek is dat gedaan door het 
institutioneel (her)ontwerpen van het huidige institutionele kader.
Het institutionele herontwerp moest rekening houden met de voornoemde doelen. Dit
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is gedaan door middel van vier institutionele principes:
- Risico’s moeten in relatieve zin, in plaats van in absolute zin gehanteerd worden;
- Een stand-still principe moet geïmplementeerd worden tegen het toenemen van 
risico’s door stedelijke ontwikkeling;
- Toegenomen veiligheid door mitigeren van risico’s moet beloond worden door het 
toestaan van stedelijke ontwikkeling;
- Risico’s moeten zoveel als redelijkerwijs praktisch is verlaagd worden met behulp van 
een model dat de kosteneffectiviteit van risico mitigerende maatregelen uitdrukt.
Van het hieruit voortvloeiende aangepaste institutionele kader werd verwacht dat het van 
invloed zou zijn op besluitvormingsprocessen, doordat theoretisch gezien de volgende 
stappen zouden moeten worden doorlopen om te komen tot een besluit:
- Als een lokale overheid haar grondgebied wil (her)ontwikkelen in de nabijheid van 
een route voor het vervoer van gevaarlijke stoffen, moet er in een vroeg stadium 
geanalyseerd worden (vanaf het begin van het planningsproces) hoe dit van relatieve 
invloed is op de risico’s;
- Als de risico’s toenemen door de geplande ontwikkeling, moet de lokale overheid de 
risico’s proberen terug te brengen tot het oorspronkelijke niveau door het zelf nemen 
van risico mitigerende maatregelen of door andere actoren te betalen om die 
maatregelen te nemen;
- Om lokale overheden te helpen beslissen hoe de risico’s het beste te verlagen zijn, 
kunnen zij met behulp van een indicator voor redelijkheid van risico mitigerende 
maatregelen bepalen welke maatregelen het beste waar voor hun geld opleveren en 
hierdoor effectievere besluiten nemen;
- Zowel effect als kans verlagende maatregelen kunnen genomen worden. Het moet ook 
mogelijk zijn voor een lokale overheid om anderen te compenseren voor het nemen 
van risico mitigerende maatregelen;
- Als het mogelijk is om risico’s te mitigeren naar het oorspronkelijke niveau of lager, 
kan het project uitgevoerd worden. Zo niet, dan moet het aangepast worden.
De mogelijke effecten van het aangepast institutionele kader
Deze institutionele principes zijn getoetst in twee spel simulaties. Het doel van de toetsing 
was om inzicht te krijgen of het aangepaste institutionele kader een verbeterde kwaliteit van 
het besluitvormingsproces heeft met betrekking tot stedelijke ontwikkeling en 
risicomanagement. Het was daarom nodig om te onderzoeken of er een meetbaar verschil is 
tussen de uitkomsten van besluitvorming in de huidige realiteit en hypothetische 
besluitvorming vanuit het voorgestelde institutionele kader. Meer specifiek was de 
verwachting dat door het toepassen van de principes van het aangepaste institutionele kader 
actoren minder problemen zouden tegenkomen met betrekking tot het plannen van stedelijke 
ontwikkelingsprojecten in vergelijking met het huidige systeem en dat zowel de 
besluitvorming over, als het begrip van risico’s zou verbeteren. Als dat het geval zou zijn, zou 
de uitkomst kunnen worden beschouwd als een verbetering van de huidige situatie.
Deze generieke verwachting is vertaald naar drie subdoelen van de effectmeting, die 
geoperationaliseerd werden in meetbare indicatoren. Het eerste subdoel was dat het mogelijk 
zou zijn om meer te bouwen zonder het risico te verhogen of dit zelfs te verlagen. Dit doel gaf 
de potentiële voordelen van het stand-still principe weer.
Het tweede subdoel was dat het besluitvormingsproces zelf zou verbeteren met
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betrekking tot het bereiken van een besluit. Dit werd uitgezocht door te kijken of 
besluitvormers meer en betere informatie gebruiken om hun besluit op te baseren. Dit effect 
werd verwacht voort te vloeien uit de ondersteunende manier van gebruiken van het 
risicomodel en het kosteneffectiviteitsmodel. Ook was het de bedoeling te onderzoeken of 
meer en betere informatie de betrokkenen hielp om makkelijker consensus te bereiken over de 
uitwerking van een plan. Dit subdoel gaf de potentiële voordelen van het relatieve gebruik van 
risicoberekeningen weer en de toepassing van het kosteneffectiviteitsmodel als een uitwerking 
van het ALARP principe.
Het derde subdoel was te onderzoeken in hoeverre de deelnemers een verbeterd begrip 
hadden van de impact van hun plannen op risico’s. Ook was het nodig te onderzoeken of ze 
een goed begrip hadden van het effect van mogelijke risico mitigerende maatregelen. Het was 
daarom belangrijk om uit te zoeken of de lokale overheden hun plannen beter konden 
uitleggen aan hun burgers om acceptabele risiconiveaus te bereiken. Ook was het de vraag of 
de deelnemers accepteerden dat hun plannen verantwoordelijk waren voor het initiële stijgen 
van het risico, omdat ze meer mensen samenbrachten in de buurt van de risicobron en of zij 
als uitvloeisel hiervan zich ook verantwoordelijk voelden om de risico’s te verlagen. Het 
derde subdoel is daarom gerelateerd aan het idee dat betrokken actoren meer 
verantwoordelijkheid gaan nemen voor de extra risico’s die zij veroorzaken middels hun 
stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten. Ook is het gerelateerd aan het idee dat de vervuiler 
(risicoveroorzaker) betaalt en dat risico mitigatie beloond moet worden.
Effectmeting
Op basis van twee spel simulaties, een in Roosendaal en een in Dordrecht, was het mogelijk 
om verschillen en overeenkomsten tussen de beide simulaties te onderscheiden. Beide cases 
werden gekozen, omdat ze op basis van het huidige institutionele kader eigenschappen 
vertoonden van een zogenoemde 'deadlock’ situatie (vgl. Van der Leij, 2009), waarin de 
gemeenten nauwelijks mogelijkheden hadden hun stedelijk gebied te ontwikkelen. Na het 
uitvoeren van de beide spelsimulaties kon geconcludeerd worden dat:
- lokale overheden meer mogelijkheden hadden om hun grondgebied te ontwikkelen 
dan in de oorspronkelijk situatie;
- herontwikkeling van het stedelijk gebied niet noodzakelijkerwijs een vergroting van 
het risico met zich mee brengt;
- het mogelijk is risico’s te verlagen naar een lager niveau dan in de oorspronkelijke 
situatie;
- risico’s modelleren bij de gemeente de aanwezigen verbeterde inzichten gaf in de 
gevolgen van hun ambities voor het risico;
- deelnemers (in Dordrecht) het kosteneffectiviteitsmodel als extra input gebruikten 
voor het bereiken van een besluit en dit als nuttig waardeerden;
- de gaming resulteerde in de basis van een door de deelnemers gedragen besluit over 
wat ze wilden ontwikkelen en welke risico mitigerende maatregelen genomen moesten 
worden;
- de deelnemers het idee hadden dat ze beter het besluit konden verantwoorden aan de 
burgers van hun stad ;
- de deelnemers bereid waren de verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor de stedelijke 
ontwikkelingsplannen en de bijbehorende mitigerende maatregelen.
In beide gevallen werd er een significante stijging van het risico verwacht als gevolg van de 
oorspronkelijke stedelijke ontwikkelingsplannen. De situatie was in Roosendaal meer
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complex dan in Dordrecht, omdat de gebieden erg verschillen in vorm en afmeting en het 
gebied in Roosendaal parallel aan het spoor loopt. Desalniettemin bleek het ook in deze 
moeilijke situatie mogelijk om risico’s te verlagen door een combinatie van maatregelen en 
het gebied te herontwikkelen. In Dordrecht bleek het makkelijker te zijn risico’s te verlagen, 
eveneens door een combinatie van maatregelen. In beide gevallen bleek het mogelijk om het 
stand-still beginsel in acht te nemen. De conclusie is dat het niet noodzakelijkerwijs zo is dat 
stedelijke ontwikkeling risico’s dusdanig vergroot dat deze niet meer te mitigeren zijn.
De deelnemers gaven te kennen dat de spelsimulaties en de toepassing van de 
beschreven principes en ondersteunende middelen een simpele en duidelijke setting creëerden 
waarin de veiligheidseffecten van stedelijke plannen kunnen worden geanalyseerd in een 
vroege fase van het besluitvormingsproces en daarom in acht kunnen worden genomen 
voordat het plan onherroepelijk is gemaakt. Het presenteren van de resultaten verschafte hen 
extra inzichten in hun plannen. De deelnemers stelden daarom ook dat zij optimistisch waren 
over het potentiële nut van het kosteneffectiviteitsmodel. Vooral in Dordrecht hielp dit om 
inzicht te krijgen in de gevolgen van verschillende maatregelen en om makkelijker tot 
overeenstemming te komen.
Vooral in Roosendaal gaven de deelnemers expliciet aan dat de plannen makkelijker 
verantwoord konden worden aan de burgers van de stad. In Dordrecht gaven de deelnemers 
aan dat de benadering het makkelijker maakt om de plannen en de hierbij horende risico’s uit 
te leggen aan burgers en andere belanghebbenden, inclusief burgemeester en wethouders. In 
beide cases waren de deelnemers enthousiast over het aangepaste institutionele kader en 
gaven zij aan dat zij bereid waren om risico mitigerende maatregelen te nemen als dat 
betekent dat daardoor plannen kunnen doorgaan. Dit en het feit dat de deelnemers beter 
begrepen dat hun plannen risico’s veroorzaken, impliceert dat zij bereid zijn om 
verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor de stedelijke ontwikkelingen.
Deze uitkomsten geven aan dat in beide cases het aangepaste institutionele kader 
leidde tot een verbeterd besluitvormingsproces rond risico’s. Het resultaat was dat deelnemers 
makkelijker om konden gaan met complexiteit en onzekerheid in het besluitvormingsproces. 
De voornaamste indicator hiervoor is dat alle drie de secundaire doelen gehaald zijn: het bleek
a) mogelijk te zijn om ambitieuze plannen te bedenken die b) voldeden aan het idee dat 
risico’s niet mochten toenemen als gevolg van het stand-still beginsel en c) omdat de 
besluitvormers beter op de hoogte zijn van risico’s die veroorzaakt worden door hun ambities 
en plannen en dat zij aangeven dat zij deze beter kunnen verantwoorden.
Aanbevelingen
De grootste voordelen van het aangepaste institutionele kader zijn hiervoor al weergegeven. 
Daarnaast maakt deze manier van besluiten nemen het ook makkelijker te identificeren wie 
verantwoordelijk is voor risico’s. Er is daarnaast een prikkel om veiligheid continue te 
verbeteren, doordat actoren beloond moeten worden voor het nemen van risico mitigerende 
maatregelen. Als zij dit doen door middel van het presenteren van de kosteneffectiviteit en 
mede hierop hun besluit nemen, wordt de transparantie van het besluit vergroot. De eerste 
aanbeveling is daarom om het aangepaste institutionele kader te implementeren in de praktijk.
De tweede aanbeveling is dat getracht moet worden om meer veiligheidvergrotende 
maatregelen te kwantificeren op hun risicoreducerende effect om op die manier 
besluitvorming te verbeteren. Op dit moment zijn er nog maar enkele maatregelen die 
makkelijk te kwantificeren zijn. Tegelijkertijd zijn er zeer veel maatregelen die in de praktijk 
daadwerkelijk genomen kunnen worden en waarvan het effect is dat deze risico verlagend 
werken (bijvoorbeeld ontploffingbestendige buitenmuren, goten onder het spoor die 
brandbare vloeistoffen kunnen afvoeren, zelfredzaamheid van mensen bevorderen of
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realiseren van betere middelen voor rampenbestrijding). Ook al is dit een lastige taak, toch zal 
dit bevorderlijk werken voor een goede besluitvorming en het (kwantitatief) verlagen van 
risico’s.
De derde aanbeveling is het implementeren van spelsimulaties in de advieswereld. De 
deelnemers aan dit onderzoek hebben de manier waarop zij hun plannen interactief konden 
herzien en nieuwe ideeën konden aanbrengen hoog gewaardeerd. De grafieken en figuren die 
gepresenteerd werden waren erg effectief in het scheppen van beter begrip van de problemen 
en de (on)mogelijkheden bij stedelijke ontwikkeling, waarna de plannen brede steun kregen 
onder deelnemers. Dergelijke simulaties zouden het advies van adviesbureaus voor hun 
klanten vergroten.
Tot slot bleek in Dordrecht dat bouwen in verschillende dichtheden (door bijvoorbeeld 
een grote woontoren van direct naast het spoor naar verder van het spoor af te plaatsen) 
risico’s significant kan doen verlagen. Dit kan gerelateerd worden aan het concept van 
veiligheid geïntegreerd ontwerpen. Dat houdt in dat veiligheid kan vergroten door op 
verschillende schaalniveaus te kijken, namelijk op gebouw, wijk en stad niveau. Als basis 
voor een verdere discussie hieromtrent is het belangrijk dit concept, dat nog weinig 
empirische basis noch gekwantificeerde uitwerking kent, te combineren met de eerdere 
aanbevelingen, zodat stedelijke ontwikkeling nog veiliger wordt.
Summary
In the Netherlands, the debate on involuntary risks has intensified in recent decades. As a 
result of the 1992 Bijlmer disaster in Amsterdam and the SE Fireworks disaster in the city of 
Enschede in 2000, for example, society is becoming more aware of the risks involved in the 
production, storage and transport of hazardous materials.
This awareness led to renewed attention from the Dutch government with regard to the 
institutionalisation of risk management approaches in order to prevent disasters and improve 
safety for people in areas adjacent to risky activities. This was done through what in the 
Netherlands is called external safety policy (externe veiligheidsbeleid). External safety policy 
aims at controlling the risks related to the production, storage and use of hazardous materials 
(e.g. fireworks, liquefied petroleum gas, ammunition), the transport of hazardous materials by 
road, rail or water and through pipelines and the use of airports. The risks related to rail 
transport of hazardous materials received specific public attention after a couple of near 
misses with freight trains in the cities of Delfzijl (2000), Amersfoort (2002), Tilburg (2007) 
and Barendrecht (2009 and 2011).
To guarantee a certain amount of safety, the Dutch government has adopted standards 
for its external safety policy. These are the individual risk (IR) - the annual probability that an 
unprotected person will die as a result of an accident involving hazardous materials at a 
certain spot if that person resides there for a full year. The risk is visualised on a map by dots 
which act as spatial contours -  and the group risk (GR) -  a measure for the cumulative annual 
probability that a group of people dies as a direct result of their presence in the influence area 
of an establishment or transport route if an incident happens with hazardous materials. This is 
visualised on a logarithmic scale by using the fN curve. These standards form the core of 
external safety policy and constitute a linking pin between the major fields of study in this 
dissertation: the rail transport of hazardous materials and local urban development.
This field of research stems from the observation that, more than in other major 
European cities, rail transport of hazardous materials in the Netherlands is organised right 
through city centres, which makes it closely related to local urban planning and the
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(re)development of real estate near railways. In planning practice, models for risk analysis are 
used. According to current risk models, based on the multiplication of probability of an event 
and the event’s effects, an increase in the transport of hazardous materials leads to higher 
risks as the probability of a disaster increases. Also on the effect side, risk increases when a 
local authority develops its territory near a transport route and as such increases the average 
number of people present near the railway. For the period to 2020, transport forecasts for 
Dutch rail transport of hazardous materials show increases in volume of between 135% and 
154%, while there are already numerous spots in the Netherlands where the risks are too high 
according to Dutch policy. At the same time, an increasing number of Dutch local authorities 
aim to intensify urban land use near railway stations. Hence, the conclusion is that the tension 
between the field of transport and the field of urban development increases. This triggered the 
study described in this dissertation.
The aim of this research was to evaluate the way in which Dutch authorities develop 
and implement external safety policy in the context of urban development adjacent to railways 
that accommodate transport of hazardous materials and to suggest improvements. In 
particular, this study explored problems in the present institutional framework in order to 
suggest improvements aimed at contributing to a more efficient external safety policy. 
Therefore, the following central research question was posed:
What is the nature o f problems concerning the transport o f hazardous materials by
rail in relation to urban planning in the Netherlands, what causes these problems and
can adapting the present institutional framework solve these problems?
This study was conducted in two parts. The first part focused on exploring the above problem 
in more detail following the theoretical framing of risk problems offered by Klinke and Renn
(2002). It consisted of an analysis of the most important institutions. Next, five case studies 
were conducted in the cities of Rotterdam, Breda, Arnhem, Eindhoven and Heerlen. In 
addition experts in external safety management were consulted using the electronic discussion 
facilities offered by the Group Decision Room (GDR) of the Nijmegen Institute for 
Management Research. Based on the results of the problem exploration, in the second part, an 
alternative perspective on rail transport and urban planning was specified and in addition 
tested on its impact on risk management. This perspective is based on adapting the present 
institutional framework for coping with external safety in local planning.
Problem analysis: five case studies
From these five cases it can be learned that the three policy fields of external safety, free 
transport and urban planning influence each other due to their interconnected nature. What 
happens in one area can seriously influence developments in the other areas. There are a 
number of features that these cases have in common. All the studied cities are hindered by 
high risks, either due to transport and future growth of this transport or due to an increased 
population near the railway as a result of the building plans. From these case analyses, it 
appeared that local authorities tend to interpret uncertainties and lack of transparency in the 
risk calculation methodology to their benefit. In the studied cases, all the cities concerned 
have been able to come up with plans and have them carried out. Great uncertainty stems 
from the lack of robust long term transport scenarios. Moreover, positive effects of measures 
to be taken in the future are anticipated. From the case analyses, the feeling remains that in 
practice the calculated risks underlying local urban planning tend to be lower than they 
actually are.
Further, the cases showed that the stakeholders involved had significant differences in
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opinion during the negotiations on how to reduce risks. The most important issue seemed to 
be who pays the costs of reducing risks or even who was responsible for reducing risks in the 
first place. There seems to be a degree of fuzziness in practice about who needs to take 
responsibility for increased risk levels. This creates situations in which nobody tends to take 
full responsibility resulting in a decision making vacuum. In this vacuum, the problems were 
‘solved’ by focusing heavily on the risk calculations and matching the two safety standards IR 
and GR.
These insights imply that, in general terms, risk management in the Netherlands is 
based on the classification of simple risk problems: risk norms are determined by policy rules 
and the role of (routine) risk management is to ensure that this policy is enforced. This makes 
sense from a Dutch policy perspective as, in environmental terms, command and control is 
often arranged with norms that have to be lived up to. However, these analyses also lead to 
believe that external safety issues in practice are much more complex, uncertain and 
ambiguous than originally intended by government officials.
Problem analysis: two group decision room sessions
The experts consulted in both GDR sessions underpinned these insights. They were also quite 
critical about the current external safety policy. A range of problems regarding the present 
safety framework was mentioned based on a structured consultation of experts using the GDR 
methodology. Their opinions and experiences were summarised into six categories, each of 
which reflects a certain consensus on the origin of the problem. The problems are related to:
1) The use of norms
2) The risk calculation model/arithmetical issues
3) The perception of risk
4) Unclear transport flows and transport volumes
5) Problems related to governance issues
6) Problems related to conflicting interests
It can be concluded that various aspects of the institutional framing of external safety policy 
seem to contribute to the increase of complexity and uncertainty in the context of risk 
management. The GDR sessions also confirm that the analytical tools that are prescribed and 
applied do not seem to offer a very solid support, since these tools are developed for a context 
where risks are basically treated as simple decision problems risks, assuming relatively low 
complexity and no serious uncertainty.
The findings of the previous two analyses suggest a series of problems of a practical 
and institutional nature. The challenge for the remainder of this study was to formulate a 
scientifically sound answer to the identified problems. Such an answer should be elaborated 
by pursuing at least three goals that are more or less directly related to the key problems. The 
first goal was to come up with a new perspective on decision making concerning the 
management of risks related to urban planning in areas facing transport of hazardous 
materials. Inherent to this view on decision-making is a shift from focusing on the 
hypothetical optimal solution in relation to a calculated norm to a focus on a satisfactory 
solution for the particular circumstances. Consequently, the nature of decision-making shifts 
from a technical optimisation approach to a process approach where structuring the debate 
with relevant stakeholders with different interests and preferences is crucial and where not the 
technical optimum but social satisfaction is the main criterion for achieving success.
Other identified problems seemed to have their origin in the way the institutions are 
arranged. The main problem here is the dominant role that the free transport of goods
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principle has on risks. This creates a situation in which actors defend their interests rather than 
trying to have a constructive debate on making urban areas or rail transport safer. Related to 
the first goal therefore is the second goal: to reduce the imbalance in (institutional) influence 
of the urban planning policy sector, the transport policy sector and the external safety policy 
sector on the risk level development in local situations. This imbalance between international 
interests (transport operation companies), national interests (rail infrastructure provider) and 
local interests (municipal authority) frustrates the debate between the stakeholders.
As economic motives for the local authorities generally dominate compared to safety, 
for example, the present situation often results in a debate on who should pay the costs of 
reducing risks or even on who is responsible for reducing risks in the first place. The third 
goal is therefore related to the previous one in the sense that the adapted perspective on risk 
management and the improved institutional balance should enable all stakeholders to take 
better responsibility for the outcome of decision-making for the local situation than the 
present approach does. To change this in a positive way implies providing the stakeholders (in 
particular local authorities) with the means to propose attractive solutions with broad support 
and the information to make trade-offs for the best of the local situation.
Towards an alternative risk management perspective
The importance of the formulated goals not only lies in the fact that risk management should 
not be about merely comparing situations to a norm or that local authorities need to facilitate 
and deal with transported materials, but it should also be about an institutional framework that 
enhances a fair and balanced decision process for all actors. This leads to the idea that another 
way of managing risks is necessary in order to create an adapted institutional framework. 
Adaptations should therefore be made to the institutional framework, focussing on how to 
facilitate methods for collecting information on risks and at the same time create possibilities 
for stakeholders involved in the decision making process to assess and manage risks properly. 
In order to intervene, I suggested that this might be done by means of institutional redesign.
The institutional redesign should take into account the earlier formulated goals for the 
framework which were then ‘translated’ into four institutional principles:
- Risks should be calculated in relative rather than absolute terms.
- A stand-still principle should be implemented for the increase of risks due to urban 
development/redevelopment.
- Increasing safety by risk mitigation should be rewarded by enabling urban 
development.
- Risks should be reduced as far as is reasonably practical (ALARP) supported by a 
model assessing the cost-effectiveness of risk mitigating measures.
The resulting institutional framework was assumed to have an impact on the decision-making 
processes. Given these rules, a decision-making process should involve the following steps:
- If a local authority wishes to develop/redevelop or intensify its territory near a rail 
transport axis, it should make an early assessment of how this will influence the risks 
from the start of the design process in a relative way.
- If the risks increase due to the planned activity, the local authority should reduce the 
risk to the level before the activity was planned by implementing risk mitigating 
measures or, if needed, compensate other actors and persuade them to implement 
measures.
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- To help the local authority decide how to reduce these risks, the reasonability ratio of 
risk-mitigating measures may be used to ensure that the municipality spends its money 
well and has made a well-informed safety decision.
- Both effect and risk-reducing measures can be taken to mitigate risks. It should also be 
possible for a local authority to pay others to take risk-mitigating measures.
- If it is impossible to mitigate risks, a project cannot be carried out or should be 
adapted.
The possible effects of an adapted institutional framework
These institutional principles were then tested in two gaming simulations. The overall goal of 
the testing phase was to gain insight into whether the proposed institutional framework could 
improve the quality of the decision making process related to urban development plans and 
risk management. I therefore wanted to measure whether there was a measurable difference 
between the outcomes of decision making given the present institutional framework versus 
the proposed framework. More specifically, the expectation was that by applying the 
principles of the adapted institutional framework, the real-world actors should encounter 
fewer problems concerning the planning of urban development projects compared to the 
dominant way of working, and that both the decision making process itself and the 
participants’ understanding of the risks would improve. If this proved to be the case, it could 
be considered as an improvement of the present situation.
The primary goal was translated into three secondary or sub goals that were then 
operationalised in indicators for measurement. The first sub goal of the test was to investigate 
whether it was possible to build more real estate without increasing the risks or with possibly 
even reducing the risks. This goal reflected the potential benefits of the stand-still principle.
The second sub goal was to investigate whether the decision-making process itself 
improved with regard to reaching a decision. This was interpreted in terms of the question 
whether decision-makers use more and better targeted information on which to base their 
decisions. This effect was expected to be the result of the decision supportive use of the risk 
calculation model and the cost-effectiveness model. Further, I wanted to investigate whether 
improved information helped stakeholders to reach consensus on the details of the plan for the 
area to be developed more easily. This sub goal reflected the potential benefits of the relative 
use of risk calculations and the application of the cost-effectiveness model as a specification 
of the ALARP principle.
The third sub goal was to investigate the extent to which the participants showed an 
improved understanding of the impact of their plans or projects on risks. Also, it was 
necessary to investigate whether they had a good account of the effect of possible risk 
mitigating measures. It was therefore important to find out whether the local authorities were 
better able to explain to residents what they planned to do in order to achieve acceptable 
levels of risk. Furthermore the question was whether they more readily accepted responsibility 
for the initial risk increase caused by the rise in population resulting from new urban 
development plans and whether they took responsibility for reducing those risks. This third 
sub goal related to the idea that the actor involved should take responsibility for the extra risk 
caused by their urban planning project. Moreover, this reflects the polluter pays principle/risk 
mitigation rewarding principle.
Results of the gaming simulations
Based on two gaming simulations, one in the city of Roosendaal and one in the city of 
Dordrecht, it was possible to discern the differences and similarities between the findings in
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the two simulations. Both cases were chosen because the actual situation, based on the present 
institutional framework, shows many characteristics of a deadlock situation. In the end it can 
be concluded that:
- Local authorities appeared to have more possibilities to redevelop their territory than 
assumed given the deadlock situation.
- Redevelopment of the urban area did not necessarily increase risks.
- It is even possible to reduce risks to a lower level than in the original situation.
- Modelling risk at the site gave the participants improved insight into the consequences 
of their aspirations for the level of risks.
- Participants used the cost-effectiveness model as extra input for reaching a decision, 
and valued this as useful.
- The gaming resulted in a basis for an arrangement among the participants on what 
they wanted to create and what risk mitigating measures should be taken.
- The participants felt better able to explain and defend such an arrangement to the 
residents of their city.
- Consequently, the participants appeared willing to take responsibility for the urban 
development and risk-reduction plans.
In the case of both Roosendaal and Dordrecht, a significant increase in risks was expected as a 
result of the initial plans for urban development. The situation in Roosendaal appeared to be 
more complex than that in Dordrecht. This difference can be explained by the fact that the two 
areas are different in shape and size. Nevertheless, even in this difficult situation it was 
possible to reduce risks and redevelop the station area. In Dordrecht it proved easier to reduce 
risks. In both cases, based on a combination of measures, risks were reduced compared to the 
initial situation and it appeared possible to adhere to the stand-still principle. Therefore, the 
redevelopment of the urban areas did not necessarily increase risks if measures were taken to 
mitigate those risks.
The participants stated that the gaming-simulation and the application of the described 
principles and support tools created a simple and clear setting in which the safety effects of 
urban plans could be assessed in an early stage of decision-making, and thus be taken into 
account before the plans were finalised. The presentation of the results provided them with 
extra insight into their actions. The respondents also stated that they were optimistic about the 
potential use of the cost-effectiveness model. Especially in the Dordrecht case, it helped to 
gain insight into the consequences of various measures and to reach consensus more easily.
In particular, the participants in Roosendaal clearly noted that the plans could more 
easily be accounted for vis-à-vis the city’s residents. In Dordrecht, the participants mentioned 
that the approach made it easier to explain the plans and the associated risks to residents and 
other parties, including the mayor and alderman. In both cases, the participants were 
enthusiastic and stated that they would be willing to take risk-reduction measures in order to 
be able to carry out their projects. This -  and the fact that they were able to account for the 
risks they cause and mitigate -  implies that they are willing to take responsibility for the 
urban development project.
Given these findings, it can be concluded that in these cases it is likely that the 
adapted institutional framework led to an improved decision-making process on risks. The 
result was that the participants could more easily cope with the complexity and uncertainty of 
decision making. The main indicator for this is that all three secondary goals were achieved: it 
appeared possible to come up with a more ambitious building programme, combined with 
compliance to the stand-still principle and better informed decision makers who have a better 
understanding of the risks caused by their ambitions and plans.
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Recommendations
The adapted framework makes it easier to identify who is responsible for what. There is also 
more incentive to continuously improve safety, due to the principle that risk-mitigating actors 
should be rewarded for their actions by supporting their decisions with a model for the 
reasonability of risk-reduction measures. As a result, the transparency of decisions improves. 
Therefore, my first recommendation is to implement this adapted institutional framework.
My second recommendation is that an effort should be made to further quantify the 
potential effects of safety measures in order to improve the appraisal of risks. At the moment, 
there are only a limited number of measures that can be easily quantified in that respect. At 
the same time, there are numerous measures that can be taken and that are assumed to have a 
risk-reducing effect. Such measures include blast-resistant outer walls, special drainage 
gutters for flammable liquids, improving people’s preparedness and installing better 
extinguishing facilities. Although this is a difficult task, it is necessary for good decision- 
support.
The third recommendation is to implement gaming simulations into normal 
consultancy practice. The participants in our test cases highly valued the way in which they 
could interactively devise new ideas for urban planning while mitigating risks. The graphs 
and figures presented to them were highly effective in creating a better understanding of the 
problems at hand, while the plans also received strong support. Such simulations would 
highly improve the advice that consultants give to their customers.
Finally, the Dordrecht case proved that building in different densities (i.e. moving the 
large tower from directly alongside the railway to a location beyond the 200  metre zone) can 
reduce risks significantly. This can be related to the concept of safety-integrated design, 
which implies that safety can be improved dramatically by taking into account safety 
measures on different levels of scale, namely the building level, the neighbourhood level and 
the city level. As a basis for discussion, however, this concept lacks an empirical foundation 
and is not grounded on the quantification of the ideas. I therefore recommend combining the 
specifics of safety-integrated design with the first two recommendations in order to improve 
urban design on a quantified basis.
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